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Since the end of the Cold War, a dynamic has become apparent that does 
not conform to our deeply held notions of the state’s monopoly of war. For 
example, the United States has been at war for a decade, but the wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq do not entirely match our conventional understanding 
of what constitutes war. Do nonstate actors get to engage the armed forces 
of a great power as peer rivals? In the past two decades, the United Nations 
has underwritten more peacemaking or peacekeeping missions than in all of 
its prior history since 1945. Are these operations within the purview of war 
or peace? Students of war, violence, and the modern world have discovered 
a paradigm shift since the end of the Cold War, although it could be argued 
that the foundations of the old order started to crumble even as the Second 
World War came to a close in the Asia-Pacific theater.1 A school of thought is 
emerging that considers the wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries “new wars,” defined by a burst of organized violence outside the 
framework of the state and its military.2 This may denote a new historical 
epoch, one in which the state’s monopoly of significant violence, which had 
defined the political history of the West and the expansion of its empires since 
the seventeenth century, no longer applies. Anticolonial groups waging wars 
of national liberation had begun to erode that monopoly even in the earliest 
years of the Cold War era, but climactic events such as the Battle of Mogadi-
shu in 1993 and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, have served as 
stark and visual signs of a new age. 
Western observers and policymakers have taken the state’s monopoly of 
violence for granted, which has affected the ways in which they have related 
to instability and threats. A century ago, Max Weber defined the modern 
state as the sole legitimate wielder of power and violence. That definition was 
based on a long history of European princely states and nation-states that had 
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developed ever greater bureaucratic reach since the early modern age, when 
fundamental changes in warfare and society led to centralized state power. 
There may be debate over whether “war made the state and the state made 
war,” as the sociologist Charles Tilly famously proposed in the 1970s, but 
there can be little doubt about the power of the European state model and its 
global projection in the age of empire.3 And yet, while modern state structures 
also emerged outside of Europe, the monopoly of violence as fundamental 
definition hardly fit even the United States, surely a European offspring, until 
the First World War.4 And in Europe itself, the basis for legitimacy changed 
in the second half of the twentieth century from the warfare state to a civilian 
state, which thrives on economic integration and interdependency, on com-
merce and welfare, not on war.5 This suggests that successful states can be 
transformed, but it also suggests that both stability and prosperity are crucial 
pillars. Sadly, that leaves much of the world in a precarious position as the 
state’s monopoly of violence has been eroded in the past decades.
The assumption of the post–Cold War years, following either realist 
theory or humanitarian instincts, that outside intervention could establish 
stability, which in turn would lead to a return of legitimate government—
ideally in a democratic form—has proved to be tenuous at best.6 And yet, 
what is the global community to do when a regime collapses, as in Egypt; 
civil war erupts, as in Libya or Syria; ethnic tensions flare up, as in the 
former Yugoslavia; or warlords and rebel groups threaten the fabric of the 
state, as in Somalia and elsewhere in Africa? One response, traced in several 
contributions to this volume, asserts the responsibility of the global com-
munity to intervene and protect the population on the basis of the modern 
human rights regime. The question, however, also raised in these pages, is 
how to establish stability and legitimacy as outsiders and at what point and 
with what means to intervene. From the perspective of a military historian, 
it appears that the division of the world into a zone of peace and a zone 
of conflict is a rather grim reality that is based on the tremendous gap in 
prosperity more than it is rooted in political ideology or the desire to adjust 
borders that colonial powers once drew up too randomly.7 The fundamental 
question that needs to be considered carefully is what alternative sources of 
legitimacy exist for the state and for society.
How much anarchy in the international system can we tolerate? I suspect 
the answer would be none until we considered the flip side of the question: 
How much order can we afford to pay for? How should the West, or the 
United States, or the somewhat diffuse global community respond to the chal-
lenges posed to the state by military threats, political and economic decline, or 
social fragmentation? Idealists might propose primary emphasis on nongov-
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ernmental organizations that can operate in conflict zones or poor regions of 
the world without some of the encumbrance that comes with official diplo-
macy. Yet the commentator David Brooks surely has a point, even as he states 
it with some degree of polemics: 
It’s hard not to feel inspired by all these idealists, but their service religion 
does have some shortcomings. In the first place, many of these social en-
trepreneurs think they can evade politics. They have little faith in the po-
litical process and believe that real change happens on the ground beneath 
it. That’s a delusion. You can cram all the nongovernmental organizations 
you want into a country, but if there is no rule of law and if the ruling class 
is predatory then your achievements won’t add up to much.8 
The ideal course of action, then, could be a combination of early recogni-
tion of sociopolitical, economic, or other fundamental crises, state and NGO 
engagement, and military intervention as a course of last resort.
At the Baker Peace Conference in the spring of 2011, scholars probed ques-
tions of failed and failing states, fragile and vulnerable societies, and the ap-
propriate international response in contemporary history and in the present 
day. In his keynote address, Gen. Anthony Zinni, former commander of US 
Central Command and an astute observer of the greater Middle East and 
of matters of national and international security, presented a wide-ranging 
overview of the problem. From the perspective of the practitioner, as both a 
military professional and a peace mediator since his retirement from the Ma-
rine Corps, Zinni offered the fundamental lesson that the best intervention 
is an early intervention (i.e., he proposed that outside forces should invest 
in economic growth, education, and social and political stability to prevent 
states from failing and societies from fragmenting). He expressed great con-
cern about the American propensity to deploy the armed forces as nation-
builders, which in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East has led to the image of 
an American as a uniformed soldier, while other foreigners are more likely to 
appear in the business attire of an investor, engineer, or educator. Zinni related 
his frustration as a regional commander with those in the United States who 
were not willing to authorize fairly limited spending on foreign aid, but would 
later support and underwrite much more expensive military operations.9
The problems that have led to the weakening and failure of states can stem 
from a depletion of natural resources, collapse of the legitimacy of a ruling 
party or individual leader, global economic developments, and a whole host 
of local issues. These are by no means new phenomena, but the apparent sta-
bility and binary nature of the Cold War tended to overshadow the poverty 
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and erosion of power in much of the Third World.10 As General Zinni put it, 
during the Cold War both the United States and the Soviet Union “bought 
these problems off.” Part of the payments arrived in the form of weapon sys-
tems that are still being used in the brutal wars in Eastern and Central Africa; 
and, of course, we are all too keenly aware of the indebtedness of Afghan 
mujahideen groups to the Carter and Reagan administrations, a fact that 
has not kept them from fighting NATO and notably the American occupi-
ers with a ferocity similar to that with which they fought the Soviets in the 
1980s. But these are the bigger wars in an age where organized violence below 
the level of interstate or even intrastate warfare threatens the nature and sta-
bility of the international system, where local warlords make common cause 
with crime syndicates, where smugglers help finance perpetual violence, and 
where business investments and much humanitarian aid is deflected into the 
coffers of the warring factions. And, most grimly, civilians make the most 
accessible and lucrative targets. Violence in weakening or failed states, in 
short, resembles “ethnic cleansing” more than it resembles “war”; and control 
over resources and territory relies on fear more than it depends on legitimate 
government. 
It is critically important to assess the challenges posed by weakening states 
and fragmenting societies. What causes state failure? Can the symptoms be 
detected early enough and will the global community develop the political 
determination to act on that recognition? Should outside powers unilaterally 
intervene, or should the global community design intervention mechanisms? 
At the symposium a fault line became visible between historians and politi-
cal and social scientists on these issues. The former suggested that every case 
is different and requires careful consideration that might, in some instances, 
lead to the decision to stay out of the downward spiral of a state because it 
is not apparent that intervention would do any good. The latter tended to 
emphasize the need to develop overarching policies that should be universally 
applicable. The surprise was the emergence of a consensus among those across 
disciplinary boundaries who study conditions in failing states that new sources 
of stability and legitimacy can evolve locally; that society in places like Somalia 
or Yemen may find ways to keep some villages, towns, or regions out of the 
vortex. And yet, from an international perspective, state failure poses a major 
threat not only to vulnerable people on the ground, but also to the world 
economy, if shipping routes see increased activity by pirates operating from 
bases in Somalia or Indonesia and Malaysia; and to international security, if 
terrorists find safe havens in Afghanistan, the autonomous tribal borderlands 
of Pakistan, or Yemen. Realists and idealists surely can find common ground 
in assessing the depth and the manifestations of the problem. Whether they 
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can find common ground in advising policymakers to intervene, and how and 
when to do so, appears much less certain. 
In part 1, David Carment and Yiagadeesen Samy present a rich and de-
tailed global analysis of what constitutes a fragile state, while T. David Curp 
provides a case study of the convulsions of the wars in former Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s. 
David Carment and Yiagadeesen Samy’s collaboration highlights the 
malleability of terms such as “failed state” and “fragile state.” The two au-
thors suggest we should use the latter, which is more inclusive and perhaps 
also less controversial. Fragile states are on the brink of collapse in any one—
or more—of three areas: effective and responsive governance, authority over 
people and territory, and capacity of the economy and of resource mobiliza-
tion. Carment and Samy’s research identifies anywhere from thirty to fifty 
fragile states around the world today that suffer from political, social, and 
economic instability, as well as from the lack of legitimacy of their authori-
tarian regimes. They note that there are similarities within regions: fragile 
states in sub-Saharan Africa are more likely to be faced by failing economies; 
the weakness and the vulnerability of Middle Eastern and South Asian states 
tend to stem from regimes that are often deemed illegitimate by significant 
parts of the populace. Drawing heavily on the statistical research of the Coun-
try Indicators for Foreign Policy project at Carleton University, Carment and 
Samy present three specific case studies—Haiti, Pakistan, and Yemen—that 
illustrate some of the different ways in which states can become vulnerable to 
a high degree of fragility. They argue that fragility of a state is an evolving pro-
cess that should be closely monitored so that the international community can 
determine ways in which to help local actors. Carment and Samy conclude 
that doing so will require preparedness to engage early on in prevention rather 
than late in intervention, and it will require integrated research criteria across 
disciplines and policy-advice mechanisms across national borders.
T. David Curp reminds us of the wars of dissolution in the former Yugo-
slavia, a primary example of what Mary Kaldor has called “new wars,” and he 
concludes that the optimism underlying Carment’s study may be misplaced 
in particular cases. Specifically, Curp considers the aftermath of the brutal 
fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the inherent difficulty of establishing a 
sovereign state in a territory comprising Bosnian Muslims, Serbs, and Cro-
ats, who continue to eye one another with great suspicion and hatred born 
from historical and recent experiences. Bosnia posed a challenge to outsiders 
who in principle wanted to intervene and stop the killing in the early 1990s, 
because it made plain that one of the foundational notions of humanitarian 
interventionism might not be universally applicable: we cannot assume that 
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it is possible to separate enemy peoples, and we may have to face the reality 
that intervention requires choosing sides. Curp implies that what stability the 
1995 Dayton Accords have helped to establish in Bosnia-Herzegovina may 
rest on the disquieting fact that most of the ethnic-cleansing projects of all 
combatants had in fact been completed by the time the political agreement 
was signed. He further argues that outside intervention, though driven by the 
best intentions and pursued in the name of human rights, has caused just as 
much harm as good in superimposing legal and political systems that do not 
fit the environment. Most pessimistically, Curp concludes that developments 
in Kosovo strongly suggest that the West’s failure in Bosnia was not unique 
and that there are deeper underlying problems. It may be that the peculiar and 
particularly volatile mix of ancient hatreds, ethnic tensions, religious divides, 
and contemporary violence in the Balkans has shown us the outer limits of the 
modern human rights regime; but Curp suspects that reflexive humanitarian 
interventionism may be partially to blame, and he questions whether Euro-
pean leaders have thought through the consequences of their actions.
In part 2, Jonathan House, James Carter, and Vanda Felbab-Brown consider 
a range of responses, from humanitarian intervention and nation-building, to 
counterinsurgency and war, to the challenge posed to international security 
and human rights by state collapse. 
Jonathan House, in an essay on the recent past and projected future of war-
fare, offers further insight into that unsettling question. House draws a careful 
distinction between insurgencies that are inspired by Mao Tse-tung’s patient 
strategy of protracted war built on asymmetrical warfare by guerrillas or other 
local forces and older forms of “compound warfare,” in which guerrillas oper-
ate alongside regular armed forces. The Vietnamese Communists, House sug-
gests, offer a modern example for the latter. From a contemporary American 
perspective, of course, it is crucial to develop successful counterinsurgency 
methods. Here, House draws on historical examples that offer a range of re-
sponses, from brutal repression in dictatorships to the complex “Afghan math” 
at present, which highlights that indiscriminate killing of insurgents stokes 
the fires of the uprising. Fortunately, modern counterinsurgents have learned 
from the past and commonly apply an assumption that their insurgent foes 
are not all fighting for the same reasons and purpose. Consequently, in to-
day’s population-centric counterinsurgency approach, it should be possible, 
if exceedingly difficult, to appeal to that majority of the people who will fight 
only when compelled by circumstances or fear. In short, if it is possible to 
provide security at the local level, the hard core of insurgents will be starved 
of support, supply, and reinforcements. House draws on the Vietnam War 
as an example of the attempt to create positive outcomes through the closer 
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integration of civilian nation-building, counterterrorism, and military efforts 
from 1967 forward. House concludes that interpreting the past helps us come 
to a better understanding of the present—and to better anticipate the threats 
and demands of the near future—but it cannot offer firm solutions. We can 
safely assume that insurgencies and asymmetrical warfare will be with us for 
some time to come, but local circumstances do not conform to rigid doctrine. 
The quintessential problem remains: the insurgent wins if he doesn’t lose; the 
counterinsurgent has to win decisively so as to avoid a long, grinding, frustrat-
ing path to defeat.
James Carter reveals the close integration of the military-industrial com-
plex of the Cold War era and private contractors in contemporary US foreign 
policy and in military interventions. He traces the roots of that pattern back 
to the Vietnam War, when private corporations were tasked with building the 
infrastructure and much of the logistics that permitted large-scale warfare in 
an underdeveloped country. While they contributed to the waging of war, 
contractors also played a critical role in the nation-building efforts. Carter’s 
essay suggests that this dichotomy persists in the wars of our time. Indeed, he 
shows how the relationship between the military and defense contractors has 
grown ever more intimate since the 1960s, and he points at the fundamental 
problems of control and accountability of contractors, who do not have to 
abide by the same rules as the armed forces. Instead of suffering from a draw-
down after the Cold War, contractors gained a greater role in the increasingly 
ambitious strategy of the United States, wherein fewer soldiers, sailors, air-
men, and marines were asked to project power around the world. Contractors 
filled critical functions not only in the areas of arms manufacture and logistics, 
but also in what the public still generally regards as core military missions. 
To illustrate the continuities since the Vietnam War, and to show the growth 
of the military-industrial-contractor nexus, Carter considers in particular the 
role played by dozens of corporations in security and nation-building efforts 
in Iraq after the 2003 invasion. As he points out, more than $50 billion worth 
of contracts were awarded to some 150 private firms for work in Iraq and 
Afghanistan in 2003 alone. The persistent influence of contractors, and the 
continuing phenomenon of war profiteering, raises serious questions about 
how we conceive of the roles of the state and its armed forces and of capital-
ist ventures in war. Carter’s contribution strongly suggests that there is little 
novelty in how the United States pursues the “new wars” of the twenty-first 
century. Aren’t we still trying to solve the question of how to win in Vietnam?
Vanda Felbab-Brown argues that while it makes good sense to consider the 
wars of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries through the lens of 
asymmetric warfare, this phenomenon has manifested itself in quite different 
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ways, and even the assumption that we won’t see interstate wars in the near 
future appears difficult to support. Consequently, policymakers and military 
commanders alike need to weigh the lessons of the past very carefully in order 
not to fall prey to rigid misreading of the present. Felbab-Brown reminds us 
that religion and ideology have served as motivating factors for challengers of 
the established order, but she cautions that a historically determinist view of 
quasi-religious wars between civilizations does not capture reality. New tech-
nologies, particularly in the field of communications, and the vulnerability of 
cyberspace introduce further complexity to international security and to the 
stability of the nation-state. The upshot of Felbab-Brown’s erudite discussion 
is the increasing spectrum of war and violence and the resulting concern that 
conventional military force and counterinsurgency capability cannot address 
the whole range. This is particularly apparent in the responses of Mexico, Co-
lombia, Jamaica, and other countries to crime, a de facto insurgency by drug 
cartels, and escalating gang violence. In those cases, the state has been on the 
defensive in efforts to rein in illicit economies, which have done great harm 
to national prosperity, and in providing basic security for its citizens. Felbab-
Brown concludes that the intertwining of crime, terrorism, and insurgency is 
dependent on local conditions and that historical and contemporary examples 
suggest the need for muscular peacekeeping on the ground and for careful 
intelligence gathering rather than for reliance on airpower and offshore strikes 
to topple an odious regime. Decisions on the nature of peacekeeping have to 
be made in advance of military intervention, so that the occupying forces can 
utilize the initial readiness of local population to cooperate against those who 
would thrive from instability and fear. Felbab-Brown ultimately reminds us 
that long-term stability requires both local consent and international engage-
ment, and she suggests that intervention in local crises needs to be comple-
mented by rigorous actions against the most rapacious transnational networks 
and crime syndicates.
In part 3, Robert Rotberg and Ken Menkhaus suggest two rather different 
systemic responses to state failure. 
In “Odious and Failed States, Humanitarian Responses,” Robert Rotberg 
advances the forceful argument that the world’s great powers and international 
institutions have a responsibility to intervene in failing states on humanitarian 
grounds. His definition of what constitutes state failure is shaped by a belief 
in the universal appeal of democracy and human rights, and he suggests that 
states that attack and abuse their own citizens and subjects are highly likely 
to suffer from irreparable social stress and economic decline. Rotberg labels 
the most repressive regimes “odious,” and he suggests that they are bound to 
collapse, which further increases the vulnerability of their already oppressed 
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and abused people. He is concerned with two fundamental issues: Should 
the world community intervene before an odious state collapses and perhaps 
fragments? And, can we agree on a responsibility-to-protect doctrine? Rotberg 
considers regimes that one may call the usual suspects, North Korea, Burma, 
and Zimbabwe prominently among them; and he discusses the upheaval in 
North Africa and the Middle East as the most recent—and in some cases 
still ongoing—example of the domestic and international ramifications of the 
slide of odious regimes into failed states. He argues that the international com-
munity should act against those that place themselves outside the modern hu-
man rights regime. In a conflict between sovereignty and justice, he suggests, 
the global community should emphasize the latter. Doing so will strengthen 
the humanitarian foundation of the modern world and help ensure stability 
in a fragile world order.
Ken Menkhaus offers a reflective essay on the local response to state fail-
ure in Somalia that proposes an important corrective to the generally deeply 
pessimistic assumptions of what happens when a state collapses. Apocalyptic 
visions of outsiders and hyperbole of casual observers notwithstanding, the 
lack of central governance and the breakdown of what we consider to be the 
fundamental functions of the modern state—security and law and order— 
have not led to outright anarchy in all parts of the country. Instead, Menkhaus 
shows that there are alternative sources for at least a degree of stability based 
on customary law, communal voluntarism, and creative ways to establish se-
curity and allow local economies to grow. But if local communities may pro-
vide “governance without government,” in Menkhaus’s words, could they also 
serve as the nucleus for new state structures? That is, could there be an organic 
response to state failure that would allow for measured engagement rather 
than outside intervention? Yet his discussion of the emergence of a radical 
Islamist regime also suggests that any local recovery remains fragile, and in-
formal governance may require protection by military force. 
The themes and policy dilemmas raised in this volume underscore that the 
global community cannot effectively create or maintain absolute security for 
all. On the other hand, our instinctive response to the images of murder, rap-
ine behavior of militias or soldiers, and a steady flow of refugees that have ac-
companied wars and violent conflicts in the past decades equally suggests that 
we cannot idly stand by. And yet we have to come to terms with the complex 
reality that has characterized recent wars around the globe and that has made 
it very difficult to know exactly when and how to intervene. The still-ongoing 
civil war in Syria offers a case in point. The most striking commonality in 
these essays appears to be an appeal for education and careful analysis, based 
equally on forecasting models and on cultural and historical awareness. Most 
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importantly, we can draw the conclusion that great powers and nongovern-
mental actors within the global community have to integrate local, regional, 
and even global responses into a coherent strategy that would allow for success 
in the “wars” on drugs, terror, poverty, and crime. If prosperity is indeed the 
main indicator for peace and stability, then the best responses to state failure 
and resulting or concurrent upheavals can neither stop at installing a new po-
litical regime nor be confined within national borders.
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The Future of War
Understanding Fragile States and  
What to Do about Them
David Carment and Yiagadeesen Samy
INtRoductIoN
“Fragility” is not a term typically applied to countries as dissimilar as Haiti, 
Pakistan, and Yemen. Yet each is fragile in its own unique way. Yemen ranks 
poorly using legitimacy standards, which include measures of gender equity, 
political representation, human rights, and rule of law, among others. Paki-
stan is a poor performer in political and social development and is plagued 
by low-intensity turmoil, political instability, and other internal challenges to 
its authority structures. A more typical choice for a high-ranking fragile state 
would be Haiti, and, indeed, this is a country that suffers from weaknesses 
in multiple areas of political and social performance but is especially weak 
in economic capacity. Depending on the specific point in time at which one 
examines each of these states, they could also be described as “weak,” “failing,” 
or “failed” states (see fig. 1 on page 4).
In comparing these three examples, we can see that some states more easily 
fit our understanding of what we think a fragile state should be. These are 
states that have typically fallen into complete collapse brought on by “man-
made” calamity, such as civil war or a mismanaged economy, sometimes ex-
acerbated by environmental degradation or natural disasters. These states are, 
despite international efforts, utterly incapable of managing their political and 
economic space. 
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State fragility can also be understood as a composite measure of all aspects 
of state performance, resulting in those countries that are typically “failed” 
being ranked at the top of the list. This list would be recognized by most 
policymakers and academics; indeed, if one surveys the vast literature on fra-
gility and the various rankings available, it is clear that such lists do not vary 
that much in terms of which countries appear at the top. There are thirty to 
fifty so-called “fragile” states, most of which are experiencing or have expe-
rienced large-scale violence and suffer from internal challenges to their au-
thority structures. 
State fragility is also an unfolding and ultimately indeterminate process 
associated with a subset of performance standards. More generally, the eco-
nomic capacity problems that beset the fragile states of sub-Saharan Africa are 
distinct from the legitimacy and authority problems of the fragile states of the 
Middle East and South Asia. 
The definition of “fragility” that we use in our research called the Country 
Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP) project (www.carleton.ca/cifp) rests upon 
conceptualizations and measures that are relative. Some states may be strong 
by certain measures and weak by others. The proper referents for understand-
ing state fragility include not only a state’s own past, present, and future per-
formance in absolute terms, but also its performance relative to other states 
Figure 1: Fragile States Venn Diagram
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at any given point. The rate of change, which is understood by examining a 
state’s relative performance, whether progressive or regressive, tells us whether 
a state is moving toward increasing fragility or whether its situation is improv-
ing. In other words, structural characteristics and measures of performance are 
useful for understanding state fragility only if there are appropriate reference 
cases with which to compare. And since these reference points are themselves 
evolving over time, it is important to understand that “fragility” is a relative 
term and has meaning only with respect to state performance at specific points 
in comparison with a given state’s peers. Figure 1 identifies how fragility fits 
into our understanding of related concepts. We can see that fragility encom-
passes more specific concepts such as failed, collapsed, and weak states and 
overlaps with but is not equivalent to developing and democratizing states.
In brief, fragility is not an “end state” such as failure or collapse; properly 
understood, it is a convergence of structural changes and processes that arise 
under specific conditions that are evolving over time. Fragility is a measure 
of the extent to which the actual practices and capacities of states differ from 
their idealized image. It is a matter of degree, not kind. It is intended to be a 
general term, one within which related, though more specific terms, including 
“weakness,” “failure,” and “collapse,” may be located. Fragility is a measure of 
the extent to which the actual institutions, functions, and political processes 
of a state accord with the strong image of sovereign state, the one reified in 
both state theory and international law. By this definition, all states are to 
some extent fragile; this is a closer representation of reality than an arbitrary 
line, however drawn, between weak and strong or resilient and vulnerable. 
Obviously, some countries have sufficiently robust capabilities across all 
vital dimensions of stateness such that we would not apply the adjective “frag-
ile” to them, even as some states are so challenged across various measures that 
few observers would argue that they are anything but fragile. To put it bluntly, 
no one will disagree that the failed state of Somalia is extremely weak and 
dysfunctional across several structural characteristics. 
The three core structural parameters for understanding fragility are au-
thority, legitimacy, and capacity (represented by the acronym ALC). First, 
there is the development or economic capacity problem. Populations living 
in fragile states are further from achieving the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) than any others on the planet. Among all developing nations, 
though they comprise roughly one-sixth of the world population, fragile states 
by various definitions account for a disproportionate amount of the absolute 
poor, of children who do not receive a primary education, of children who die 
before their fifth birthdays, of maternal deaths, of people living with HIV/
AIDS, and of people lacking safe drinking water.
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“Capacity” refers to the potential for a state to mobilize and employ resources 
toward productive ends. Its actual ability to do so is captured through our mea-
sures of authority and legitimacy. States lacking in capacity may prove unable 
to respond effectively to sudden shocks such as natural disasters, epidemics, 
food shortages, or refugee flows. They may not have sufficient resources to feed, 
clothe, and educate their population, particularly in the presence of exogenous 
shocks of all kinds, whether domestic or international, whether natural or hu-
man in origin. They may therefore be heavily reliant upon civil society and the 
international community in such situations. Key measures of capacity include 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, education, human development, in-
fant and maternal mortality, literacy, disaster risk, arable land, and energy con-
sumption (from a total basket of about twenty indicators).
Second, there is the authority problem, namely, the inability to control 
both people and territory. Since the end of the Cold War, fragile states have 
overwhelmingly been the locus of much of the world’s violence, both conflict-
related and otherwise. Today, however, politically motivated civil conflict is not 
the only source of violence and instability in fragile states; fear of criminal and 
drug-related violence has come to dominate these states and their neighbors, 
surpassing concerns regarding terrorism, civil war, and international conflict. 
A state that does not fulfill the most basic obligations of authority is a state 
whose leadership does not have the means and credibility to compel internal 
order or to deter or repel external aggression. In addition, that leadership does 
not, or cannot, provide sufficiently for the people to attract minimal sufficient 
domestic support. Fragility begins when the central state starts to deteriorate, 
leading to the fractionalization of society, with loyalties shifting from the state 
to traditional communities that seem to offer better protection. 
The parameter of “authority” captures the extent to which a state possesses 
the abilities to enact binding legislation over a population, to exercise coercive 
force over its sovereign territory, to provide core public goods, and to provide 
a stable and secure environment to its citizens and communities. States lacking 
in authority may be unable to exercise control over the full extent of their legal 
territory; such states will likely have difficulty responding effectively to threats, 
whether internal or external. In some areas, nonstate actors such as rebel militias 
or criminal organizations may possess de facto authority; in others, the rule of 
law may be completely absent. Border control may be intermittent or nonex-
istent, enabling illicit flows of people and goods. Essential government services 
may be either underprovided or privatized. Other potential problems include 
the inability to enforce government policy, combat corruption and criminality, 
effectively mobilize the resources of the state toward the ends requested and 
required by government, regulate private markets, or guarantee contracts. 
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Key measures include: rule of law, economic growth, internal rebellion, 
border disputes, size of the informal economy, paying taxes, military expen-
ditures, political stability, terrorism, refugees hosted, and regulatory quality 
(from a basket of about twenty-five total indicators).
Finally, there is the legitimacy problem. When it comes to practicing effec-
tive governance, many fragile states lack the legitimacy to be effective and re-
sponsive policymakers. To be sure, while there are still some deeply entrenched 
and often predatory regimes among those states we call fragile, many simply 
reflect a disengaged population weary of governments incapable of providing 
basic services and a legal system that makes contractual relationships, property 
rights, and respect for human rights untenable. Fragile states need an institu-
tional architecture for consolidated and sustainable political competition that 
ensures elites are answerable to the people they serve. 
The emergence of state disorder is due to the failure of prevailing socie-
tal values to legitimize existing divisions of labor and political order. Percep-
tions and expectations are essential determinants of how a society views and 
reacts to state policy. In some cases, fragile states are in transitional stages in 
which existing ideologies fail to legitimize the positions of various actors in 
a hierarchical social structure. Under such conditions, the result can be the 
breakdown of the social and political orders. In the context of state fragility, 
the destruction of national identities stands in the way of acquiring shared 
values that could provide a basis for intergroup cooperation and recognition of 
a common authority. The obstacles to contractual or hierarchical solutions to 
the problem of mutual noncooperation are analogous: both the trust required 
for a contract and the legitimacy needed for stable authoritative hierarchy will 
be elusive when state-society relations are weak.
The legitimacy parameter refers to the extent to which a state commands 
public loyalty to the governing regime, and the extent to which domestic sup-
port is generated for that government’s legislation and policy. Such support 
must be created through a voluntary and reciprocal arrangement of effective 
governance and citizenship founded upon broadly accepted principles of gov-
ernment selection and succession that is recognized both locally and inter-
nationally. States in which the ruling regime lacks either broad and voluntary 
domestic support or general international recognition suffer a lack of legiti-
macy. Such states face significant difficulties in maintaining peaceful relations 
among various communities within the state; any security found within the 
state is likely the result of coercion rather than popular consent. As a result, 
such states are inherently vulnerable to internal upheaval, and must be con-
sidered fragile as a result. Key measures of legitimacy include gender equality, 
level of democracy, minority rights, civil and political rights, freedom of the 
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press, corruption and transparency and accountability, and international cov-
enants on human rights (from a basket of about fifteen total indicators).1
PRofIles of fRagIlIty
Let us return now to the three examples cited at the beginning of this paper. 
Our motivation for choosing these cases is that they are almost always listed 
among the most fragile states when one examines the various annual rankings 
produced by different organizations, including CIFP. Yet a closer examina-
tion of the underlying factors leading to fragility in these states (see below) 
indicates that they are also each unique in their own way. In this section, we 
will thus identify the various risk factors that contribute to making these three 
states fragile, highlight some trends regarding their changes over time, and 
identify some policy options for external actors. We will then conclude with 
some general recommendations for policymakers. In an effort to illustrate the 
tripartite approach discussed above, each profile highlights particular areas of 
state weakness: Pakistan’s authority challenges, Haiti’s capacity challenges, and 
Yemen’s legitimacy challenges. To be sure, each of these countries has weak-
nesses in all three areas, but, again, it is notable that these countries are distinct 
in the way their fragility is manifested.
PakIstaN: the PIvotal state 
In January 2008, following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, an Economist 
editorial argued that democracy offered the best chance for bringing stability 
to what the magazine called “the world’s most dangerous place.” Pakistan’s 
intricate relationship with Afghanistan makes it particularly important as a 
pivotal state in the War on Terror. To be sure, both Afghanistan and Pakistan 
have taken divergent paths in nation-building. For example, whereas Afghani-
stan is a true client state, Pakistan tends toward the bureaucratic authoritarian, 
with a largely untaxed middle class that benefits from a lax financial system, 
and a strong military apparatus that has proved the most incapable of deliver-
ing emergency services. Although governance is a primary area of weakness 
throughout the region, particularly with regard to inclusiveness, transparency, 
and accountability, security concerns, both domestic and regional, under-
mine attempts to strengthen Pakistan’s internal governance structures. The 
grievances of many of the groups engaged in violent conflict in Pakistan stem 
largely from frustrations with its system of governance. 
Pakistan belongs to a group of second-tier countries, which, though not 
being outright failures, are particularly vulnerable in certain aspects of “state-
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ness.” CIFP’s rankings have placed Pakistan in the top twenty fragile states 
in the world in most years during the past two decades. On the one hand, 
as Pakistan’s inability to control internal conflict, environmental degrada-
tion, and a highly unequal society increases over time, the legitimacy of the 
government continues to erode and challenges from within increase. Indeed, 
historically, aid to Pakistan has been used to shore up a centralized authority 
structure, whether it was perceived to be legitimate or not. That reinforced 
authority structure, a kind of bureaucratic authoritarianism, has been in place 
since the 1950s.
On the other hand, the risks that Pakistan poses to its neighbors have 
been shaped by its historical rivalry with India. Pakistan’s behavior, specifi-
cally in reference to Kashmir, was, until it acquired its own nuclear weapons, 
formed by the need to counterbalance Indian military superiority. Beyond 
Kashmir, the news does not get any better. In addition to supporting separat-
ist movements and terrorist attacks in India, Pakistan has provided sanctuary 
and training, as well as arms, to other hotbeds of conflict throughout Asia, 
including Sri Lanka, southern Thailand, and of course to the mujahideen in 
Afghanistan during the war against Russian occupation.
More fundamental analyses suggest that the risks Pakistan poses lie in the 
need to externalize internal tensions through territorial expansion and con-
quest—what MIT professor Myron Weiner called many years ago the “Mace-
donian Syndrome.”2 This argument is based on the assumption that the only 
way to hold together an ethnically fractionalized and artificial country like 
Pakistan is through strong-arm leadership. The key attributes are a highly cen-
tralized government, heavy investment in the military security apparatus, and 
a very weak middle class. 
In essence Pakistan’s problems are to a large extent self-created. An analysis 
of the country’s underlying risk shows that it faces significant performance 
challenges in all but a few of its core state functions. Of particular concern are 
its governance and human development scores, low even when compared to 
others in the region. It is both weak and unstable and ranks as the third-most-
fragile state in Asia. It is particularly weak in authority—ranked fourth in 
Asia by our measurements because of security challenges presented by various 
armed militant groups, and this despite receiving massive military aid from 
the United States since the 9/11 attacks. Further, the government has been 
unable to extend control throughout the country, and faces secessionist move-
ments from tribal and militant groups. State legitimacy is also problematic, as 
attempts to retain control of the government and army draw protests from nu-
merous quarters. The country has had an average of more than one hundred 
bombings a year during the last several years. 
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To be sure, Pakistan’s capacity is also a high-risk area. The capacity of the state 
to respond to the needs of the population is weak. Although growth rates in per 
capita terms have been mostly positive since the 1990s, at an average of nearly 
2 percent, poverty remains a growing problem. According to the latest Human 
Development Report, 60 percent of Pakistan’s population lives on less than $2 
a day, and 23 percent on less than $1.25 a day. The country is ranked in the 
medium human development category, only a few ranks above countries such as 
Angola, Madagascar, and Haiti. It faces a range of development challenges in the 
areas of education, health, and respect for human rights, despite receiving more 
than US$44 billion in foreign aid since 1960 (our calculations using World 
Bank data). Pakistan will most likely not meet its MDGs in primary education 
and gender equality, nor in child and maternal mortality.
Less than 2 percent of Pakistan’s population pays income tax—the result 
of loopholes in the system, corruption, and the protection of special interests 
among others—so that the country’s revenue from taxes is one of the lowest 
in the world. The absence of an efficient tax system means that the wealthy 
are largely untaxed, thus preventing any meaningful redistribution of income 
or creation of a fiscal pact where government has to be accountable to its tax-
payers. Why tax and be accountable when aid, despite being volatile, keeps 
flowing in year after year? 
In addition, there are a number of militant groups in Pakistan, varying in size 
and strength from small tribal groups to national militant organizations. There 
are many pro-Taliban militant groups situated in North and South Waziristan 
and the North-West Frontier Province. These groups occasionally cooperate but 
are often engaged in low-intensity violent conflicts with other militant groups. 
With respect to sequencing, we can see that after Pakistan experienced 
internal violence over the last couple of years, there was an effort to 
shore up existing authority structures, no matter how weak they were, as 
a bulwark against further decline. Such an emphasis, exemplified in the 
United States’ long-term-aid program for Pakistan (as a result of its sup-
port for allies in the Global War on Terror), led to a distortion in both 
the selection of aid recipients in Pakistan and the type of aid provided. A 
large amount of aid has been given to Pakistan, a state with limited au-
thority and capacity, regardless of the legitimacy of the regime in power. 
The result is a deeply unpopular, nearly illegitimate regime, heavily de-
pendent on external aid that can be unstable over the long term. This 
“shoring up” of authority structures then results in a vicious cycle of 
further decline, where both capacity and legitimacy are undermined and 
in turn authority is further challenged (see fig. 2 on page 11).
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The negative reinforcement of Pakistan’s authority structures is 
achieved through an institutional system, political structure, and popu-
lar media in Pakistan that collectively reinforce the identity of state-
centric nationalism. The Pakistani state is not so much a subordinate 
to dominant ethnic groups but rather works in partnership with them. 
This partnership is reinforced when the state is challenged by regional 
minority groups, itself a response generated by assimilative pressures, 
policies on in-migration, economic competition, and, more recently, po-
litical threats of secession. 
The net result is a lethal “policy feedback” process, in which the cen-
tral government’s policies in Karachi, in the form of entitlements for the 
majority ethnic groups, induce minority groups to organize for political 
action. This challenge in turn generates greater resistance to change from 
the state-center. Simply put, the sequencing of Pakistan’s increasing fra-
gility appears to begin with a deterioration in its authority structures, 
which, rather than being adaptively modified in a positive way, are nega-
tively reinforced, with the consequence of increasing instability over the 
short run.
Is democracy a viable alternative for bringing stability to Pakistan? 
Though the country has flirted with democracy since independence, there 
is little reason to believe it will be a panacea. An opening up through 
democratization would create opportunities for increased challenges from 
within and the possibility that fundamentalists might win elections.
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No country is in a position to “fix” Pakistan. Changes must come from within. 
But there are good reasons for hastening and widening the integrated regional 
approach to stability called the “Dubai process.” Such an approach requires a 
frank assessment of how Pakistan and Afghanistan (and India) are historically 
interlinked, how Pakistan has historically been the source of much of the in-
stability in the region, and recognition that the current strategy on Pakistan 
is not working. Most importantly, it means understanding that Pakistan’s in-
ternal problems are fundamentally linked to core problems in governance and 
human development. 
If Pakistan fails, the costs will be immense. Research conducted by Lisa 
Chauvet, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler has shown that ignoring frag-
ile states can be extremely expensive in terms of development, as well as for 
neighboring countries and the international community.3 These authors esti-
mate the annual cost of failing states to be more than twice the amount of aid 
being distributed globally, with most of the cost being inflicted on neighbor-
ing countries. It is far more expensive to invest in rebuilding failed states than 
to monitor and take appropriate preventive action in fragile environments. A 
strategy of reacting to events is clearly not sustainable in the long run. Pakistan 
is a good example of a situation where preventive strategies focused on pro-
moting good governance and human development must be applied.
haItI: fRagIlIty as vulNeRabIlIty
Since its independence, Haiti has had a troubled economy. Even by historical 
standards, however, its recent experiences have been particularly traumatic. 
It is the only non-African country other than Afghanistan that is consis-
tently ranked among the top ten most fragile states. In fact, Haiti has failed 
to achieve any real growth and development over the last several decades. Its 
GDP per capita in 2008 of US$1,087 was roughly half of what it was in 
1980, and life expectancy at birth is at sixty-one years; the corresponding 
numbers for its immediate neighbor, the Dominican Republic, are US$7,600 
and seventy-two years. Haiti received US$8.9 billion in foreign aid over the 
period of 1960 to 2008, yet it is ranked 149th out of 182 countries on the lat-
est human development index (HDI), with 72 percent of its population living 
on less than $2 a day and 42 percent not using an improved water source.4 In 
addition to Haiti’s many poverty-driven problems, there are also issues related 
to the extreme inequality that exists in the country. Haiti has an extremely 
small, mostly French-speaking elite that dominates much of the country’s as-
sets; most measurements of income inequality place Haiti at or near the bot-
tom of the list of developing countries. 
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The difficulties that Haiti faced in the immediate aftermath of the 2010 
earthquake in terms of rescue efforts and aid coordination on the ground 
stemmed from deep underlying weaknesses in governance, human develop-
ment, economic development, and security that were in place many decades 
before the earthquake struck. Poverty and fragility meant that security was 
never guaranteed, that property rights had been virtually nonexistent, that 
there were no building codes, that construction-quality standards were not 
respected, and that successive governments were too weak to enforce whatever 
standard was in place. For most of its contemporary history, Haiti’s govern-
ments and leaders have failed to provide security to their people, to promote 
economic freedom, or to encourage entrepreneurship. The result is an ex-
tremely weak formal economy with entrenched corruption that is heavily de-
pendent on external assistance, and a large informal sector where most people 
are barely surviving.
Much of the extreme degradation of Haiti’s environment, particularly its 
level of deforestation, can be explained by demographic factors; the deforesta-
tion is also a direct result of the levels of poverty in the country. For decades, 
rural Haitians have been forced to turn to local forests as a source for cooking 
fuel in the absence of reliable and affordable alternatives. In 2000, the island 
nation had 880 square kilometers of forest, covering just 3.2 percent of the total 
land area. The remaining forest was disappearing at a rate exceeding 5 percent 
per year.5 Without significant tree cover, the land cannot absorb even moderate 
levels of rainfall. Thus, whereas other nations may not be unduly disturbed by a 
given storm, Haiti is likely to be deeply affected. When intense phenomena such 
as tropical storms hit the country, the results are inevitably tragic. 
Haiti also suffers from a range of macroeconomic problems, including an 
extreme and chronic lack of liquidity. Its levels of foreign direct investment and 
foreign aid improved somewhat in the latter half of the 1990s but collapsed 
again in the wake of Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s 2000 reelection and the resulting 
American decision to suspend all bilateral aid. Aid flows have been on the rise 
again in the past few years. Haiti’s industry has gradually decayed since the 
early 1990s and was only recently slightly revived through the Hemispheric 
Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement (HOPE) Act. Haiti’s other 
traditional exports are largely agricultural, including cash crops such as sug-
arcane, coffee, and mangoes. These continue to suffer due to international 
agricultural tariffs, as well as increased competition from new market players 
such as Vietnam. There are few other sources of economic growth within the 
country; as a result, Haitians have had to increasingly turn to other sources of 
income, including international remittances and, in more extreme cases, illicit 
activities such as corruption, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. Transparency 
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International ranked Haiti 168th out of 180 countries in its 2009 corruption 
perceptions index, which measures the perceived level of public-sector corrup-
tion. Criminal activities are becoming increasingly transnational in character; 
the activities of Haitian organized-crime gangs are becoming a matter of in-
creasing importance for Canada.6
Despite seeing a large part of its debt written off as a result of reaching the 
completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, 
Haiti still owed US$1.25 billion in 2009 (according to IMF data). Of this 
amount, the biggest creditors were the Inter-American Development Bank 
(34 percent) and Venezuela’s Petrocaribe (24 percent).7 However, following 
the earthquake, President Hugo Chávez announced that Venezuela would 
cancel Haiti’s debt. Given Haiti’s poor track record, one has to wonder what 
all those loans and remittances have accomplished. 
Corruption and lack of independence within the judicial system also con-
tribute to the instability of the political system, further weakening government 
checks and balances. With no independent body able to review government 
actions, Haitians have little choice but to hope that the elected president re-
mains committed to democracy and broad-based economic growth. Although 
Haiti features a relatively rural population by regional standards, the capital of 
Port-au-Prince tends to dominate political decision making within the coun-
try. As a result, many regions are excluded from efforts to enhance economic 
and social benefits; this increases discontent and reduces the legitimacy of 
the central government. Further, although the government of Haiti ostensibly 
controls all areas of the country, in reality many rural jurisdictions are in fact 
under the de facto control of local individuals or groups. In some cases, these 
groups use this control to dominate the local population. 
In 2005, the entire Haitian diaspora sent US$985 million home in the 
form of remittances, contributing the equivalent of one-fourth of Haiti’s 
GDP. The diaspora helps alleviate poverty by sending money to friends and 
family, but also by providing them with goods for private consumption or 
retail. Although the Haitian population uses an important part of remittances 
sent to buy consumer goods, only a small percentage of the money is saved, 
invested, or spent on services with positive externalities such as education and 
basic health care. The question as to why there has been only a minimal im-
pact on social capital in Haiti can be answered by considering that the Haitian 
national government has not encouraged senders and recipients of remittances 
to save and invest in supporting good governance because the country receives 
so much in aid to do precisely that. A functioning banking and legal system 
free of corruption and with lower transaction costs would also increase the 
benefits linked to remittances. For example, transfer costs and transaction fees 
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are currently high and can amount to more than 5 percent of the money trans-
ferred in the form of remittances.
Despite immense remittance flows finding their way into households, the 
net impact of diaspora groups on the political process in Haiti has been some-
what ambiguous and counterproductive. That is because, in the case of Haiti, 
overly partisan political engagement by the diaspora group has encouraged 
more intransigent behavior by homeland politicians. This is true for most 
countries with a history of deep social divisions or open conflict, but excep-
tional in the case of Haiti. For example, beyond the political and economic 
activities that remittances might support, there is also the issue of crime fi-
nancing in diaspora communities, and the potential for migrant groups to 
bring with them criminal patterns from their country of origin when they 
immigrate. Despite continuing debate regarding the true impact of criminal 
deportees on crime in Haiti, there are nonetheless firm reasons to suspect 
some connection. In essence, the practice by Canada and the United States 
of deporting convicted criminals to Haiti might be termed trade in human 
criminal capital. The potential exists for such criminals to use the skills and 
knowledge acquired in the host country to manipulate immigration systems, 
illegally reentering the country and acting as a criminal entrepreneur, thus fa-
cilitating activity between host and home countries, to the detriment of both.8 
Haiti’s performance has been appalling when compared to the global sample 
of countries. It was ranked among the top ten fragile states during the period 
1983–1994, among the top twenty for most of the period of 1995–2003, and 
again among the top ten during the period of 2004–2007; its fragility score 
has deteriorated by 20 percent over the full period. The small gains that were 
made in rare periods of relative stability were quickly erased as a result of a 
combination of political instability, poor economic policies, and natural disas-
ters. Let us examine figure 3 below, keeping in mind that just as in figure 2, an 
increasing trend is associated with increasing fragility and deterioration in the 
ALC components. Capacity scores have always been very high (poor) in the 
case of Haiti and are also the least susceptible to rapid fluctuations. However, 
authority structures have worsened so much, followed by legitimacy, that they 
are now largely responsible for the fragility of the country. Except for capacity 
scores, there is a clear upward trend line in all other components. 
In the case of Haiti, the situation was improving in the two years prior to 
the 2010 earthquake. In particular, improvements in authority structures and 
the political sphere were, to a certain extent, offsetting the country’s poor eco-
nomic performance. However, the earthquake’s devastating effects have caused 
the situation in the country to deteriorate again. Specifically, we see increasing 
problems in governance, security and crime, human development, and the 
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environment, and only a very minor improvement in economic performance. 
A key goal in rebuilding the country should be increased capacity, focusing 
on economic development, and reinstating and creating basic services to its 
people. Second, providing security through proxy in order to reestablish effec-
tive authority and control over territories and people will be essential. Finally, 
only after authority and capacity have been stabilized should democracy be re-
introduced to the country. After all, how is it that a leadership that was utterly 
incapable of providing for its people before and during the earthquake can be 
considered legitimate? It will take years if not decades to introduce less cor-
rupt forms of leadership to Haiti. In summary, we have evidence of volatility 
and quick reversal in the case of Haiti, where rapid gains quickly evaporated 
as a result of an exogenous shock exacerbated by the lack of a functioning 
economy and a weak political system.
yemeN: tRIPle thReat
In 2010, Yemen started to give way to internal stresses that had built up over 
the past decade. Not only is the Arab world’s poorest nation challenged by 
mass protests of the kind that toppled tyrants in Egypt and Tunisia, brought 
civil war to Libya, and forced concessions from oil-rich despots in Bahrain and 
Saudi Arabia, it is home to a resurgent al-Qaeda, a northern Shiite uprising, 
and a revived southern secessionist movement. The 1990 North-South unifi-
cation is proving to be untenable. The country could easily disintegrate into 
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three or more pieces. Today, Yemen has replaced Afghanistan as the most im-
portant al-Qaeda stronghold in the world. Many of that organization’s most 
dangerous operations have originated in Yemen. Judging from their recent 
actions, the extremists are both motivated and highly capable.9 
Yemen’s underlying sources of conflict and instability are impossible to 
solve over the short run. The country is running out of oil and water. Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, in power for more than thirty years, proved incapable of hold-
ing the country together without extreme force. Transitioning Yemen toward 
a more democratic system will only mean a hardening of tribal divisions and a 
deepening of the corruption, clientelism, and cronyism that are rife through-
out the country. 
Yemen’s political authority, economic capacity, and regime legitimacy expe-
rienced modest improvements in the mid-1990s, but since 2000 have seen an 
alarming deterioration (see fig. 4 on page 19). Yemen’s risk profile represents 
a country that has few positive economic, social, and political attributes. The 
country suffers from an underdeveloped and haphazard rule of law, uneven 
and inequitable economic development dividing the North and the South, an 
extremely corrupt civil service and judiciary, a weak educational system, poor 
service delivery, and a government struggling to control excessive spending on 
the military. Its leaders are heavily dependent on foreign aid to finance budget 
deficits and development programs. Yemen’s taxation system, as in the case of 
Pakistan’s and perhaps worse, is almost nonexistent, meaning the government 
is accountable to no one. Its agricultural sector is under threat due to water 
scarcity and a chronic inability to buy inputs such as fertilizer, putting at risk 
more than half of the country’s economically active population who work in 
agriculture.
Even before the country transformed into a sanctuary for extremists, Ye-
men was one of the poorest in the world. It ranks 133rd out of 169 on the 
human development index, with a per capita GDP of about $1,000 compared 
to an average of about $26,000 for the other Gulf states. Yemen’s GDP annual 
growth average of 2.6 percent is far below the regional average of 5.9 percent. 
Literacy and life expectancy are among the lowest in the world. There is a 
plethora of small arms scattered among Yemen’s diverse tribal peoples, making 
security a major challenge. Adding to these problems, Yemen has a very high 
population growth rate of 3.46 percent and an extremely large “youth bulge” 
of 46.4 percent.10 More than 18 percent of its total labor force is unemployed, 
especially in urban areas. The urban population is growing at a rate double 
that of the total population, and city infrastructure is increasingly unable to 
handle that growth. Nearly half of Yemen’s population lives below the poverty 
line with a daily income of $2. Although many natural resources are located in 
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the South, a reduced portion of public funds from an unsympathetic govern-
ment leaves them hindered by grinding poverty. An analysis of Yemen’s budget 
shows that the regime’s priority has been military spending, an area dominated 
by Saleh’s relatives. Military expenditures are typically four times the amount 
spent on health care. 
Oil accounts for almost 90 percent of export earnings and around 70 per-
cent of government revenue, making the country susceptible to internal shocks 
such as droughts and floods and external shocks such as oil prices. Based on 
current trends, oil reserves are expected to be depleted within fifteen years.11 
Yemen is one of the most water-scarce regions in the world, with water tables 
falling by about two meters a year, a rate of extraction that exceeds precipita-
tion by about 70 percent. Without corrective action, groundwater supplies in 
Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, are expected to be exhausted very soon and already are 
unsafe to drink. Some fifty thousand Somalis flee to Yemen each year, leading 
to the diffusion of their conflicts. Outbreaks of violence within refugee camps 
are contributing to Yemen’s instability.
The 1990 unification of the “republican” North Yemen with the formerly 
Marxist South Yemen was followed rapidly by civil war in 1994. That conflict 
ensured the domination of Saleh’s Northern forces and his tribe’s control of 
the country’s political institutions. Since then, Saleh has established an intri-
cate network of patron-client relations in the North, while largely ignoring 
the economically weaker South. Saleh’s government is heavily influenced by 
al-Qaeda Arabs, jihadists who fought for him in the 1994 civil war after their 
return from Afghanistan. Today, Bin Laden supporters are thought to be in 
positions of influence in the military and the government. Saleh also faces 
rebellion in the North from a band of very capable Shiite rebels in the Saada 
region on the border with Saudi Arabia.
There is some urgency to the situation for the people of both Yemen and 
the West. The country has become the center of al-Qaeda operations for at-
tacks on the United States, including the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole 
in Aden, the failed targeting of CIA agents in 2010, and two attacks on the 
US Embassy in Sanaa in 2008. South Yemen–based al-Qaeda leader Anwar 
al-Awlaki, an engineer with US-Yemen dual citizenship, was implicated in 
the November 2009 Fort Hood shootings, the attempted bombing of a US 
aircraft in Detroit on Christmas Day 2009, and indirectly to the Times Square 
bombing attempt of 2010. Anwar al-Awlaki was killed in a drone attack on 
September 30, 2011, in Yemen. 
In response, the Obama administration has made a more secure and stable 
Yemen an administrative priority, insisting that the country improve its efforts 
to track down al-Qaeda operatives in the South. The collusion between Saleh’s 
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military and al-Qaeda is seen as a major impediment to progress in that area, 
so, using a blueprint suggestive of the United States’ approach to Afghanistan 
and Iraq, the administration is focusing on root causes. When she visited the 
country last year, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that her gov-
ernment wanted a broader security relationship with Yemen beyond fighting 
extremists by tackling the sources of Yemen’s fragility such as poverty and cor-
ruption. Between 2006 and 2010, US military assistance to Yemen has totaled 
about US$250 million. In 2010, military and civilian aid was almost evenly 
split and combined for about US$300 million and will increase in 2011.
If Yemen continues on its current trajectory, it will become a failed state 
in less than two years, and, depending on the actions of opposition forces 
and their supporters, collapse could come sooner. Yemen’s implosion would 
have a significant impact on Saudi Arabia, itself feeling the direct effects of 
upheaval in the North. Failure would also give al-Qaeda unprecedented op-
erational space in the South. For that reason the United States is reluctant 
to create a power vacuum by pressuring Saleh to step down (the US has not 
signaled that Saleh should resign as they did with Mubarak and Gadhafi). It 
has been suggested that giving the opposition greater opportunities in advance 
of the elections planned for 2013 might lead to an immediate reduction of 
tensions. Accommodation, democratization, and decentralization are often 
seen as solutions for moving a country away from authoritarianism. After all, 
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democracy appears to be the path deemed suitable for some of Yemen’s Arab 
neighbors. Yet there is little reason to believe democracy offers a way out for 
Yemen. Most of the country’s major institutions are controlled by President 
Saleh and are largely dysfunctional. There remains a deep economic and po-
litical divide between the privileged North and the impoverished South. The 
gap between popular expectations and authoritarian rule looms so large in Ye-
men, it is doubtful that reform-minded movements like the kind we saw play 
out in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and Jordan could succeed without significant 
international involvement. The country is simply too poor and too divided 
and Saleh’s tribe too powerful.
Looking forward, we can anticipate that Saleh will continue to collabo-
rate with the United States for self-serving reasons: to maintain his control 
of power, to obtain access to foreign aid, and to use the cover of antiterror-
ism efforts to oppress opposition to his regime. The government’s ongoing 
complicity with al-Qaeda is troubling, but it may also serve to co-opt some 
extremists. The problem is that the process of deradicalization may take years 
to succeed. The crux of the issue is that Yemen, like much of the Middle East, 
has an authoritarian leader clinging to control well past his due date, and there 
are no viable alternatives for keeping the country together.
Since the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC, on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, which were facilitated through the support of al-Qaeda by the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the world has realized that weak and failed 
states pose a threat not only to their own people but also to the security of 
other countries and the international community. In our extremely inter-
connected world, we can no longer allow countries to descend into chaos 
without expecting some of that to affect the rest of the world. 
Yemen was the most fragile state in the Middle East and North Africa 
according to data from 2009—a year before the beginning of the Arab upris-
ing that has since swept across the region.12 In fact, it is consistently ranked 
among the ten most fragile states in the world. Table 1 below shows how 
Yemen stacks up against the Middle East and North African countries (the 
MENA region is made up of twenty-one countries). Most have become po-
litically or economically unstable for different reasons. Their social indicators 
such as life expectancy and primary school completion rates are not dire when 
compared, for example, to some of the countries in the sub-Saharan African 
region, yet protest and war are on the rise. The table shows that these protests 
and conflicts are related to legitimacy rather than to pure economic and po-
litical problems; the regional average for legitimacy is worse than the global 
average. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and Tunisia are to some extent fragile 
in their own unique ways. Yet both perform disappointingly in the basket of 
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legitimacy standards, which include measures of gender equity, political repre-
sentation, human rights, and rule of law. 
PolIcy RecommeNdatIoNs
Security, Development and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap Between Theory 
and Policy13 emphasizes the multidimensional and multifaceted nature of the 
“fragile” state and highlights the need for continuous assessment and moni-
toring of countries at risk in order to be able to intervene before they begin 
to fail, and gives suggestions on how to transition them from fragility to sus-
tainable and stable states when they begin to recover. The book also shows a 
disconcerting upward trend in fragility over time, despite increasing amounts 
of resources being devoted to fragile states. In particular, there is a widening 
gap between the most fragile and the most wealthy states.
Needless to say, there are numerous challenges to state-building that arise 
in the modern context, including risks of ethnic conflict, challenges to eco-
nomic development, and regional instability. First, leaders must ensure that 
they have institutions to provide adequate services to the population. Second, 
they must find ways to properly channel ethnic, social, and ideological com-
petition that will otherwise erode the effectiveness of weak institutions even 
more. Finally, leaders must find a way to overcome the cumulative effects of 
poverty, overpopulation, rural flight, and rapid urbanization, as well as envi-
ronmental degradation, which can otherwise overwhelm a vulnerable state’s 
legitimacy. Rebuilding fragile states is a function of the policies leaders choose. 
Narrow policies favoring one group are less sound than broad distributive 
ones. In severe cases, the state must ensure that on the one hand, it has the ca-
pacity to respond to crises produced by uneven ethnic mobilization and social 
change, and that on the other hand, it does not become the dominating force 
providing differential advantages to regions and ethnic groups. 
Although state-building is primarily a domestic process that involves lo-
cal actors, the role of international actors is still very important. The donor 
community can contribute to supporting and facilitating political and insti-
tutional processes in order to strengthen the basis for resilience through pre-
vention, mediation, and support of underlying structures. This might include 
political settlements, working to underpin the responsiveness of the state to 
effectively fulfill its principal functions in providing key services, and support-
ing legitimate forms of societal political pressures that will determine how a 
state should function. 
First, given the aforementioned conceptualization of fragility as being multi-
dimensional, it follows that varying policy responses are required and need to be 
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contextualized. In our own work, we have found that except for the most severe 
cases of fragility, countries are rarely extremely deficient in all of their ALC com-
ponents. Such an observation underscores the variety of ways in which states 
exhibit fragility, and supports the utility of the ALC approach in highlighting 
different situations. We have also found it extremely helpful to profile countries 
along different clusters that include governance, economics, security and crime, 
human development, demography, and environment. It is not uncommon for 
countries with relatively similar fragility scores to behave quite differently along 
these different indicator clusters, thus further highlighting strengths and weak-
nesses, as well as entry points for policy actions. Furthermore, using quantita-
tive indicators at the structural level, in combination with dynamic analysis or 
events-based monitoring and qualitative assessments that are timely in order to 
provide a full picture of what is happening in-country, can provide further nu-
ance and contextualization for policy actions. 
Second, although “doing no harm” makes sense in theory as a principle, 
in reality the practice is quite different. As an example, consider the recent 
elections that were held in the extremely fragile state of Haiti, where the 
underlying assumption (and source of confusion) is that democratic elections 
can buy legitimacy. All that these elections have done has been to further de-
Table 1: Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Rankings
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stabilize a country that has hardly recovered from the tragic January 12, 2010, 
earthquake. In fact, only a quarter of Haiti’s registered voters turned out for 
the elections, which were reported to have cost around US$30 million, and 
the first-round results were subjected to much criticism. It would have made 
far more sense to strengthen state institutions and work with the current, 
albeit weak, government to deliver basic services to the population, and gradu-
ally build legitimacy before holding elections later. 
Third, and related to the second point, the timing and the sequencing of 
policies are crucial. On the one hand, focusing on state-building as the main 
objective, as recommended by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), makes sense, but only for those countries where 
legitimacy is weak. On the other hand, some states can be strong but lacking 
in capacity; after all, many democracies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
have been overthrown and replaced by authoritarian regimes because of their 
failure to deliver economic development. Two findings from our work are 
crucial here. To the extent that the level of development is a highly significant 
determinant of fragility, growth should be prioritized, even if other factors 
such as regime type and trade openness matter. Furthermore, in the most se-
vere cases of fragility, where sudden changes in authority structures are highly 
destabilizing and independent of changes in capacity structures, specific in-
struments targeting individual weaknesses are required, rather than focusing 
on security and hoping development will follow. 
However, in situations where fragility is not extreme, strategic timing and 
preventive diplomacy may be more appropriate for particular areas because of 
the positive feedback that they create for other weak areas. Our point is not to 
disagree with state-building as a concept but to argue that interventions need 
to be context-specific and timed properly and strategically. 
Fourth, alignment with local priorities, coordination among international 
actors, acting fast but staying engaged for a long period of time, and avoid-
ing pockets of exclusion, as recommended by the OECD, are all sensible in 
theory. In practice, these objectives are far from being met. Although donors 
should strive to work with governments as much as possible to help them 
build legitimacy and capacity to deliver basic services, governments sometimes 
need to be bypassed and aid provided through different channels. Further-
more, aid dollars need to be systematically monitored by the deployment of 
impact-assessment tools, and we need to be ready to withdraw or suspend aid 
when results are not satisfactory. The proliferation of donor agencies and lack 
of coordination among them is still a pressing problem, leading to the duplica-
tion of efforts. In this respect, the use of multidonor trust funds, for example, 
should be further encouraged. 
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As far as avoiding exclusion, in looking at aid allocation among frag-
ile states, it is still the case that fragile states are underaided as a group when 
compared to other aid recipients. Within the group of the most fragile states, 
one can find both aid darlings and aid orphans, with some countries being over-
funded with respect to absorptive capacity. For example, the top five recipients 
of aid among the forty-three fragile states identified by the International Net-
work for Children and Families (INCAF) received more than half of the aid 
allocated in 2008, despite representing only about 20 percent of the population 
living in these fragile states. It is quite likely that some of these countries are re-
ceiving more aid than they can absorb effectively. In our view, too much empha-
sis is still placed, generally as well as in the case of fragile states, on the quantity, 
rather than the quality, of aid delivered. More specifically, the relationship be-
tween fragility and democracy in both countries is clearly complex, but suffice it 
to say that neither has enjoyed fully open participatory systems. Countries with 
highly functional democratic processes are indeed stable, but then so are deeply 
entrenched repressive regimes; Zimbabwe and Pakistan as partial democracies 
lie somewhere in between. Therein lies the problem, because the most unstable 
countries are those with moderate levels of democratic performance. This pres-
ents a challenge to efforts to move repressive regimes toward more open and par-
ticipatory forms of governance. One must understand the nature of the problem 
at hand in order to develop pragmatic policies that will target problems without 
setting off chain reactions of disturbance.14
These findings are intuitively plausible. Increased democratic participa-
tion in autocratic or authoritarian states may provide valuable guidance for 
government policy, not to mention reduce literal barriers to commerce such 
as restrictions on citizen movement or assembly. However, truly responsive 
democratic governments are more likely to produce policies addressing popu-
lar concerns that are not growth-focused, such as regional wealth distribution 
and social programming focusing on minority interests. This is not to say that 
democracy is a bad thing, only that it should not be treated as a magic bullet 
that will solve all of a developing country’s problems. Concentrating on ac-
countability, transparency, and predictable rules governing economic interaction is 
more likely to produce greater wealth and increased distribution. Higher lev-
els of wealth do correlate with stronger democracies, suggesting that putting 
elections ahead of growth may ultimately be an inefficient use of resources 
even if well-intentioned. Having examined some of the issues related to both 
sequencing and timing from a case-specific perspective, we now turn to an 
evaluation of the large sample empirics.
We have three recommendations for policymakers working in fragile-state 
situations. First, support policy-relevant analysis. It has been argued many 
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times before that a key problem in responding to fragility and failure is not 
the availability of information or, for that matter, the absence of early warning 
information, but the absence of a clear understanding of how to make diagno-
sis policy relevant. In this regard and as we have shown, risk analysis and early 
warning need to be practicable, standardized, and accessible. In other words, 
the absence of a clear understanding of how specific information fits within 
the operational capacities of the end user is the most significant constraint on 
effective conflict prevention. Properly understood policy-relevant diagnosis 
combines real-time dynamic analysis with structural information, matches the 
analysis to the operational capacity of the end user, and provides an evaluative 
framework for assessing policy impact.
Second, make prevention pay. Political will, or, more specifically, its ab-
sence, is the number one justification for failing to respond to impending and 
foreseeable disaster. Making prevention pay means that the costs (and risks) 
of inaction must be fully calculated and clearly communicated. It also means 
that institutional incentive structures must be better developed to ensure bet-
ter coordination across departments and between governments. Pooling of 
resources is one way to assist in the process of identifying costed options, but 
this must be achieved at both the micro and the macro levels. Coordination 
means that program officers from different departments should work effec-
tively together as a problem-solving team and not in isolation. 
Third, integrate findings and methodologies across research communities. 
There is a lot of good, mostly complementary, analysis, both in academe and 
advocacy circles, on fragility and failure. Some analysis and research finds its 
way into the policy community, but not much of it is linked together in a for-
mal institutionalized way with ongoing and secure funding. When it is used, 
fragility analysis tends be drawn on in an ad hoc and selective way. As a result, 
key findings remain underutilized, and researchers have little incentive to col-
laborate among themselves and with the policy community. More hazardous 
is a trend within government toward individually tailored in-house analytical 
tools, with each department advocating a distinct set of indicators, tool kits, 
and set of assumptions about causal connections that support their agendas.
Notes
1. CIFP uses statistical measures of the aforementioned ALC components cor-
responding to six different categories of state performance: economics, governance, 
security and crime, human development, demographics, and the environment. For 
definitions, rankings, and indicator measurement, see www.carleton.ca/cifp.
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3. See Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler, “The Cost of Failing States 
and the Limits to Sovereignty” (UNU-WIDER Research Paper, no. 2007-30).
4. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 
2009: Overcoming Barriers; Human Mobility and Development, http://hdr.undp.
org/en/content/human-development-report-2009.
5. FAO Newsroom, “Haiti at Crossroads,” December 18, 2006, http://www.
reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6WLL9Z?OpenDocument; and 
Sonia Verma, “Aid in Haïti a ‘Logistical Nightmare,’” Toronto Star, September 
25, 2004.
6. The above data and analysis draw directly from David Carment and Yiaga-
deesen Samy, “Haiti without Tears: Getting Aid Right,” Policy Options 31, no. 4 
(April 2010): 57–63.
7. See International Monetary Fund, “Haiti: Debt Statistics and IMF Support,” 
January 27, 2010, http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/2010/012710.htm.
8. Alexa Barrera, Sonia Bouffard, Andrew Harrington, and Per Unheim, “Ja-
maica: A Risk Assessment Brief,” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), 
February 2006, http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1241.pdf.
9. Portions of this analysis are drawn from David Carment, “The New Ter-
rorism: Understanding Yemen,” Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 
March 2011, www.cdfai.org.
10. For a full description of these indicators and the sources from which they 
are drawn, see Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), http://www.carleton 
.ca/cifp/ffs_indicator_descriptions.htm.
11. See Nicole Alie, Mahsa Hedayati, Amy Keuhl, and Nathan Lysons, “Ye-
men: A Risk Assessment Report,” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), 
2007, http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1338.pdf.
12. The data in this report shows that people are not demonstrating for just a 
lack of economic opportunity or poor social services. They have been challenging 
the very legitimacy of the regime itself. Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Institute, http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/Social%20Underpinnings%20of%20Unrest 
.pdf.
13. See David Carment, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy, Security, Devel-
opment, and the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy (New 
York: Routledge, 2010).
14. In autocratic countries, some democratic opening correlates with higher 
economic growth. However, research shows that in countries that enjoy low levels 
of democracy, further increases in political freedoms and responsiveness actually 
correlate with reduced economic growth. With these two ideas in mind, the an-
swer to whether democracy stimulates economic growth appears to depend on 
context; a little is good, but a little more may cause harm. 
 the Future of War 27
RefeReNces
Alie, Nicole, Mahsa Hedayati, Amy Keuhl, and Nathan Lysons. “Yemen: A Risk 
Assessment Report.” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), 2007. 
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1338.pdf.
Barrera, Alexa, Sonia Bouffard, Andrew Harrington, and Per Unheim. “Jamaica: 
A Risk Assessment Brief.” Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP), Feb-
ruary 2006. http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/app/serve.php/1241.pdf.
Carment, David. “The New Terrorism: Understanding Yemen.” Canadian De-
fence and Foreign Affairs Institute, March 2011. www.cdfai.org.
Carment, David, Stewart Prest, and Yiagadeesen Samy. Security, Development, and 
the Fragile State: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Policy. New York: Rout-
ledge, 2010.
Carment, David, and Yiagadeesen Samy. “Haiti without Tears: Getting Aid 
Right.” Policy Options 31, no. 4 (April 2010): 57–63.
Chauvet, Lisa, Paul Collier, and Anke Hoeffler. “The Cost of Failing States and 
the Limits to Sovereignty.” UNU-WIDER Research Paper, no. 2007-30.
FAO Newsroom. “Haiti at Crossroads,” December 18, 2006. http://www.reliefweb 
.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/EGUA-6WLL9Z?OpenDocument.
International Monetary Fund. “Haiti: Debt Statistics and IMF Support,” January 
27, 2010. http://www.imf.org/external/np/country/2010/012710.htm.
United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 2009: 
Overcoming Barriers; Human Mobility and Development. http://hdr.undp.org/
en/content/human-development-report-2009.
Verma, Sonia. “Aid in Haïti a ‘Logistical Nightmare.’” Toronto Star, September 
25, 2004.
Weiner, Myron. “The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of Inter-




Human Rights and Wrongs in Failed States
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the International Community, 
and the Challenges of Long-term Instability in 
Southeastern Europe
T. David Curp
Europe has no exit strategy for Bosnia.
—Gerhard Spörl, Spiegel 
In this chapter I will briefly survey both the recent history of and several key 
problems confronting the nested Matryoshka doll of weak and incompetent 
states currently attempting to exercise sovereignty in the former Bosnia—the 
(Serbian) Republika Srpska; the Muslim-Croat confederation (which is ef-
fectively divided between the de facto independent Croatian Herceg-Bosna 
statelet and a Bosnian Muslim/Bosniak ministate); the central government of 
Bosnia headquartered in Sarajevo; and the host of international bodies and 
NGOs tasked with peace-building and reconstruction. These states and the 
constellation of outside powers and organizations that seek to maintain the 
peace in Bosnia would seem eerily familiar to a bureaucrat of the Holy Roman 
Empire.1 
In Bosnia, leading European countries in cooperation with the United 
States appeared to have been so enamored of the options that Gen. Anthony 
Zinni has argued confront outsider powers contemplating a response to a 
civil war—that one must either not intervene, choose a side, or separate the 
parties—that they implemented all three, initially in that order. For more 
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than four years, from 1991 to 1995, divided Western policies and hesitancy 
to get involved led to an international paralysis that allowed the heavily armed 
Bosnian-Serbian nationalist factions to effectively conquer and ethnically 
cleanse much of the country. In 1995 Bosnian-Serbian atrocities, from the 
ongoing attacks on Sarajevo to the assaults on UN safe areas—particularly the 
massacre in Srebrenica—helped trigger a massive NATO intervention that 
forcibly brought the warring factions to peace talks at Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base in Dayton, Ohio—a place chosen in part because it was so bleak 
that the parties would be forced to focus on the work of peacemaking rather 
than enjoying the delights and distractions of a larger, better appointed urban 
environment.2 
The Dayton Accords (brokered in part with the indispensable assistance 
of both Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman ) resulted in a durable peace 
that set the stage for a massive NATO military presence in that country, saw 
the creation of a federal Bosnian constitution and government, and included 
an agreement by the various Bosnian factions to embrace a series of inter-
national objectives intended to put that country on the road to postwar re-
covery—including the right of refugees who had suffered ethnic cleansing to 
return to their homes. To support these ends, in addition to military forces, 
the European Union and the international community deployed a not-so-
small army of multinational organizations, NGOs, and quangos (quasi- 
nongovernmental organizations) to further the redevelopment of Bosnia. 
The result over the past fifteen years has been the creation of a (mostly) 
peaceful quagmire—highly expensive, deeply corrupt, and potentially quite 
volatile—such that Günter Verheugen, until recently a commissioner of the 
EU for more than a decade, remarked that Bosnia represents “an almost in-
soluble problem”3 for Europe.
How and why has the work of a whole range of well-funded and well-
intended initiatives failed so completely in Bosnia, and what are the results 
and implications of this failure? I will consider three distinct aspects of the 
problem: First, the ways in which the conduct of both local and international 
actors during and after Bosnia’s civil war created conditions that have created 
insoluble dilemmas for all concerned in achieving any of their core objectives. 
Second, I will examine three distinct areas where both indigenous and exog-
enous efforts to spur development and respect for human rights have done 
more harm than good in Bosnia—the provision of generous foreign aid and 
the ongoing internationally-sponsored prosecutions of war criminals, and the 
continued development of religious life. I will conclude by analyzing how 
these cumulative, expensive failures have built upon one another and suggest 
that there are larger and deeper failed-state problems in Europe than Bosnia 
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alone—problems rooted in both the humanitarian extremism and the dys-
functions of the European community.
a seRIes of uNfoRtuNate eveNts: the hIstoRy of yugoslavIa’s aNd 
bosNIa’s WaRtIme aNd PostWaR dIsINtegRatIoN 
If the international community is not willing to abide by its own prin-
ciples when faced with major difficulties, what can we expect from local 
politicians? (From the Council of Europe’s criticism of the reform of 
Bosnia’s judiciary by the Office of the High Representative)4
A thorough examination of the various problems created by Western indeci-
sion and the conduct of Bosnia’s civil war locally is outside the scope of this 
narrative. I will, however, draw attention to two aspects of the conflict that 
helped set the stage for some of Bosnia’s deeper postwar pathologies. The first 
of these is the relative military incompetence of the Izetbegović administration 
in Bosnia. It should be noted that this incompetence to some degree is very 
much to the credit of former president Alija Izetbegović, who (in an almost 
suicidal fashion) resisted until the last moment the militarization of Bosnia’s 
secession from Yugoslavia. Yet, while the efforts of Izetbegović to find a peace-
ful resolution to Bosnia’s move to independence demonstrated how ruthless 
was the Serbian effort to subvert democracy through force of arms, the effects 
of the president’s failures were deep and long-lasting. By actively hindering 
Bosniak self-defense through the surrender of arms to the Yugoslav People’s 
Army (henceforth JNA [Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija]), even as Serb forces 
began their attack on Bosnia in the summer of 1992, President Izetbegović 
effectively facilitated the Bosnian-Serb blitzkrieg that put over 70 percent of 
the area of the republic under Serb control by the fall of 1992.5 Furthermore, 
the failure to prepare for a military conflict—that both Serbian actions prior 
to the fall of Yugoslavia and JNA assaults on Slovenia and especially Croa-
tia had telegraphed (combined with the impact of the UN-sponsored arms 
embargo—see below), deepened both the Izetbegović administration’s depen-
dence upon criminal elements and further alienated Bosnian Croats (and even 
some Bosniaks)6 from the government in Sarajevo, setting the stage for the 
civil war that almost destroyed Bosnia within its first year of existence and 
further tied already strongly pro-Zagreb Bosnian Croatians more closely to the 
Tuđman regime than to Sarajevo. 
 Second, the role of the UN-sponsored, EU-supported arms blockade upon 
Bosnia and the international community played a key role in undermining 
the Bosnian state, facilitating Bosnian Serb victories, and increasing—if that 
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were possible—contempt for the UN both locally and internationally among 
those policymakers who effectively maneuvered around the embargo. The na-
ive and destructive belief that a blockade on arms would somehow help limit 
or contain the conflict did more than provide a major advantage to Serbian 
aggressors throughout most of the war—it also of necessity forced the Bosnian 
Croatian and Bosniak authorities and their ostensible Croatian allies to de-
velop smuggling networks that deepened the nexus between organized crime, 
national defense, and political power brokers in both communities.7 These 
ties have proved enduring and represent another major barrier to economic 
(and police) reform in Bosnia. Furthermore, the Clinton administration, 
which was deeply at odds with this policy, circumvented it through clandes-
tine contacts with Iran, which smuggled weapons to Bosnia through Croatia. 
These policies in turn further strengthened the political dependency of both 
the United States and Bosnia on Tuđman’s Croatia.8 Not only did this move 
enhance the Croatian military’s capacity to wage war through that country’s 
“cut” on all Iranian arms it received and then transshipped to Bosnian forces, 
it also represented a signal to that country’s leadership that the United States 
would not allow UN policies and the expressed will of the international com-
munity to constrain the requirements of a “humanitarian” realpolitik. The 
eventual Croatian-facilitated, NATO-supported military victory that emerged 
in the summer of 1995 both in Bosnia and in Croatia would set the stage for 
the kind of peace that would be fashioned in Dayton.
The Dayton Accords as well as their initial implementation reflected the 
kind of minimalist, low-cost, low-risk approach that had driven the broader 
international community’s various policies toward the former Yugoslavia since 
the beginning of its breakup. The consensus that the Dayton settlement le-
gitimized Bosnia’s partition (and even Slobodan Milošević’s role as a “peace-
broker”) need not be elaborated here.9 During the first postwar decade, even 
as the international community transformed Bosnia into a “semi-protectorate,” 
flooded the region with aid, and (reluctantly) expanded NATO and the Euro-
pean community’s role in Kosovo, contradictions continued to beset the 
international community’s peace-building efforts. Two contradictions of the 
“semi-protectorate” that complemented preexisting (prewar and wartime) 
fault lines in Bosnia are worth attending to: the complementary relationship 
between the growing and diverging authority, power, and jurisdiction of both 
Bosnia’s various nationalist parties and the Office of the High Representative. 
 The growth of nationalist parties throughout the former Bosnia and Her-
zegovina for much of the last fifteen years is hardly unique to the Balkans. 
As Valery Tishkov has argued in relation to Chechnya, persistent violence 
and intervention can help induce a sociopolitical “demodernization.”10 
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The realities of this postconflict demodernization make Bosnia’s status as 
a semi-protectorate and the unilateral expansion of the international com-
munity’s authority (formally vested in the Peace Implementation Council 
[PIC]) in the region through the so-called “Bonn Powers,” which, in De-
cember 1998, granted the (formally weak) high representative (henceforth 
HR) “unlimited authority to impose laws at any constitutional level, and 
to dismiss elected representatives, political party officers and public offi-
cials.”11 As a number of analysts of the situation in Bosnia have noted, 
the HR’s expanded powers (and the increasingly expansive—and unac-
countable—use of them made by most high commissioners) have created a 
symbiotic relationship between nationalist (and other) parties and the HR. 
Local political authorities can defer or avoid unpleasant policy choices by 
deferring to the HR. The HR, in turn, can (and does) point to the toxicity 
and irresponsibility of the Bosnian political environment as a sign of the 
ongoing importance of this position and its maintaining untrammeled au-
thority. The result is a remarkably efficient vicious circle that is almost as 
politically devastating as the demodernization that sustained conflict can 
induce, perhaps even more so for enjoying the imprimatur of the inter-
national community.12
a PRofusIoN of good INteNtIoNs: seekINg moNey, JustIce,  
aNd god IN a Post-humaNItaRIaN cRIsIs
The EU has always preferred the path of the short term, anything to 
avoid a crisis rather than facing up to the issues. (Paddy Ashdown, for-
mer high representative to Bosnia, describing the political situation in 
May 2010)13
Bosnia’s transition from a constituent republic of Yugoslavia to a de facto 
international protectorate during almost twenty years of war-making and 
peace-building has fractured the country in multiple ways. Each fracture, 
in turn, both has hampered efforts at state-building and recovery from the 
war and continues to distort other aspects of social, cultural, and economic 
life. Three key areas of social, political, and cultural life that are especially 
weighted down with the burdens imposed upon them by Bosnia’s (and the 
international community’s) history and that interact with one another in 
dynamic and largely destructive ways are (1) the failure of economic de-
velopment; (2) ongoing alienation from judicial institutions; and (3) the 
massive revival of divided religious institutions in the midst of deep politi-
cal cleavages. Any one of these issues has the power to undermine Bosnia’s 
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state-building and recovery—but their collective disequilibrium, along with 
the numerous missteps of the international community, does a great deal to 
ensure that Bosnia remains an ongoing experiment in intervention, and an 
incompetent, if not a failed, state.
European aid and other outside assistance has been massive, generous, 
and regular.14 Over the past fifteen years, in a country the size of Tennessee 
with a population of a little over four million people, the EU alone has spent 
more than €25 billion (almost equally divided between reconstruction and 
the salaries of aid workers15) in Bosnia, exclusive of the (considerable) costs 
of providing security since 1995.16 While the needs of Bosnia after almost 
four years of war were severe—especially considering the previous, Tito-era 
poverty-stricken status of the republic and the wartime internal displacement 
of more than 60 percent of Bosnia’s population—the scale and continuing 
nature of outside financial aid has distorted Bosnia’s economy (more aid per 
capita than has ever been spent in any postconflict situation—see below17). 
Observers have noted that Bosnian public expenditures—which run at more 
than 50 percent of the country’s GDP (including transfer payments to indi-
viduals for veterans and other pension benefits that regularly consume hun-
dreds of millions of euros annually)—have remained at “unsustainable” levels 
for over a decade. Yet, according to the World Bank, state-provided transfer 
payments “are barely reaching the country’s poorest citizens and there is little 
evidence of poverty reduction.”18
The high public expenditures and public sector employment mirror-image 
the various aid bureaucracies in European Union and OECD support. The 
support of the latter institutions, in addition to modeling a bloated style of 
governance that Bosnia cannot sustain (and absorbing many of those Bos-
nians most adept in foreign languages), has also fostered what the economist 
Laza Kekic has termed “aid addiction” in Bosnia. According to Kekic, in the 
current situation the sheer scale of aid and its “pushers” have stifled local eco-
nomic initiative, provided subsistence without employment for most of Bos-
nia’s population, and has led to the virtual occupation of Bosnia by a highly 
trained and well-compensated EU soft-power “expeditionary force” (even as 
the country has experienced a substantial brain drain of educated Bosnians 
looking for opportunities abroad).19
In regard to supporting Bosnian efforts to establish the rule of law, the 
track record of outside supporters has been even less successful and contrib-
uted further to maintaining and deepening Bosnia’s divisions. Three sets 
of legal problems loom particularly large and include (1) the international 
recognition of Kosovo independence, which has fueled the popularity of and 
claims by the nationalist leadership of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska that they, 
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too, are entitled to secede from Bosnia; (2) the inability of local, national, 
or international political actors to implement the right of refugees to return 
to their former homes, even as they successfully adjudicate property owner-
ship between ethnic groups; and (3) the more deeply divisive question of 
securing justice against war criminals. The multiple international failures on 
these fronts accentuate local feelings of betrayal and humiliation of many 
Bosnians who feel victimized at the hands of both prosperous war criminals 
still in their midst and the international community that is unable to deal 
with them. This in turn reinforces a local sense of entitlement by an ag-
grieved, victimized population that acts as if continued European aid and 
security assistance are legitimate forms of reparation for the wrongs they 
have suffered. 
The legal, political, and philosophical questions tied up with the inter-
national recognition of Kosovo’s independence (exacerbated by the ongoing 
political deadlock) have produced numerous political crises in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina over the last several years, particularly between the Office of 
the High Representative and the president of the Republika Srpska. The 
international community, having gone from insisting at the beginning of 
their intervention that Kosovo would remain an integral part of Serbia to 
reneging on that commitment, has emboldened the president of Republika 
Srpska, Milorad Dodik, to insist upon the right of Serbs to secede from Bos-
nia. Dodik, who, prior to his apparent conversion to nationalist politics was 
a Social Democrat, successful reformer,20 and “darling of the international 
community,” has, since his 2006 election (which reinforced ethnic polari-
zation in all three of Bosnia’s major ethno-national communities),21 threat-
ened on several occasions to call a referendum on the issue of statehood 
for Republika Srpska22 The ease with which President Dodik tacks back 
and forth between defending the status of Republika Srpska as enshrined 
in the Dayton Accords and demanding that Serbs have the same right to 
self-determination as Bosnia enjoyed in 1992 (or Kosovo received from the 
international community) demonstrates both continuity in and deepening 
of Serb alienation to Bosnia. This stance also reveals the contradictions in 
the stance of an international community that claims to support democratic 
governance in the western Balkans, but apparently only to the degree to 
which democracy conforms to predetermined outcomes.23 
The international community’s efforts to enforce justice often further 
intensify a sense of alienation and unreality among the various inhabitants 
of Bosnia. For example, Bosnian Muslims regard efforts to prosecute war 
criminals from their communities as perverse, since Bosnian soldiers made 
war under the shadow of ethnic cleansing and possible genocide—hence for 
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Bosniaks any effort to equate their defense of their communities, even when 
it involved atrocities, cannot justly be compared to Serbian or Croat crimes. 
The international community’s insistence that Bosniak soldiers be put on 
trial for war crimes even as it had failed for much of the last fifteen years 
to find even the most important of Bosnian Serbian war criminals such as 
Radovan Karadžić (captured only in 2008) and General Ratko Mladić (the 
butcher of Srebernica who was at large until July 2011—even though, at 
least via Wikileaks, we know that some European diplomatic personnel are 
convinced that the Serbian government was well aware of his location)—
does little to encourage Bosniak compliance with or sympathy toward inter-
national concepts of justice. 
Legal issues related to the right of refugee return and compensation for sto-
len or confiscated property also reflect a perverse logic. The relatively greater 
efficiency of some NGO and official European organizations in interacting 
with their local Bosnian counterparts often works at variance to the broader 
goals of the Dayton Accords. General Anthony Zinni opened up a particu-
larly terrifying window onto the dilemmas of war- and peacemaking in our 
thoroughly wired and technologically savvy world when he spoke of a concept 
of which the American military is increasingly aware—that of the “strategic 
corporal,”24 or, for civilian purposes, the Fadia Hamdi effect (the Tunisian 
policewoman who slapped the street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi, whose 
self-immolation became the spark for the Arab Spring). In the current age 
of global news and a wired world order, even the lowest-level functionary or 
soldier has the ability to create a media firestorm through one unconsidered 
rude or ill-timed act that can cause incalculable damage. 
In Bosnia, the problems that confronted the international community and 
refugee organizations were the “strategic alderman,” the “strategic town clerk,” 
and the “strategic sheriff ”—local officials who, in collusion with significant 
elements of the local population, had effectively nullified the right of return 
by helping to continue to fan the flames of local nationalist hostility. While 
unable to oppose low-level officials directly, the ability of NGO and EU of-
ficials’ effectiveness in negotiating compensation of property for the expellees 
with these same officials thoroughly reinforced and solidified the results of 
ethnic cleansing—refugees who had received financial compensation for their 
confiscated property (whose possession they could not enjoy since this would 
involve living among hostile neighbors) were even less likely to return to areas 
from which they were expelled; while those who benefited from the ethnic 
cleansing became more firmly established in the property their government 
stole for them on behalf of their nation. The legal international imprimatur on 
this process (paid for at least indirectly through the international community’s 
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heavy subsidies of the various national enclaves) only adds to the legitimiza-
tion of ethnic cleansing, the sense of abandonment and alienation of many 
expellees toward those providing them aid, and, further, helps to permanently 
cement Bosnia’s ethno-national divisions.25
Finally, religious developments are among the more unsettling areas of 
NGO activity in Bosnia. Even where there is no intention on the part of 
either religious leaders or ordinary believers to undermine the Bosnian state, 
both the region’s social and cultural dynamics and history interact with the 
remarkable resurgence of post-Yugoslav religion in such a way as to further 
undermine efforts at state-building.26 Religious life has commanded most at-
tention regionally over much of the last two decades due to international con-
cern related to the potential for Islamic radicalization among Bosniaks.27 This 
concern is heightened by the ongoing (if reduced) presence of foreign muja-
hideen, some of whom had connections to al-Qaeda as well as the ongoing 
stream of money, missionaries, and mosque-building aid from Saudi Arabia, 
Iran, and Turkey to Bosnia.28 
Though there have been some minor instances of jihadist recruitment and 
activity in Bosnia for much of the last fifteen years (and a wider rejection of 
jihadist efforts either to recruit locally or to maintain a mujahideen presence 
in Bosnia), more important has been an even greater increase in both Islamic 
social and cultural activism and a general deepening of religious practice among 
a Bosniak population that prior to 1992 was not renowned for its strict ritual 
adherence. The real transformations of Bosnian Islam are not due to the tiny 
minority of Bosniaks turning to jihadist ideologies. Rather, ironically, much like 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy regionally, religious transformations are caused by 
the increasing power and visibility of faith in the public square, religious leaders’ 
transnational engagement with coreligionists abroad, and the role of both reli-
gious leaders and ordinary believers in maintaining and even strengthening their 
faiths’ war-forged alliance with ethno-nationalist political movements.
The desecularization and sacralization of public life has developed 
throughout Bosnia (and much of the rest of the former Yugoslavia as well) 
for much of the last twenty years.29 For Bosniaks, a variety of factors, par-
ticularly their experiences as victims of ethnic cleansing and of genocide, 
has led to a unique blending of Islam and national identity. Furthermore, 
in both war and peace, even as Bosniaks have found themselves at odds 
with their Christian neighbors, they have become much more connected 
to Muslims around the world. Embassies from Muslim countries, especially 
Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as Muslim relief organizations, have played a 
major role in providing various forms of aid, from mosque reconstruction, 
donations of (mostly) religious literature, and support for young Bosniaks 
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to study in universities around the Muslim world, as well as the organization 
of cultural events.30
Among Bosnian Christians there has been a parallel double movement 
of religion both outward to coreligionists abroad and expansive politically, 
socially, and culturally at home. Michael Sells has argued that something 
like a religious apartheid against non-Catholics has obtained in Herzegovin-
ian Bosnia31—a development exacerbated by the importance of the famous 
Marian shrine at Medjugorje, whose presence on Bosnian soil for some Bos-
nian Croatians (and their conationals in Croatia) makes the unification of 
the Croatian portions of Bosnia and the “motherland” a religious necessity.32 
Secular Serbian scholars have discussed the general “desecularization” of Ser-
bian society33 and the significant impact of the development of Orthodox 
religious education among the youth of the Republika Srpska, as well as the 
religious impact of the secession of an Albanian-dominated Kosovo (and 
subsequent destruction of Serbian religious shrines in that country). Reli-
gious revival and deepening ties with coreligionists have created a cultural 
and social map that differs a great deal from the formal political geography 
of Bosnia. 
Two further, deeper problems complicate the role of religious actors (as 
well as those who would seek to build a secular state) in Bosnia. The first is 
that the widespread perception that secular international and domestic politi-
cal institutions and actors are corrupt and have failed has further enhanced the 
authority of religious actors.34 Second, the multiple contradictions implicit in 
the OHR’s and the European Union’s policies—the tension between demo-
cratic state-building and maintaining Bosnia as a dependent region, of seeking 
“truth” and reconciliation, the repeated OHR promises and threats tied to 
Bosnia’s potential EU membership that recedes further into the future—stand 
in stark contrast to the clear and rhetorically powerful, if not always insight-
ful or healing, statements of foreign or domestic religious figures.35 The well-
meaning symbolic efforts first of UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection 
Force), and later of secular NGOS, the Office of the High Representative, and 
UN troops and personnel in Bosnia, to engage (on a limited basis) religious 
believers or to create alternative secular symbols of order and stability such as 
the rebuilding of the famous Mostar bridge, or the less well-meaning role of 
UNPROFOR and later UN troops in human trafficking and prostitution lo-
cally, have created potent antisymbols of secular life.36 This authority, since it 
is mostly negative, however—relying upon the failure of secular international 
and domestic actors—buttresses religious sensibilities and authority, which 
need not engage in constructive activity.37 The result is further division of an 
already shattered polity.
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sItuatIoN Not uRgeNt, sImPly tRagIc: state faIluRes  
aNd/oR systemIc faIluRes
“It must be very frustrating for you not to accomplish anything. Why 
don’t you simply leave?” I asked.
He answered: “Yes, it is frustrating. But if I go back to New York, 
even though I will have a nice office and a very good position, I will be 
just another insignificant bureaucrat. Staying here is exciting, and makes 
me feel important.” (Dzenita Mehic’s report of a conversation with a 
“prominent UNPROFOR official”)38
Time need not heal any wounds. In Bosnia the fictions of successful humani-
tarian intervention (which masked American and European sanction of Bos-
nian Serb ethnic cleansing), of federal Bosnian unity (that has brought about 
no effective integration between numerous mini- and micro-political entities), 
and of a progressive European protectorate (that has not stabilized Bosnia in 
spite of massive expenditures of work and money and in spite of having the 
virtually untrammeled political power of the Office of the High Representa-
tive) have all produced a bloodless quagmire. Few to no lives are lost to the 
violence of war, but the political, cultural, social, and even economic costs of 
this desert called peace are nonetheless severe.
One problem is the interrelationships between the international commu-
nity’s fictions of successful engagement to end ethnic cleansing (as opposed 
to ratifying its results) and promote international law, NGO and European 
self-interest in maintaining a perpetually dependent Bosnian protectorate, 
and the local vitality among many Bosnians of mutually exclusive hostile na-
tionalisms, religious revival, and economic corruption. For many aid workers 
and European officials, UNPROFOR’s and Europe’s Bosnian protectorate has 
been a steady source of employment, career development, and even symbolic 
justification of the importance of international institutions—and has been 
perceived as such by many locally. Even worse, the increasingly visible “en-
largement fatigue” in many countries within the European Union (clear even 
prior to the financial crisis that exacerbated this fatigue39) is making the most 
important “carrot” possessed by European entities—membership in the EU—
in Bosnia appear increasingly unobtainable. 
Furthermore, the persistent “underestimation” of the power of religion to 
motivate the “angry young men” (and many women who love and use them/
are loved and used by them and who also suffered and invested greatly in the 
struggles that tore Bosnia apart) also represents a too often missed opportunity 
to tie international initiatives more closely to local supporters rooted in the 
 human rights and Wrongs in Failed States 39
social and cultural lives of their communities. The for too long overly secular 
nature of the international community’s engagements in Bosnia represents a 
dangerous blind spot, since religious ideals of justice, mutual aid, community, 
and alienation all represent a “bully pulpit.”40 This limited but real power of 
religion, if engaged respectfully and with careful attention to the concerns, 
values, and prejudices/limitations of religious elites as well as “ordinary” lay 
believers, is well positioned to advocate for a vision of the future different 
from the ones currently being proposed in Bosnia.
The international community has grown used to having, proposing, and 
often imposing its own truths. Throughout the Western world our ability to 
consider World War II the “good war,” though it involved close collaboration 
with a Soviet regime that had itself been guilty of mass murder, is something 
that produced little if any cognitive dissonance for American or most West 
European consciences for generations—a point of view that is deeply con-
tested from the Oder River to Kamchatka. Yet our efforts at imposing our 
truths—be they the inherent stability and vitality of a multicultural society 
(one of our newest intellectual fashions41) or the necessity of letting bygones 
be bygones (no matter how horrific the injustice)—often require compro-
mises, if only because our willingness to bend as much of our power as would 
be necessary to impose such truths is limited. These compromises in turn 
become the grounds for further alienation and incomprehension of Western 
goals, methods, and beliefs.
In conclusion, the weakness of state structures in Bosnia is an intensely 
local problem rooted in recent history where conflict narratives and politi-
cal solidarities brought into being by criminals and patriots (including many 
criminal-patriots), as well as a majority of ordinary people in high and low 
places, not only destroyed the old Yugoslavia but continue to mutually re-
inforce one another’s efforts to destroy even the ideal of mutual coexistence 
much less solidarity among the different communities of Bosnia. While that 
is a local tragedy, there is a problem of another form of state failure that the 
past and current situation of Bosnia brings to the fore that is much more 
urgent to address—that of the post–Cold War policies of the Western com-
munity (especially those of NATO, the EC/EU, and the United Nations) and 
the international aid community. The inability of Europe’s most well-funded, 
technologically sophisticated, and culturally/politically legitimate states, insti-
tutions, and military forces to enact effective strategies of development, rec-
onciliation, and state-building in a region where their own interests are deeply 
engaged, their resources are more than sufficient (and near at hand), and their 
familiarity with local conditions should be at their greatest (relative to other 
regions), is a sign of state failure and incompetence that has implications far 
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more serious than the civil war and disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. If 
in what, relative to most other postconflict regions, are all but ideal conditions 
of regional peace and stability, efforts at rebuilding Bosnia have proved to be 
such an expensive and seemingly insoluble enterprise, what realistic hope is 
there for restoring peace and effectively reconstructing shattered societies in 
other, less well-developed, more instable regions? A decomposing Bosnia, in 
the “belly of the (first world) beast” for more than twenty years, has demon-
strated the limits of the military, political, and economic competence of the 
United States, NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations. What 
we have yet to do is to begin to evaluate, much less remedy, the collective 
incompetence and failings of those states and institutions that are seeking to 
maintain international order.
Notes
1. Sumantra Bose, Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International 
Intervention (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 60–68. At various lev-
els of governance the principles of representative democracy coexist with ethno-
national power-sharing, up to authorizing different entities within the Bosnian 
state—such as the Republika Srpska—and to develop “special parallel relation-
ships with neighboring states.”
2. Derek Chollet, The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American State-
craft (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 121, 133–38.
3. “Former European Commissioner Günter Verheugen: The EU ‘Has No Vi-
sion of Where We Are Heading,” Spiegel Online International, February 9, 2010, 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676784,00.html.
4. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, “Travails of the European Raj,” Journal of 
Democracy 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 65.
5. Marko Attila Hoare, How Bosnia Armed (London: Saqi Books, 2004), 44–49. 
6. Charles R. Shrader, The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Mili-
tary History, 1992–1994 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 
43–44.
7. Peter Andreas, “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in 
Bosnia,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 35–37.
8. See Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), 
72–73 (on the role of Croatian military success in American diplomacy and plan-
ning); and 164–67 (on the dynamics of American-led conversations between Pres-
idents Tuđman and Izetbegović). Silber and Little argue that by 1995 “Croatia 
was the centerpiece of US strategy . . . the counterbalance to Serbia . . . with the 
might of international backing.” Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death 
of a Nation (New York: Penguin, 1997), 361.
 human rights and Wrongs in Failed States 41
9. Silber and Little, Yugoslavia, 383; Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The 
Making of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000), 181.
10. Valery Tishkov, Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2004); see also Latinka Perović, “The Flight from Moderni-
zation,” in The Road to War in Serbia: Trauma and Catharsis, ed. Nebojša Popov 
(New York: Central European University Press, 2000), 109–22.
11. Marcus Cox, State-Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from 
Bosnia (Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2001).
12. See Richard Caplan, “International Authority and State Building: The 
Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 62; Cox, 
State-Building, 19–20; and David Chandler, “From Dayton to Europe,” Inter-
national Peacekeeping 12, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 336–49.
13. Bruno Waterfield, “Bloodshed to Return to Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown Fears,” 
Telegraph, May 27, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
serbia/8541578/Bloodshed-to-return-to-Bosnia-Paddy-Ashdown-fears.html.
14. “Commission Reports on Saudi Donations to Bosnia,” Saudi Embassy, 
July 13, 2001, http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2001/news/page266.
aspx. From 1992 to 2001, Saudi Arabia provided more than US$380 million 
to Bosnia, in addition to providing further support for 10,000 orphans, for 
3,000 Bosnian pilgrims, and for the restoration of over 160 mosques in the 
country. 
15. Gerhard Spörl, “Opinion: Europe has no exit strategy for Bosnia,” July 16, 
2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/opinion-europe-has-no-exit-
strategy-in-the-balkans-a-636347.html.
16. Steven R. Bowman, “Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations,” in Congressional 
Research Service Issue Brief 93056. Estimates of the total costs of SFOR/IFOR 
from FY 1992 to FY 2002 came to over $11 billion—while the US mission would 
continue for another three years, the size (and presumably the costs of US military 
operations) would decline considerably during that time.
17. Martina Fischer, “Introduction: Moving out of the Dayton Era into the Era 
of Brussels?” in Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, ed. Martina 
Fischer (London: Transaction, 2006), 12.
18. Zlatko Kovach, “World Bank Helps Tackle BiH’s Public Expenditures,” 
SETimes.com, June 5, 2010, http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/
en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/05/06/feature-03.
19. Laza Kekic, “Aid to the Balkans: Addicts and Pushers,” in Balkan Recon-
struction, ed. Thanos Veremis and Daniel Daianu (London: Routledge, 2001), 24.
20. Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 
1918–2005 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), takes a remarkably 
positive view of Dodik’s politics; while Bose, Bosnia after Dayton, 274, regards 
the Western international community’s support of Dodik as a “sad story” of 
seeking “particular individuals” in preference to institutional reform and devel-
opment.
42 Chapter 2
21. Thorsten Gromes, “The Prospect of European Integration and Conflict 
Transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Journal of European Integration 31, 
no. 4 (July 2009): 438.
22. “Milorad Dodik—One Foot in Bosnia, but His Heart in Serbia,” Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 28, 2009, http://www.rferl.org/content/Milo-
rad_Dodik__One_Foot_In_Bosnia_But_His_Heart_In_Serbia/1617635.html.
23. Many Bosnian Croats consistently have voted for the Croatian Democratic 
Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, or HDZ 
BiH, which, similar to most of the Serb parties of Republika Srpska, has fought to 
maintain self-government and opposed reforms to centralize the state institutions 
of Bosnia. Florian Bieber, Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector 
Governance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 62. 
24. Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons from the 
Battlefield to the Boardroom (New York: St. Martin’s, 2009) , 210.
25. Carl Dahlman and Gearóid Ó.Tuathail, “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: 
The International Community and the Returns Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia-
Herzegovina,” Political Geography 24, no. 5 (2005): 569–99.
26. One sign of the resurgence of religious belief is that while the numbers of 
atheists/nonreligious had grown from more than 12 percent to 31 percent of the 
population of the former Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1987, by 2006 only 2.5 per-
cent of peoples throughout Yugoslavia classified themselves as such. In Bosnia the 
corresponding figures were 29 percent nonreligious by 1987, with only 5 percent 
nonreligious or atheist in 2000. Reinhard Henkel, “Religions and Religious Insti-
tutions in the Post-Yugoslav States between Secularization and Resurgence,” Acta 
Universitatis Carolinae, nos. 1–2 (2009): 51, 53.
27. The roots of a moderate Islamization of Bosnian politics run deep, but 
grew especially strong during Bosnia’s civil war, when, under the hammer blows of 
local Serbian atrocities, Bosnian Croatian ambivalence over a multinational polity, 
Western indifference, and significant support from the Muslim world, many Bos-
niaks, with the support and encouragement of President Alija Izetbegović, turned 
more and more to Islam as an answer to their sense of isolation during the war, as 
well as to fellow Muslims throughout the world, who often provided crucial aid 
during and after the war. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention (New York: M. E. 
Sharpe, 1999), 196–97. It should be noted that the separatist vision of the Islamic 
president Izetbegović, though at times supported, was contested (fiercely) by other 
devout Muslims whose understanding and practice of Bosnian Islam was much 
more inclusive and liberal. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, The Denial of Bosnia, trans. 
Francis R. Jones and Marina Bowder (University Park: Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 43–44. See also Alison Pargeter, The New Frontiers of Jihad: 
Radical Islam in Europe (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 
40–44, who notes the aid Iran and Saudi Arabia supplied to Bosniaks as well as 
the local resentment these countries’ heavy-handed policies produced.
 human rights and Wrongs in Failed States 43
28. Harun Karčić, “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
International Actors and Activities,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30, no. 4 
(2010): 525–32.
29. Ivan Iveković, “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The 
Politicization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States,” 
Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 523–36. See also Dan Bilfelsky, “Islamic Revival 
Tests Bosnia’s Secular Cast,” December 28, 2008, http://www.jonathantan.org/
handouts/Islam/Islam-H130aa-Bosnia.pdf; and Karčić’s “Islamic Revival,” noted 
above, for a discussion of the “desecularization” among Bosnian Muslims.
30. Eldar Sarajlić, “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and For-
eign Policy Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (paper presented at the 
conference “After the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, Politics and International Net-
works in the Balkans,” European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Decem-
ber 2010), 14–25.
31. Michael Sells, “Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion, and Violence in 
Bosnia-Hercegovina,” Sociology of Religion 64, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 309–31.
32. Juan A. Herrero Brasas, “In the Name of Mary: Sacred Space, Sacred Prop-
erty, and Absolution of Past Sins,” in Religion, Violence, Memory, and Place, ed. 
Oren Baruch Stier and J. Shawn Landres (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006), 150–62. 
Vjekoslav Perica argues that the influence of the “West Herzegovinian lobby” is 
so important throughout Croatia that “it is almost impossible to talk about the Cro-
atian Catholic Right without mentioning the Franciscans of western Herzegovina.” 
Perica, “The Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State, and Society in Con-
temporary Croatia,” Religion, State, and Society 34, no. 4 (December 2006): 325.
33. Mirko Blagojevic, “Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society,” 
Religion in Eastern Europe 28, no. 1 (February 2008): 37–50.
34. Janine Natalya Clark, “Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina: Are Religious Actors Doing Enough?” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 4 (June 
2010): 671–94.
35. Clark notes numerous instances of how religious language has proved both 
powerful to devotees—such as the Muslim community’s (both politicians and 
clergy) terming those Muslims who died during the war “šehidi/martyrs,” or the 
insistence of Serbian clergy have cultivated a “victim” complex. Clark, “Religion 
and Reconciliation,” 682. 
36. Paddy Greer, “Bridge-Building in Mostar: From Fragmented Stumbling 
Blocks to Overarching Narrative Solutions,” in Post-Conflict Reconstruction, ed. 
Neil Ferguson (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 119–32.
37. John Kelsay, “Bosnia and the Muslim Critique of Modernity,” in Reli-
gion and Justice in the War over Bosnia, ed. G. Scott Davis (New York: Routledge, 
1996), 139.
38. Dzenita Mehic, “We Are Dying of Your Protection,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists (March/April 1995): 44.
44 Chapter 2
39. Graham Timmins and Dejan Jović, “Introduction: The Next Wave of En-
largement; The European Union and Southeast Europe after 2004,” Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans 8, no. 1 (2006): 2–4.
40. R. Scott Appleby, The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and 
Reconciliation (New York: Carnegie, 2000), 3–8.
41. This view stands in stark contrast to our cooperation with much of the inter-
national community’s postwar efforts to support ethnic cleansing throughout Europe 
to achieve the stability that we then believed only ethnically monolithic states could 
achieve. People throughout the former Yugoslavia were keenly aware of these contra-
dictions, even as some of their number imposed ethnic cleansing upon their former 
fellow citizens. See Timothy Garton Ash, History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and 
Dispatches from Europe in the 1990s (New York: Vintage Books, 1999), 191.
RefeReNces
Andreas, Peter. “The Clandestine Political Economy of War and Peace in Bosnia.” 
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 29–51.
Appleby, R. Scott. The Ambivalence of the Sacred: Religion, Violence, and Recon-
ciliation. New York: Carnegie, 2000.
Ash, Timothy Garton. History of the Present: Essays, Sketches, and Dispatches from 
Europe in the 1990s. New York: Vintage Books, 1999.
Bieber, Florian. Post-War Bosnia: Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Gover-
nance. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Bilfelsky, Dan. “Islamic Revival Tests Bosnia’s Secular Cast,” December 28, 2008. 
http://www.jonathantan.org/handouts/Islam/Islam-H130aa-Bosnia.pdf.
Blagojevic, Mirko. “Desecularization of Contemporary Serbian Society.” Religion 
in Eastern Europe 28, no. 1 (February 2008): 37–50.
Bose, Sumantra. Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Inter-
vention. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Bowman, Steven R. “Bosnia: U.S. Military Operations.” In Congressional Research 
Service Issue Brief 93056.
Brasas, Juan A. Herrero. “In the Name of Mary: Sacred Space, Sacred Property, 
and Absolution of Past Sins.” In Religion, Violence, Memory, and Place, edited 
by Oren Baruch Stier and J. Shawn Landres, 150–62. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2006.
Burg, Steven L., and Paul S. Shoup. The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Con-
flict and International Intervention. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999.
Caplan, Richard. “International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.” Global Governance 10, no. 1 (2004): 53–65.
Chandler, David. “From Dayton to Europe.” International Peacekeeping 12, no. 3 
(Autumn 2005): 336–49.
 human rights and Wrongs in Failed States 45
Chollet, Derek. The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft. 
New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005.
Clark, Janine Natalya. “Religion and Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Are Religious Actors Doing Enough?” Europe-Asia Studies 62, no. 4 (June 
2010): 671–94.
Cox, Marcus. State-Building and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from Bosnia. 
Geneva: Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 2001.
Daalder, Ivo H. Getting to Dayton: The Making of America’s Bosnia Policy. Wash-
ington, DC: Brookings, 2000.
Dahlman, Carl, and Gearóid Ó. Tuathail. “The Legacy of Ethnic Cleansing: The 
International Community and the Returns Process in Post-Dayton Bosnia-
Herzegovina.” Political Geography 24, no. 5 (2005): 569–99.
Fischer, Martina. “Introduction: Moving out of the Dayton Era into the Era of 
Brussels?” In Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, edited by 
Martina Fischer, 7–46. London: Transaction, 2006.
Greer, Paddy. “Bridge-Building in Mostar: From Fragmented Stumbling Blocks 
to Overarching Narrative Solutions.” In Post-Conflict Reconstruction, edited 
by Neil Ferguson, 119–32. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010.
Gromes, Thorsten. “The Prospect of European Integration and Conflict Trans-
formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Journal of European Integration 31, no. 
4 (July 2009): 431–47.
Henkel, Reinhard. “Religions and Religious Institutions in the Post-Yugoslav 
States between Secularization and Resurgence.” Acta Universitatis Carolinae, 
nos. 1–2 (2009): 49–61.
Hoare, Marko Attila. How Bosnia Armed. London: Saqi Books, 2004.
Holbrooke, Richard. To End a War. New York: Random House, 1998.
Iveković, Ivan. “Nationalism and the Political Use and Abuse of Religion: The Po-
liticization of Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam in Yugoslav Successor States.” 
Social Compass 49, no. 4 (2002): 523–36.
Karčić, Harun. “Islamic Revival in Post-Socialist Bosnia and Herzegovina: Inter-
national Actors and Activities.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30, no. 4 
(2010): 519–34.
Kekic, Laza. “Aid to the Balkans: Addicts and Pushers.” In Balkan Reconstruction, ed-
ited by Thanos Veremis and Daniel Daianu, 20–40. London: Routledge, 2001.
Kelsay, John. “Bosnia and the Muslim Critique of Modernity.” In Religion and 
Justice in the War over Bosnia, edited by G. Scott Davis, 117–42. New York: 
Routledge, 1996.
Knaus, Gerald, and Felix Martin. “Travails of the European Raj.” Journal of De-
mocracy 14, no. 3 (July 2003): 60–74.
Kovach, Zlatko. “World Bank Helps Tackle BiH’s Public Expenditures.” SE-
Times.com, June 5, 2010. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/
en_GB/features/setimes/features/2010/05/06/feature-03.
46 Chapter 2
Mahmutćehajić, Rusmir. The Denial of Bosnia. Translated by Francis R. Jones and 
Marina Bowder. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000.
Mehic, Dzenita. “We Are Dying of Your Protection.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scien-
tists (March/April 1995): 41–44.
Pargeter, Alison. The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Perica, Vjekoslav. “The Most Catholic Country in Europe? Church, State, and 
Society in Contemporary Croatia.” Religion, State, and Society 34, no. 4 (De-
cember 2006): 311–46.
Perović, Latinka. “The Flight from Modernization.” In The Road to War in Serbia: 
Trauma and Catharsis, edited by Nebojša Popov, 109–22. New York: Central 
European University Press, 2000.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. “Milorad Dodik—One Foot in Bosnia, but 
His Heart in Serbia,” April 28, 2009. http://www.rferl.org/content/Milorad_ 
Dodik__One_Foot_In_Bosnia_But_His_Heart_In_Serbia/1617635.html.
Ramet, Sabrina P. The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–
2005. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006.
Sarajlić, Eldar. “The Return of the Consuls: Islamic Networks and Foreign Policy 
Perspectives in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Paper presented at the conference 
“After the Wahabi Mirage: Islam, Politics and International Networks in the 
Balkans,” European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, December 2010.
Saudi Embassy. “Commission Reports on Saudi Donations to Bosnia.” July 13, 
2001. http://www.saudiembassy.net/archive/2001/news/page266.aspx.
Sells, Michael. “Crosses of Blood: Sacred Space, Religion, and Violence in Bosnia-
Hercegovina.” Sociology of Religion 64, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 309–31.
Shrader, Charles R. The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia: A Military His-
tory, 1992–1994. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003.
Silber, Laura, and Allan Little. Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York: Penguin, 
1997.
Spiegel Online International. “Former European Commissioner Günter Verheu-
gen: The EU ‘Has No Vision of Where We Are Heading.” February 9, 2010. 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,676784,00.html.
Timmins, Graham, and Dejan Jović. “Introduction: The Next Wave of Enlarge-
ment; The European Union and Southeast Europe after 2004.” Journal of 
Southern Europe and the Balkans 8, no. 1 (2006): 1–5.
Tishkov, Valery. Chechnya: Life in a War-Torn Society. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, 2004.
Waterfield, Bruno. “Bloodshed to Return to Bosnia, Paddy Ashdown Fears.” Tele-
graph, May 27, 2011. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
serbia/8541578/Bloodshed-to-return-to-Bosnia-Paddy-Ashdown-fears.html.
Zinni, Tony, and Tony Koltz. Leading the Charge: Leadership Lessons from the 






The Past and Future of Insurgency
Protracted Warfare and Protracted Counterinsurgency
Jonathan M. House
INtRoductIoN
When Professor Miner invited me to this conference, he asked me to dis-
cuss the current debates and future possibilities for insurgency and counter-
insurgency. In other words, I will try to focus on how such conflicts have 
worked in the past and may occur in the future; I’m sure the other panel 
members have a much better grasp of the issues that motivate such conflicts. 
Having said that, however, let me trespass for one minute into an area that 
I know is much more familiar to the other panelists than it is to me. My 
older daughter, having been an Army brat, was too smart to serve in uni-
form, so instead she joined the Foreign Service. Because the Department 
of State is as efficient as the Department of Defense in using its personnel 
correctly—which is to say, not very efficient at all—my daughter, who mi-
nored in Russian in college, spent six months learning Spanish before she 
was assigned to a consulate on the border between Mexico and Arizona. A 
year ago, she telephoned to tell us that she was getting hazardous duty pay, 
while living five blocks from the United States, because the drug wars had 
begun to target Americans. 
My point is that insurgency has many forms and many different motives; it 
is not simply about takfiri terrorism or Marxism-Leninism, nor is it confined 
to the Middle East. The causes and methods of insurgency are almost timeless; 
only the tactics of combating it have changed in recent decades.
50 Chapter 3
theoRy of INsuRgeNcy
Insurgency, or asymmetrical warfare, has existed throughout history. For ex-
ample, the word “assassin” comes from the followers of Ḥasan-e Ṣabbāḥ (d. 
1124), the head of a Persian sect of Shiites. Ṣabbāḥ sent out dedicated (and by 
some accounts drug-crazed, which may be the origin of the word “hashish”) 
assassins in disguise to dispose of enemy leaders, allowing his independent sect 
to conduct its own foreign policy without a standing army.
Insurgency becomes most prominent, however, when one state or alliance 
has an overwhelming advantage in the conduct of conventional warfare, so that 
opponents feel they cannot possibly compete against the dominant army. This 
was true during the Napoleonic Wars, the post–World War II decolonization 
period, and it is true again today, when the United States and a few of its West-
ernized allies have developed such a lethal form of mechanized air-land combat 
that even large, well-equipped armies such as that of Iraq fall apart quickly.
Traditionally, insurgencies have functioned best as part of what my col-
league Tom Huber has termed “Compound Warfare.” The 1808–1814 
conflict in the Iberian Peninsula was an illustration of this: Two forces, one 
conventional and one unconventional or insurgent, cooperated against a com-
mon enemy. In this instance, the conventional force was the relatively small 
British-Portuguese army commanded by Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of 
Wellington, while the unconventional force was composed of various Span-
ish militias and other irregular forces, from which we get the modern term 
“guerrilla” for “little war.” Napoleon’s imperial armies were what would today 
be labeled the counterinsurgent force. To control the guerrillas, the French 
needed to disperse throughout the peninsula, whereas to defeat Wellington, 
they needed to concentrate their troops in one mass.1 Although they outnum-
bered their opponents by as much as five to one, the French were unable to 
do both, and failed accordingly. There are numerous similar examples of com-
pound warfare, such as the British forces in Palestine with T. E. Lawrence’s 
Arabs against the Turks in 1918, and the Continental army and irregulars like 
Francis Marion during the American Revolution.
Notice, however, that such a compound approach tends to relegate the 
insurgent or guerrilla to a supporting role; it is possible for observers and 
historians to even overlook that role completely and assume that the conven-
tional army won by itself. This is one reason why Western armies have tended 
to dismiss insurgents as relatively unimportant. 
Mao Tse-tung had several original ideas in his life, but for our purposes 
his most important one was the idea that the insurgent or guerrilla could 
“grow his own” armies, develop his own force that was capable of defeating its 
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opponent using tactics that resembled those of a conventional army. This is in 
effect what the Chinese Communists did during the final, post-1945 phase of 
their civil war, defeating the huge, well-equipped nationalist forces of Chiang 
Kai-shek. 
I should hasten to add two points about Mao’s theory, however: First, the 
essence of his insurgency was that it was protracted, a long, drawn-out struggle 
that wore down the capabilities and motivation of the insurgent’s opponents. 
Quick victory through insurgency is an oxymoron, as Che Guevara discovered 
so painfully in Bolivia, and as the Greek Communists learned when they tried 
to create a conventional army and government during the 1946–1949 civil 
war. Second, many insurgencies that appeared to fit Mao’s model were in fact 
instances of compound warfare. Most famously, the Vietcong suffered heavily 
during and after the 1968 Tet offensive, so that by some revisionist accounts 
the United States and South Vietnam eliminated the VC structure in many 
areas of Vietnam.2 Although the protracted insurgency in Vietnam undoubt-
edly succeeded in causing the US to leave the country, victory still required 
that the North Vietnamese army, a superbly equipped mechanized force, con-
duct two major conventional campaigns in 1972 and 1975 before it defeated 
its southern opponents. As James Willbanks, my boss, refers to his participa-
tion as an adviser in the first of these campaigns, “Willbanks’ First Law is that, 
if they’re using tanks, they’re not guerrillas.” One could argue, of course, that 
these tanks represent the logical conclusion of Mao’s desire for the insurgent 
to grow his own forces. However, even if you consider the two different states 
of Vietnam to be one nation, the mechanized forces of the North Vietnamese 
army did not arise from the Vietcong but were the sons and grandsons of the 
Vietminh in the first conflict.
Let me return for a moment to Mao, who in 1930 gave us the most famous 
prescription for guerrilla warfare: 
Divide our forces to arouse the masses, concentrate our forces to deal 
with the enemy.
The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the 
enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.
To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; 
when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.
Arouse the largest number of the masses in the shortest possible time 
and by the best possible methods.3
Put simply, this means that an insurgent attacks his opponent only when he 
can achieve a temporary superiority of forces at the precise point of battle or 
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ambush; otherwise, the guerrilla must avoid battle in order to survive. This 
is why Western commentators are so fascinated with the passage that begins 
“The enemy advances, we retreat.” Notice, however, that Mao’s tactical advice 
is preceded and followed by a constant emphasis on the need to motivate and 
mobilize the populace. For Mao and for most successful insurgents, gaining 
and maintaining political support is far more important than what happens on 
the battlefield. Carl von Clausewitz may have taught Mao that “war is merely 
the continuation of policy by other means,”4 but the Chinese leader took this 
idea to its extreme, insisting that politics and popular motivation were at the 
center of any struggle. For example, one of Mao’s most effective weapons was 
his literacy program, teaching peasants to read so that they could better absorb 
Communist ideology. This has an interesting parallel in Saudi Arabia, where 
the dominant Wahhabi sect controls primary education to spread its interpre-
tation of Islam, thereby producing most of the 9/11 hijackers.
Mao, as I’ve already remarked, did not believe that insurgency must or 
would always use guerrilla tactics. In fact, he condemned those of his col-
leagues who focused on “guerrilla-ism” rather than adjusting their methods to 
local circumstances. Thus, “guerrilla” is only one methodology or set of tactics 
to be used in protracted asymmetrical warfare—depending on the circum-
stances, terror bombings, labor strikes, and large public protests may all be 
used as means to the end of wearing down and replacing the existing counter-
insurgent government. For an example of this, look at the left wing in Cuba 
from the 1930s through 1958, which laid the foundation for Fidel Castro’s 
guerrilla success at the end of this period.
couNteRINsuRgeNcy theoRIes
If insurgency (or protracted revolutionary warfare) has existed for millennia, 
how did governments go about repressing such insurgencies? In the vast ma-
jority of cases, rulers regarded the insurgents as malcontents, troublemakers, 
and criminals who should be put down as quickly and violently as possible. 
Rebels would be executed either with or without trial, depending on local 
norms. The measure of effectiveness for such a counterinsurgency was often 
the body count, the number of rebels (whether real or imaginary) killed or at 
least imprisoned. Colonel Gadhafi obviously believed in this approach.
Truly ruthless governments may, in fact, eliminate all effective opposition 
and thereby restore their control, at least in the short run. No one success-
fully rebelled against Joseph Stalin, for example, although the Lithuanians, 
Ukrainians, and other non-Russian groups certainly tried at the end of World 
War II.5
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From our current perspective, however, there are numerous problems with 
this approach, which is focused on eliminating the full-time insurgents. Quite 
apart from the immorality of attempting to kill large groups without adequate 
trial, such repression may actually increase the resentment and resistance to 
the ruling regime, so that killing ten insurgents actually leaves you with one 
hundred new insurgents to face—this is known as “Afghan math.” As early as 
Cyrus the Great in the sixth century BC, rulers found that it was much easier 
to conquer and govern people by tolerating local cultures and customs than by 
forcing them to conform to central standards.
When the rebellion was obviously violent or extreme, of course, there was 
usually no question about the right and necessity of repression. However, 
if the resistance took the form of large, relatively peaceful and prosperous 
crowds, the troops involved might refuse to fire, and in fact might go over to 
the rebel side. This happened on numerous occasions in European history, 
most notably in Paris in 1789, 1830, and 1848;6 it apparently happened again 
in 2011 in Egypt, although we don’t know all the details yet.
Moreover, what about the case when the government itself regarded the 
rebels as simply misguided citizens? Consider, for example, the long and pa-
tient efforts of the British government to deal with the American colonists 
during the 1760s and 1770s. Even after the skirmishes at Lexington and Con-
cord had converted the confrontation into a rebellion, Sir Henry Clinton, the 
British commander in New England, wrote that he needed “to gain the hearts 
and subdue the minds of America.”7 
To further complicate matters, what happened when the counterinsurgent 
force was from a foreign country, thereby giving the insurgent easy propa-
ganda victories such as labeling the third party as a colonialist and the existing 
government as a puppet? In Afghanistan, for example, the United States and 
its NATO allies have attempted to enforce what we consider to be universal 
values, such as equality for women and suppression of the drug trade based on 
poppy cultivation. As Ralph Peters has noted, this makes the Westerners into 
the revolutionaries, upsetting the social and economic norms of the popula-
tion in question. Such actions can well give rise to what David Kilcullen has 
termed “the Accidental Guerrilla,” the man fighting not for some abstract 
revolutionary cause but rather to defend his locality and way of life.8 Kilcul-
len argues convincingly that our true enemies, such as al-Qaeda, can provoke 
us into such situations, which only contribute to the insurgent’s ability to 
wear out the counterinsurgent while politically weakening the already-fragile 
state in question. Meanwhile, the guerrilla uses the local culture as part of 
his camouflage, with the foreign troops on the outside trying to pierce that 
camouflage.
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Therefore, instead of viewing insurgencies as simply rebels vs. government 
or patriots vs. repressors, the most common recent view of this problem is 
what John Shy once called “the triangularity of the struggle.”9 This viewpoint 
assumes that there are three actors in any insurgency: a minority of people 
who actively support the insurgency, another minority of people who actively 
support the existing regime and its counterinsurgent effort, and a large group 
of people—often the majority of the population—who are generally neutral. 
This majority undoubtedly has opinions about the issues at stake, but is more 
concerned with its own livelihood and security from attack.10 Shy argued that 
in the American Revolution, for example, the British ultimately lost because 
they could not protect the populace from Patriot irregulars, leaving that popu-
lace no choice but to acquiesce with the revolutionaries. In fact, Shy noted 
that the rebels used the mechanism of local government to force everyone to 
join the local Patriot militia. Neutrality became impossible, and the minority 
of British Loyalists had to move to other British colonies.
This triangular interpretation is behind the now-common theory of 
population-centric, rather than enemy force–centric, counterinsurgency. Here, 
the counterinsurgent forces seek to gain the trust and support of the popula-
tion, not only protecting the people from attack and trying to separate the in-
surgents from the populace but, where necessary, addressing local needs such as 
water, sanitation, schools, and so on. One obvious drawback of this approach, 
of course, is that it never produces the kind of overnight success that Western 
societies expect from their militaries. In fact, it is difficult if not impossible to 
develop objective measurements of the degree of success, if any, that the coun-
terinsurgent forces are having in gaining popular support.11 However, given 
the protracted nature of most insurgencies, the counterinsurgent force might 
as well try to accomplish something positive while waiting for the insurgent 
to fail or lose hope. Another aspect is that the counterinsurgent must always 
try to use minimum force, like a policeman, while the insurgent has no such 
limits on violence.12 Any deadly force, however necessary, may cause civilian 
casualties or otherwise alienate the population the counterinsurgent seeks to 
attract. This is particularly difficult for conventional armed forces, which are 
designed to deliver maximum rather than minimum force.
The actual winner in any insurgency depends on many factors. First and 
foremost, as already suggested, is the legitimacy of the government and the de-
gree to which the populace recognizes that government as legal and binding. 
This, of course, is at the heart of this conference’s focus on “failed states.” To 
draw an obvious conclusion about the two conflicts in Vietnam, for example, 
much of the populace rightly or wrongly considered the French and the South 
Vietnamese governments to be foreign and unrepresentative. No amount of 
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military skill in the field can overcome such a perception, as it saps the will of 
the populace, as well as of any third-party nation, such as the United States, 
that is involved in the counterinsurgency. In Vietnam, American efforts to 
avoid the image of foreign colonialism only handicapped our efforts without 
convincing the local populace. You may recall that the senior American head-
quarters in that struggle was called the “U.S. Military Assistance Command, 
Vietnam”—we maintained the fiction that we were only “assisting” the army 
of the Republic of Vietnam, and thus never achieved unity of command and 
effort. 
Another consideration, which we tend to overlook, is geography. Terrain 
that is difficult to move through—mountains, forests, swamps, jungles— 
usually favors the insurgent, who can more easily attack and retreat as neces-
sary. Such terrain also drives up the cost of counterinsurgency, because the 
only way the security forces can get at the insurgents is by means of very ex-
pansive hardware such as helicopters and aircraft. More importantly, however, 
one has to look at the borders of the country under attack. Every insurgent 
needs access to another country, preferably a friendly one, which provides 
sanctuary, weapons, supplies, and so on. In both of the Indo-Chinese conflicts 
(that is, 1946–1954 and 1959–1975), the North Vietnamese Communists 
had ready access to Chinese sanctuary, aid, and advice; in the second conflict, 
the North used the neutral countries of Laos and Cambodia to funnel troops 
and weapons into South Vietnam. If, on the other hand, the insurgency is iso-
lated on islands (such as the Philippines) or a peninsula (Malaya and Greece), 
or even by artificial structures such as elaborate border fortifications (Algeria), 
the insurgent will be much more vulnerable to being cut off and defeated. 
Then there are the nonmilitary factors. Unemployment and poverty favor 
an insurgent and make it difficult for the government to assist the populace. 
Generally speaking, a successful counterinsurgency will involve the united ef-
forts of all the government’s agencies and all its levers of power—political/
diplomatic, information, military, and economic.
futuRe WaRfaRe
With this brief background, let me leave the comfortable realm of the histo-
rian and attempt to make observations about future warfare. Still, history is 
the only source, however imperfect, of data from which to generalize, so bear 
with me.13
We should recognize that future wars will not necessarily be insurgencies 
or asymmetrical contests like those of the past decade. I would submit that 
this is true for two reasons: First, nation-states remain strong, and there is 
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always the possibility of another conventional force-on-force conflict. I am 
not one of those who claim that we will have a military collision with China, 
but neither can we exclude unexpected conflicts, such as the Falklands or 
Malvinas War of 1982 or the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2009. As Defense 
Secretary Robert Gates remarked in a 2011 speech, “when it comes to pre-
dicting the nature and location of our next military engagements, since Viet-
nam, our record has been perfect. We have never once gotten it right, from 
the Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, 
Iraq, and more—we had no idea a year before any of these missions that we 
would be so engaged.”14 
Moreover, the very fact that Western forces are today preoccupied with 
counterinsurgency means that such forces neglect the conventional skills that 
gave them military dominance. Because training time and funds are limited, 
soldiers can’t master every possible form of warfare. To cite but one example, 
during the early years of this century, the Israel Defense Forces had to dedicate 
all their troops to security and counterinsurgency against radical Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza. The IDF had little time to practice the armor-
heavy combat that had made it famous. This is one of the principal reasons 
for Israel’s defeat by Hezbollah in 2006. This risk is particularly great if the 
insurgent is able to combine conventional and unconventional weapons and 
tactics. Such a combination is usually called “hybrid warfare,” although it is 
largely a variant of the compound warfare I mentioned earlier.15
Still, it is a safe bet that asymmetrical warfare will remain a major form of 
conflict in the foreseeable future. If anything, such tactics are easier to apply in 
the twenty-first century than in the nineteenth or twentieth century because 
of improved technology. For example, the classic problem for revolutionaries 
was to minimize the effects of one rebel being captured or converted by the 
government. The usual method to limit the damage was to organize small 
cells, consisting of only three people, so that one person could possibly be-
tray the names of only the other two people in his or her cell, plus one more 
person located in an adjacent cell. This was the structure of bomb-makers 
in Algiers in 1957, when the French army used months of investigation and 
frequent torture to trace the members of all the cells and put the terrorists out 
of action.16 In 1965, however, science-fiction author Robert Heinlein cor-
rectly predicted that a computer network would enable revolutionaries to con-
tact innumerable fellow conspirators without ever meeting or even knowing 
the identities of those conspirators.17 The advent of the Internet, Facebook, 
cell phones, and other electronic devices makes insurgency much easier, and 
counterinsurgency more difficult, than it was fifty years ago. The unsuccessful 
efforts of the Egyptian and Iranian governments to deny Internet service show 
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how difficult it is for any state to control the flow of information as it might 
have done years ago.
Moreover, insurgencies no longer need to complete their rebellions in a 
hail of gunfire and an armed march on the capital. Particularly when dealing 
with weak states, the insurgent may well be able to co-opt the government 
from within. Hezbollah has clearly done this in Lebanon, combining its repu-
tation as an opponent of Israel with large social welfare programs and a ma-
jor political party. Hamas attempted to do the same thing in the Gaza Strip, 
culminating in its 2007 takeover of the Strip from the Palestine Liberation 
Front; unfortunately for the people of Gaza, Hamas is stuck on the horns of 
a dilemma because it has pledged never to recognize Israel or cede Arab land, 
and without such recognition its rule has only led to more misery. 
The Mexican drug conspiracies, like the Taliban in Pakistan, represent a 
variation on this theme. Traditionally, we have assumed that an insurgent 
sought to take over control of the entire state, but what happens if a nonstate 
actor is satisfied with controlling a particular border region? Although one 
can hardly categorize Mexico or Pakistan as a “failed state,” in each case the 
nonstate actors have challenged the central government’s exclusive control of 
force in specific areas. Perhaps the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia 
have accomplished the same thing in Georgia, although there the conven-
tional force of Russia is far more significant than any local insurgency.
Both of these approaches—co-opting from within, like Hezbollah; and 
gaining control of a limited region within a larger state—complicate the 
efforts not only of the state being attacked, but also of third parties such as 
the United States who are willing to help counter the insurgency. It is already 
difficult politically for a sovereign state to ask for foreign assistance against a 
classic internal insurgency, but even more embarrassing to admit that one can’t 
maintain order in some small area along one’s own border. Thus, no matter 
how many drones the US may employ on the Pakistani border, Islamabad 
simply cannot invite the US in to help police the border regions in question. 
Nor, given our troubled history, can Mexico City ask for US troops.
To come back to the overall future of insurgency: Insurgencies are fun-
damentally about extreme public dissatisfaction with the existing regime or, 
perhaps in the case of nonstate actors such as al-Qaeda, dissatisfaction with an 
entire group of regimes. The demonstrations and violence that occurred in the 
winter of 2010–2011 reflect massive economic and political unrest quite apart 
from the cultural clashes of Western society with the rest of the world. Even 
in cases such as Tunisia and Egypt, where the ruling regimes collapsed quickly, 
their successors will be hard-pressed to satisfy public demands for change. We 
appear to be entering another era like that of the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
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when large colonial empires dissolved quickly and the newly independent 
people expected major changes to occur overnight. This so-called “Revolu-
tion of Rising Expectations” meant that no government or economy, however 
successful, could keep up with public illusions about what was possible. Add 
increasing worldwide scarcity in grain and fuels, and you have a witches’ brew 
of frustration. This situation is rife with the possibilities for armed conflict 
and perhaps insurgency. 
With that as background, let me conclude by listing some of the factors 
that can facilitate efforts to counter and control future insurgencies:
First and foremost, as I already noted, is the need for the existing state to be 
functioning and legitimate. One can argue that no state can do this without 
first establishing a secure environment, but the reverse is also true—a secure 
environment means nothing if the majority of the population does not per-
ceive the government as legitimate. 
Second, and closely related, is the need for that government to understand 
and address the needs of the people, including the issues (real or invented) 
on which the insurgents are building. Especially when foreign troops such as 
Americans become involved in counterinsurgency, those foreign troops must 
both understand the culture and issues with which they are dealing and make 
every effort to have the host nation’s forces appear to be in charge and effective.
Third, it is important to recognize the insurgency as such at the earliest 
possible point in time. Some of you undoubtedly recall the Bush administra-
tion’s repeated refusal to admit that there was an insurgency in Iraq during 
2004 and 2005. This is natural, because governments prefer to regard any 
rebels as criminals, without dignifying the insurgents’ political cause by dis-
cussing it publicly. However, as long as the existing government insists that it’s 
dealing with only criminals, then all the peacetime constraints about mini-
mum force, probable cause, sufficient evidence, and so on apply to efforts to 
control those “criminals.” 
It is also important to avoid assuming that all your opponents have the 
same goals. Particularly in weak or failed states, there may well be multiple 
different groups of insurgents with different agendas. By lumping them all 
under a simple label such as “jihadists,” the counterinsurgents not only fail 
to understand their motivations but also miss opportunities to form alliances 
with some groups against others.
Fourth, the full-time insurgents must be isolated from outside help and, 
as far as possible, from the support of the populace. So long as the insurgents 
can easily cross and recross borders while gaining information, recruits, and 
supplies from the populace, the counterinsurgents will have great difficulty 
repressing the uprising. 
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Fifth, while local paramilitary police and infantry troops are essential to 
provide government presence throughout the country, these “boots on the 
ground” cannot sustain themselves without a structure for recruiting, paying, 
training, and supplying those forces in the field. In Vietnam, Iraq, and now 
Afghanistan, the United States has found it much easier to build infantry bat-
talions than a durable logistics support structure. 
Finally, the counterinsurgency effort has to be sustainable both economi-
cally and psychologically. As I noted earlier, the essence of an insurgency is to 
wear down the security forces both physically and mentally. Insurgents who 
are motivated by their religious beliefs in an afterlife are particularly suited 
to such a protracted, attritional conflict. In order to win, not only the troops 
involved but the nation or nations providing those troops must recognize that 
insurgency is often measured in decades, not months. As Henry Kissinger 
observed about the United States in Vietnam, “In the process, we lost sight of 
one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not 
lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win.”18
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Chapter 4
“The Lessons of the Last War Are Clear”
The Military-Industrial Complex, Private Contractors, 
and US Foreign Policy
James M. Carter
The recent conflict has demonstrated more convincingly than ever before 
the strength our nation can best derive from the integration of all of our 
national resources in time of war. It is of the utmost importance that  
the lessons of this experience be not forgotten in the peacetime planning 
and training of the Army. The future security of the nation demands that 
all those civilian resources . . . be associated closely with the activities of the 
Army in time of peace. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, April 27, 1946
This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large 
arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—
economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every State house, 
every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for 
this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. 
Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of 
our society.
In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition 
of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-
industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power 
exists and will persist.
—Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January 17, 1961
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It may well be that the lessons of the last war are always clear. The problem 
is that those lessons are often much more obviously useful for the last war, 
and not necessarily for those to come. When General Eisenhower drew on 
World War II as “the last war” for its lessons, he believed the war had been 
won in large part through total mobilization and the use of the private sector. 
Going forward, then, he viewed the integration of various public, academic, 
scientific, military, and political resources as vital to the nation’s foreign policy, 
national security, and, ultimately, its wars. Over the next decade and a half, 
those resources were indeed integrated as the nation prepared and launched 
a cold war. So thorough had been this integration that Eisenhower famously 
warned the nation in his 1961 Farewell Address of a “military-industrial com-
plex,” and of “the potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power” that 
had accompanied that integration. 
At the end of the Cold War more than four decades later, that integration 
had expanded dramatically. Much of what the former Republican president 
warned against not only had come to pass, but either was not recognized as 
threatening to the nation’s ideals and democratic institutions or was embraced 
as part of a pervasive “new American militarism” according to some, including 
military historian Andrew Bacevich.1 To be sure, a reliance on private corpo-
rations is not of recent vintage. During the Vietnam War, as this essay will 
make clear, the United States turned over to a private consortium responsi-
bility for nearly all construction projects designed to make a large-scale war 
possible. On their own terms, they succeeded, and many termed what they 
accomplished “the construction miracle of the decade,” despite a tragic and 
failed war. In any case, most of us take for granted that the United States now 
conducts foreign policy interventions, occupations, wars, and nation-building 
campaigns relying to a large extent on the private sector. The increased role 
of private corporations, even the “privatization of the military,” is fraught 
with problems—problems of war profiteering and corruption, problems of 
accountability and transparency. Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the 
phenomenon has grown exponentially. This essay will explore these changes 
by viewing the corporate roles in both Iraq and Vietnam and will attempt to 
deal with some of their implications for the future of US foreign policy. 
the eNd of the cold WaR aNd the “last suPPeR”
In 1993, the administration of Bill Clinton, and specifically his secretary of 
defense, Les Aspin, organized a gathering of about fifteen CEOs from the 
leading military contractors for dinner at the Pentagon. One of those present 
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at the dinner was Norman Augustine, then head of Martin Marietta. He later 
recounted part of the evening, saying, “At the dinner, I was seated next to the 
defense secretary, and we discussed what appeared to be the industry’s evolving 
strategy for survival—a strategy which I referred to as Mutual Assured Starva-
tion,” a scenario in which multiple companies compete to build the pieces of 
one airplane—rather than those companies each building multiple airplanes.2 
Augustine understood that budgets would be shrinking and, of course, that 
meant fewer and fewer orders for contractors. 
As it turned out, however, that’s not what the secretary had in mind that 
evening. Indeed, the administration’s plans for the future of the leading Pen-
tagon contractors were much more far-reaching. Aspin told his audience, in 
no uncertain terms, that they would have to either merge or die. Contractors 
grown fat on the swollen budgets of the Reagan military buildup during the 
1980s would now have to learn to make do with less. The Pentagon needed 
fewer contractors, and those gathered would be responsible for getting the 
industry in line with a new economic landscape. The Pentagon would, in 
part, subsidize the transition by taking care of the costs of dismantling facto-
ries, moving parts and equipment and so on.3 The resulting wave of mergers 
and acquisitions that followed is well known: “The rest is history,” Augus-
tine later wrote. “General Electric Aerospace merged with Martin Marietta, 
which combined with Lockheed. McDonnell Douglas joined Boeing. Grum-
man joined Northrop. When the dust had cleared, there were only a few 
firms left standing.” Those remaining, five actually, are often referred to as 
the “primes,” and include Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Ratheon, 
Northop-Grumman, and Boeing.4 They are just one, albeit large, exponent 
of the modern military-industrial complex. Little did the so-called primes 
realize how drastically this private-government relationship would expand 
over the next decade. 
Around the same time, Dick Cheney boasted about the omnipresence of 
his former company, Brown and Root, in the conduct of US foreign policy, 
saying, “The first person to greet our soldiers as they arrive in the Balkans and 
the last one to wave good-bye is one of our employees.”5 Although speaking 
specifically about the firm’s role in the Balkans crisis of the 1990s, Cheney’s 
comment reflected a larger phenomenon that has grown exponentially over 
the years since. That phenomenon is the United States government’s reliance 
upon private corporations to meet its foreign policy objectives. Today, hun-
dreds of private corporations operate under contract with the government 
to provide services too numerous to count. Their presence mushroomed in 
the years following the end of the Cold War. Now, hundreds of companies 
compete for federal contracts supporting the US military operations around 
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the world. From 1994 to 2002, the US government signed more than three 
thousand contracts worth an estimated $300 billion with private firms.6 
Many more corporations than most Americans realize are now tied to the 
conduct of US foreign policy in complex ways. They are no longer merely 
called upon by the state for support during war; nor are they simply producing 
this or that weapon system for the Pentagon. They are increasingly present in 
the absence of war in the everyday functioning of the US military worldwide 
and carry out many tasks that were once the responsibility of uniformed per-
sonnel. At the same time, these companies have become ensconced in political 
terms as well. In addition to extensive lobbying efforts, companies skillfully 
establish a production presence in as many states across the nation as possible, 
and thus have effective political leverage in the Congress through elected of-
ficials who will move to protect the jobs these companies create. That political 
insulation is parlayed into increasing legislative favors, Pentagon and State De-
partment contracts, access to power, and a more influential voice in the coun-
try’s foreign affairs generally. This access and influence are perhaps nowhere 
more visible than in the invasion and occupation of Iraq beginning in 2003. 
“a PaRade of hoRRIbles”: PRIvate coNtRactoRs aNd the  
RecoNstRuctIoN of IRaq
In September 2001, then secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld initiated a 
review of existing Iraq War plans and ordered that the new plans not include 
any preparations for administering Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein. 
Shortly thereafter, in early 2002, the State Department initiated its own study 
to deal specifically with postwar requirements of an Iraqi state with no govern-
ment. By August 2002, the National Security Council also had initiated its 
own internal study. Around the same time, interagency groups involved in the 
planning included the CIA; the US Agency for International Development 
(USAID); the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Defense, Treasury, Justice and 
Commerce Departments. Despite what might appear to be a lot of serious 
planning and preparations for the massive reconstruction needs of a postinva-
sion Iraq, the reverse was the case. The various agency and interagency groups 
worked instead on their own corner of the problem as they saw it. None really 
knew what the others were doing. Indeed, “all the interagency Iraq planning 
groups were working in secret. Few knew the others existed,” according to the 
report.7 
State and Defense each produced dark scenarios—a list of 29 from Defense 
included at number 13 “not finding WMD”—termed a “Parade of Horribles” 
and “The Perfect Storm,” for what might go wrong in Iraq, and yet neither 
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shared these assessments with the others. As planning proceeded, systematic 
study and policy formation around reconstruction needs were shunted aside 
by Rumsfeld and Defense as the administration tightly focused on the military 
task of toppling Saddam Hussein. Before the end of the year, President Bush 
assigned the Defense Department total responsibility for postinvasion Iraq. 
In making the decision, the president had sidestepped the existing internal 
system—those numerous interagency working groups toiling away for months 
crafting plans to stabilize Iraq—in favor of Defense and Rumsfeld’s own in-
house working groups. Those working outside the Department of Defense 
couldn’t believe what had just happened—one USAID official recalled, “We 
were just stunned.” The point of all this is to demonstrate the unconscionable 
lack of coordination and policy integration amid which the United States in-
vaded Iraq.8
Following the rapid American invasion and conquest of Iraq in March 2003, 
postwar planners and experts were quickly flown into neighboring countries 
to wait for the dust to settle before entering Baghdad to begin their work in 
stabilizing and rebuilding a ravaged country. Within weeks, the federal gov-
ernment began granting contracts to American corporations to rebuild Iraq’s 
infrastructure. According to the Center for Public Integrity’s investigation, 
those with the best relationship to government officials quickly found them-
selves on an inside track with greater access to the enormous sums of money 
pouring into Iraq. As of September 2003, Vice President Dick Cheney’s old 
company Halliburton, and subsidiary Kellogg Brown and Root, had received 
almost one-quarter billion dollars in payment for work done so far, with much 
more to follow. The total contract value stood at $2.3 billion.9 In less than a 
year, additional federal contracts brought their total to more than $11 billion. 
Among other tasks, the companies were responsible for the rebuilding of Iraq’s 
oil-producing infrastructure. 
Halliburton (and subsidiary KBR), though by far the largest contractor in 
Iraq, was only one of many dozens of similar corporations contracted for bil-
lions in reconstruction projects. Bechtel Group, also a corporation with solid 
government connections, signed contracts with the government valued at 
$2.8 billion. Washington Group International, another well-connected firm 
with an interesting history in the federal contracting business, which I will 
explore in some detail below, signed on for around $500 million for Afghani-
stan and more than $3 billion for work in Iraq. Blackwater USA contracted 
to provide an array of security services valued at $21 million. DynCorp, the 
private corporation charged with creating and training an Iraqi police force, 
contracted for around $93 million. Vinnell Corporation (Northrop Grum-
man), tasked with training the New Iraqi Army (NIA), signed on for $48 
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million. Fluor Corporation, a construction giant with some 50,000 employees 
in 25 countries spread across 6 continents, contracted for projects totaling 
$3.7 billion in logistics support. CH2M Hill, a Colorado-based firm handling 
construction and engineering tasks, signed on for more than $1.5 billion; and 
American International Contractors, Inc., specializing in an array of construc-
tion services, signed contracts valued at $1.5 billion. Still, these were just a 
few of the more than one hundred corporations contracted for work in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.10 
By late summer, independent experts estimated that one-third of the $3.9 
billion cost of the ongoing conquest and occupation of Iraq was devoted to 
private contractors. The flood of money to postwar Iraq (and Afghanistan) 
continued to grow. In November 2003, the Bush administration pushed for 
and the Congress appropriated $18.7 billion to cover the initial costs of re-
construction and logistics work for Iraq. The pace of the work surprised nearly 
everyone, including officials at the Pentagon, who quickly found themselves 
inundated with not only requests and bids, but also complaints and accu-
sations of cronyism, fraud, and corruption. Officials quickly established a 
central office to oversee the letting of contracts, stating, “The work in Iraq 
is moving at such an incredible pace that we needed one office to oversee 
everything.”11 At the same time, representatives from hundreds of companies 
flocked to a Pentagon conference for contractors held in Arlington, Virginia, 
to hawk their particular wares and solicit work from the federal government. 
One excited conference attendee and prospective bidder pointed out, “There 
is just so much money that we can tap into. It’s just wonderful to have this 
opportunity.”12 Before the year was out, more than 150 US corporations had 
received contracts worth some $50 billion for work in Afghanistan and Iraq.13
These companies (as well as numerous subcontractors) scrambled to build 
and rebuild the infrastructure destroyed over the past dozen years. They be-
gan work on a police network, a military force, a communications grid, a 
transportation system, an integrated media system, the oil production and 
transportation system, water and sewage treatment systems, and ports. The 
number of those working for the contractors immediately climbed to between 
fifty thousand and seventy-five thousand, making the numbers working for 
private contractors in Iraq alone greater, by more than 2 to 1, than the military 
forces making up what the Bush administration called the “coalition of the 
willing.”14 The contractor employees seemed even more willing.15
Many of the activities and practices of these private and largely unaccount-
able corporations were the object of sharp criticism from the public, media 
outlets, and congressional watchdogs.16 The way in which the contracts were 
let, for example, led to accusations of favoritism, cronyism, and conflicts of 
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interest among government officials with close ties to the military industry. 
Former secretary of defense and head of Halliburton (and then vice president 
of the United States) Dick Cheney was only the most well-known and visible 
of these. Contracts awarded to Halliburton, KBR, and Bechtel raised congres-
sional eyebrows because the contracts were awarded on the basis of an existing 
and past relationship with the federal government and were not open to any 
outside bidding process. In some cases, corporate representatives sat in on 
meetings at which they discussed the terms of the contract the company was 
about to receive, thus obliterating the line between the federal government 
and private firms. 
Additionally, the contracts through which these deals were codified were 
known as “cost-plus-award-fee.” This kind of contract stipulates that the gov-
ernment will pay for all costs associated with the job as well as an additional 
award fee based on performance. Most of them were arranged through either 
the US Defense Department or the Agency for International Development, 
and investigating officials were then unable to gain access to them in order to 
better understand the process. Although made illegal amid the revelations of 
World War I profiteering, this particular contractual device was decades ago 
revived and now flourishes in Iraq and Afghanistan. The cost-plus-award-fee 
arrangement permits rising profits as costs rise; all a contractor has to do to 
increase the former is to increase the latter. Consequently, curbing the costs 
of the work or project becomes disadvantageous to a corporation that might 
otherwise be keen to reduce costs in the interest of greater profits. Through 
these contracts, private corporations realized windfall profits by taking ad-
vantage of the relative urgency, chaos, and uncertainty of war. Despite clear 
evidence of fraud, mismanagement, corruption, and kickbacks, the Bush 
administration steadfastly refused to make the system transparent, and con-
gressional committees of jurisdiction have also repeatedly refused to launch 
serious and public investigations.17
Congressman Henry Waxman, by far the most visible figure investigat-
ing and calling for greater scrutiny of the whole process, wrote that the Bush 
administration intended to reward a few handpicked companies by award-
ing “individual contractors monopolies over different sectors of the Iraqi 
economy.”18 By spring 2004, there were some twenty-three hundred recon-
struction projects planned, and none of the contracts for them were subject to 
competitive bidding.19 Evidence of corruption, kickbacks, bribery, and waste 
was pervasive.
One journalist wrote that “June 2004 has emerged as a month when both 
money and accountability were thrown out the window.” June 2004 was, not 
coincidentally, the month for the official transfer of authority from the United 
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States to the Iraqis, the dissolution of the American-run Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA). Referring to the unregulated atmosphere then prevailing in 
Iraq as “something like a Barneys warehouse sale in the Wild West,” the Los 
Angeles Times disclosed official documents exposing a frenzied effort to rush 
contracts and otherwise logjammed projects through the system hurriedly to 
beat the deadline for the transferal of power. On just one day in late May, offi-
cials pushed through more than $1.5 billion in spending for projects. In excess 
of one thousand contracts were signed in the month of June alone, roughly 
double the usual monthly figure. Two-thirds of those were signed without 
following standard procedures. Investigators later found refurbished schools 
and hospitals in a state of disrepair. Many projects remained incomplete or 
were not begun. In some places, piles of materials awaited the start of projects, 
and in others, workers waited for materials. Relying on official statements, the 
Los Angeles Times reported that even the oil and power infrastructures “are in 
worse shape than during the regime of Saddam Hussein.”20 
American officials in Iraq during this period conceded that the frenetic 
atmosphere led to unimaginable waste and corruption. In more than one in-
stance, occupation officials were given large amounts of cash, $6.75 million 
in one case, and told simply to get rid of it by the end of the month. Iraq was 
awash in pallets of shrink-wrapped bricks of cash—American soldiers actually 
played football with them to fight boredom.21 
Those who worked closely with the firm Custer Battles LLC came forward 
to report shocking levels of bribery and kickbacks totaling untold millions. 
Halliburton (and subsidiary KBR) accepted bribes for handing out subcon-
tracts from their posh villa in Kuwait, digs they had staked out well before 
the invasion of Iraq even began. With the invasion quickly over and the long 
and costly occupation begun, KBR proceeded to vastly overcharge the US 
government to transport fuel into Iraq and to provide meals to soldiers. The 
profiteering in this case climbed to more than $150 million. Vinnell Corpora-
tion did such an apparently poor job of training Iraqi forces that the entire 
first battalion walked off the job, and the US Army had to take over. Employ-
ees from the security firm CACI International were deeply entangled in the 
prisoner abuse scandal at the Abu Ghraib facility. These and other companies 
remained virtually unaccountable for a time. By late 2005, however, a US 
District Court handed out the first formal indictments for instances of money 
laundering, bribery, wire fraud, conspiracy, and interstate transportation of 
stolen property. American officials working for the Coalition Provisional Au-
thority, investigators soon discovered, had accepted bribes of hundreds of 
thousands of dollars to steer government contracts worth more than $13 mil-
lion to particular companies. The conspirators kept this hidden by writing 
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bids not exceeding $500,000. Any contract beyond that amount would be 
reviewed by higher-level officials.22 
Overall, the rebuilding or state building in Iraq moved sluggishly along. A 
disproportionate share of money committed to Iraq was in fact devoted to deal-
ing with military and security needs and related construction and not to the 
building/rebuilding campaign. Large-scale military campaigns launched against 
Al Fallujah and An Najaf aimed at defeating an increasingly sophisticated in-
surgency garnered inordinate energies as well as media coverage. Relatively little 
reconstruction aid had actually been spent. Of $18.4 billion in the 2004 supple-
ment, only $3.6 billion was committed to relief and reconstruction efforts (about 
35 percent of the goal). Of this figure, only $2.1 billion had been obligated.23 As 
of late 2005, the Congress had approved $20.9 billion for the reconstruction of 
Iraq. Of that figure, $12 billion had been spent. Additionally, estimates of the 
costs of increased security ran from 22 to 36 percent of each rebuilding project. 
Violent attacks and broad-based resistance to the American presence had con-
tinued to grow since 2003. Military officials reported dozens of attacks daily on 
US forces and Iraqis who cooperated with them. From May to September 2005, 
insurgent attacks killed more than three thousand in Baghdad alone.24
Reflecting the increased violence throughout Iraq, in March 2005, the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) canceled two power genera-
tor projects to move $15 million to ramp up security. Other projects were cut 
for the greater emphasis on security issues. These mounting costs resulted in 
dozens of millions in reconstruction aid being shifted away from rebuilding 
projects. Relatively optimistic estimates found that 1,887 of 2,784 projects 
had been completed. These included power stations, water treatment facili-
ties, and police stations. In many cases, however, completed projects remained 
unusable. Five of the newly constructed electrical substations, built at a cost 
of $28.8 million, sat idle because no system to distribute the power had been 
built. Others were hastily built and then neglected for lack of trained person-
nel or equipment availability and quickly fell into disrepair. Inspectors also 
found that millions of dollars had been squandered and wasted or completely 
lost.25 Despite successful building projects here and there, auditors and inspec-
tors generally reported on the failure to rebuild Iraq’s physical infrastructure. 
Even though more than $5.5 billion was committed to restoring electricity 
service, according to a July 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
report, “power generation was still at lower levels as of May than it had been 
before the U.S. invasion in 2003.”26 
Even for those features of state building for which money had been spent 
and some work done, the results were mixed at best. An independent investi-
gator who traveled to Iraq to see the progress found supposedly rebuilt schools 
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with leaky roofs, no working sewage systems, flooded playgrounds, unreliable 
electricity, missing and broken equipment, and peeling paint. All across Iraq’s 
cities, the electrical grid was notoriously unreliable, and due to a rise in the 
incidence of cholera, kidney stones, and diarrhea, people did not generally 
trust that the water was potable. With hospitals and clinics still lacking ade-
quate medicines, equipment, funding, and staffing, the nation’s public health 
infrastructure also remained critically fractured.27 
The US occupation authorities had as their central task the reversal of years 
of downwardly spiraling public health trends. A young population (half are 
under eighteen years of age), Iraqis were also saddled with high infant and 
childhood mortality rates; high general, chronic, and acute malnutrition rates; 
and an elevated rate of infectious disease.28 These conditions hit the young 
particularly hard. Chronic illness, such as high blood pressure and cholesterol, 
was much more prevalent among women and the elderly. More than 220,000 
Iraqis lived with chronic illnesses directly attributed to war. The 2003 war in 
Iraq exacerbated these trends. A 2005 study concluded, “The proportion of 
chronically disabled in population groups that are not normally soldiers—
namely women, children below nine and elderly above 60—is larger in the 
ongoing war than in the first Gulf war, and was in turn larger in the first Gulf 
war than in the Iran-Iraq war.”29 Despite the seeming omnipresence of private 
contractors, remarkably little had been done to rebuild the physical infrastruc-
ture of the ravaged nation and to reverse these ominous trends. 
As the months turned into years and as chaos engulfed Iraq, concerned 
officials and experts sought examples or lessons from history that might help 
solve these complicated problems. In doing so, they often settled upon those 
examples they believed successful, and least likely to highlight the very kind 
of failures they were encountering. As such, administration officials and aca-
demic experts rarely, if ever, invoked the American war in Vietnam. Despite 
the omnipresence of that war’s long shadow since the 1960s, or perhaps be-
cause of it, it remains the elephant in the room everyone carefully navigates 
around as though it does not exist.30 The great irony here is, of course, that the 
war in Vietnam is perhaps the best place to go searching for insight. That war 
stands out as an example of nation-building in an atmosphere of war and the 
reliance upon private corporations to hastily put in place all the infrastructure 
of a modern state. 
PRIvate coNtRactoRs, WaR PRofIteeRINg, aNd state-buIldINg IN vIetNam
The United States initially became directly involved in Vietnam in the mid-
1950s in an intentionally limited nation-building campaign. One of those 
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limitations was the 17th parallel—the US intended to build a separate, mod-
ern, and independent state in the southern half of the recently independent 
nation of Vietnam. While recognizing at least some of the difficulties of build-
ing a new nation where before no such nation had existed, the architects of 
US Cold War containment doctrine were nothing if not confident. Keeping 
the military presence limited and never imagining war, the administration of 
Dwight Eisenhower began to rely upon dozens of private contractors to carry 
out the construction of the new nation. Within half a dozen years, Vietnam-
ese nationalists had organized an effective resistance and begun to fight back. 
Nation-building prescriptions alone were not working, and the United States 
faced the possibility of failure unless it beat back local resistance by increas-
ing its own involvement in and aid to its client regime in the capital city of 
Saigon.31 
Because southern Vietnam in the 1950s–1960s lacked anything approach-
ing a modern communication and transportation infrastructure, significantly 
escalating the American presence also required substantial physical devel-
opment. Consequently, in 1965 the administration of Lyndon B. Johnson 
breathed new life into a several-year-old $15 million construction contract 
awarded to a two-firm consortium made up of Raymond International and 
Morrison-Knudsen (RMK). In 1996, Morrison-Knudsen, a construction gi-
ant based in Boise, Idaho, became Washington Group International following 
a merger. The Vietnam consortium, of which it was the lead sponsor, had 
handled military construction needs since 1962. Reliance on private firms to 
carry out the construction for a wider American presence would prevent hav-
ing to escalate with tens of thousands of troops months earlier than eventually 
happened.32 
By the spring of 1965, construction allocations climbed to over $150 
million, and RMK could hardly keep pace. Construction projects quickly 
spread across much of southern Vietnam and involved bases, ports, am-
munition dumps, airfields, radio installations, refugee camps, barracks, fuel 
depots, hospitals, and warehouses. By May the consortium had more than 
doubled its workforce from the 1964 level, hiring several hundred American 
construction workers and eleven thousand Vietnamese, largely as nonskilled 
laborers. Several months later, the orders still ran far ahead of the capacity of 
RMK alone. One exasperated MK official explained, “All we knew was that 
they wanted a lotta roads, a lotta airfields, a lotta bridges, and a lotta ports, 
and that they probably would want it all finished by yesterday.” In early Au-
gust, RMK brought on board two other large American construction firms, 
Brown and Root and J. A. Jones Construction, to form the RMK-BRJ. This 
consortium, frequently called the largest construction entity ever, became 
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the sole contractor for the federal government for construction projects in 
Vietnam. The consortium, renaming itself the “Vietnam Builders” in 1966, 
played a key role in the American presence in Vietnam and ingratiated itself 
there just as much as the US military or the other exponents of the Ameri-
can mission.33
At its peak, the consortium’s workforce numbered slightly more than 
51,000, with around 47,000 Vietnamese, Koreans, Filipinos, and others, 
and 4,000 Americans overwhelmingly in supervisory and management roles. 
Within these numbers, however, this workforce changed a great deal. Over 
the life of the contract, the Builders employed between 180,000 and 200,000 
Vietnamese. A high rate of turnover, the demands of the work, and the fluid-
ity of a war environment in general gnawed away at cohesion and unity of 
purpose that the private contractors relied upon in their constant race to make 
deadlines and increase the pace of work on hundreds of simultaneous projects 
across southern Vietnam.34 
That work environment was busier and the activity more frenetic than 
ever in 1966. The contractors expected to (and did) achieve $40 million of 
work-in-place per month in the fall. Collectively, the various projects required 
close to 150,000,000 board feet of lumber; 3,600 prefabricated buildings; 
11,000,000 pounds of nails; 750,000 sheets of plywood; and 98,000,000 
pounds of asphalt, plus nearly 2,000 trucks and tractors, just to name a very 
few of the much-needed materials. Construction materials competed with an 
increasing flow of commodity aid, food aid, military aid, and all other imports 
for limited dock space, deep-draft berthing, and airfields. Once the needed 
materials did arrive, a reliable transportation system would have to then dis-
perse the right supplies and equipment to the right job site out of the many 
hundreds then under way. The Builders also required the simultaneous con-
struction of their own camps, demanding still more resources of labor, time, 
materials, and a system of efficient and rapid supply.35 
During the life of the contract, the Vietnam Builders moved 91 million 
cubic yards of earth, used 48 million tons of rock product and nearly 11 
million tons of asphalt, poured 3.7 million yards of concrete (enough to 
have built a wall 2 feet wide and 5 feet high completely around southern 
Vietnam), and moved an average of more than 500,000 tons of goods every 
month. Collectively and individually, they gobbled up hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars in profits for their efforts. In the process, Vietnam Builders 
employed 8,600 Americans and more than 51,000 Vietnamese. They built 
six ports with twenty-nine deep-draft berths, six naval bases, eight jet air-
strips ten thousand feet in length, twelve airfields, just under twenty hospi-
tals, fourteen million square feet of covered storage, and twenty base camps 
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including housing for 450,000 servicemen and their families. In short, they 
put on the ground in southern Vietnam nearly $2 billion (or $8.8 bil-
lion adjusted) in construction of various kinds of facilities and infrastruc-
ture. Only when assessed in full measure does one begin to appreciate why 
those involved referred to their work as “the construction miracle of the 
decade.”36 
The emphasis on preparation for war meant a diminution in emphasis 
on nation-building. While southern Vietnam’s military-related infrastructure, 
roads and bridges, and ports and airfields became modernized, the war de-
stroyed hamlets, villages, and farmland, turned peasants out as refugees, and 
generally disrupted the countryside in an overwhelmingly agrarian society. 
The resulting mass movement and forced urbanization exposed the absence 
of infrastructure in the urban environments as well. Access to decent housing, 
jobs and job training, health care and education, and measures to combat 
poverty and protect against vice and crime were notably absent. At the height 
of the war, the regime in Saigon spent less than 1 percent of its enormous US 
aid budget on public health. Incidences of cholera, dysentery, diarrhea, and 
malnutrition ballooned into a public health crisis. The number of orphans 
also shot up, reaching well over 10,000. The war also produced approximately 
100,000 casualties each year, an estimated 30,000–50,000 amputees awaiting 
prosthetics they would likely never receive, and 4 million refugees out of a 
population of 14 million.37
Tragically, the American aid program also contributed to the obstacles to 
state-building as it inundated southern Vietnam with an array of consumer 
goods, equipment, and people. The avalanche of goods and the resulting eco-
nomic inflation, in fact, became one of the chief preoccupations of the Ameri-
can mission, officials back in Washington, and congressional investigators. In 
1966, the United States sent to Vietnam $793 million in economic aid and 
$686 million in military aid. The level of aid dropped slightly in fiscal 1967, 
but rose again to nearly $2 billion for 1968. Merchandise imports alone ac-
counted for $650–$750 million of this aid package for each of those years. 
This influx of troops, equipment, money, and other goods in large quanti-
ties critically undermined the building of an indigenous economic base, even 
without the flood of people. At the same time, such infusions also created 
many opportunities for corruption, which became rife throughout the aid 
program. Congressional investigators found that an alarming quantity of aid 
goods never reached their intended targets but were diverted into the thriving 
black market that operated as a kind of shadow economy throughout much 
of the war.38 
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According to the USAID, “there was an inordinate amount of corrup-
tion—by any standard. The amount of corruption was far beyond that 
which could be tolerated under the grease-the-wheel theory.” On the 
American side, too, corruption ran rampant in the black market, in cur-
rency manipulation scandals, theft, and more. Corruption ate into the 
program’s effectiveness, its legitimacy, its members’ morale, and its ability 
to carry out the ultimate aims of the United States. The USAID’s final 
comprehensive report concluded, “There is little question that corruption 
. . . was a critical factor in the deterioration of national morale which led 
ultimately to defeat.”39 
There are many explanations for the pronounced level of corruption. Illinois 
representative Donald Rumsfeld, a member of the House investigative team, 
expressed his frustration over this problem: 
I want this record and you gentlemen to know how disappointed I was 
at the discussions in Vietnam with AID personnel. Invariably the reason 
[our questions] could not be answered was because of the lack of re-
cords, the lack of audits, the lack of procedures whereby this information 
would be available. . . . I got the feeling . . . that the information is not 
available. . . . It is distressing for a . . . member of a subcommittee to be 
attempting to come to grips with these problems, and to be repeatedly 
told that necessary and basic information is not available.40
The US aid economy was rife with corruption, graft, waste, and outright 
fraud. Rumsfeld also charged the administration with letting contracts that 
were “illegal by statute.” He criticized in particular the infamous “Presidents 
Club,” to which Brown and Root head George R. Brown, one of the princi-
pal Vietnam contractors, had given tens of thousands of dollars in campaign 
contributions. Rumsfeld pushed for full investigation into the whole affair, 
saying, “Under one contract, between the U.S. Government and this combine 
[RMK-BRJ], it is officially estimated that obligations will reach at least $900 
million by November 1967. . . . Why this huge contract has not been and is 
not now being adequately audited is beyond me. The potential for waste and 
profiteering under such a contract is substantial.”41 
As investigation uncovered waste and corruption in Vietnam, the war 
ground on, inexorably preventing ultimate success for the larger project of 
creating a new, modern, democratic nation below the 17th parallel. For the 
United States, the war in Vietnam finally ended rather ingloriously in 1973, 
and the sovereign nation-state of “South Vietnam” still had never become a 
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reality. Instead, much if not most of southern Vietnam lay in ruins, torn asun-
der by years of warfare extending back to the late 1940s.
too bIg to faIl: mIlItaRy coNtRactoRs aNd the futuRe of  
us foReIgN PolIcy
The once discernible line between the private sector and the public-military 
sector has continued to erode. In the case of Vietnam, the federal government 
relied upon a consortium of just four large firms for nearly all of its mili-
tary construction needs. It selected those firms quite purposefully without 
any semblance of an open, competitive atmosphere. The firms were large and 
formed a collective reach and resource base unmatched by any competitors. 
In the case of Brown and Root, political connections also served them very 
well. Lyndon Johnson chose private contractors to somewhat quietly put in 
place an immense military infrastructure to allow for a greater American mili-
tary role. Construction engineers and military planners quickly began to put 
in place an infrastructure complete with airfields; military bases; deep-draft 
ports; primary and secondary roadways; dredged canals; an electrical grid; 
water, fuel, and oil storage facilities; barracks; and hospitals. The project im-
mediately consumed enormous sums of money and untold manpower, both 
American and Vietnamese. Indeed, this massive military construction project, 
aimed at greater security and making Vietnam defensible, siphoned critical re-
sources away from state-building. This was a dilemma that President Johnson 
explicitly recognized. The private consortium allowed the president to escalate 
to a major war in Vietnam. It could accomplish a great many tasks quickly and 
efficiently. It could not, however, solve the greater crises of state-building. It 
could only temporarily mask those problems. 
In Iraq, the level of corporate involvement, measured in either numeric 
terms or by a scale of the work responsibility, was at least as great as in Viet-
nam. Private firms carried out a range of tasks that, up until recently, the 
military did for itself. The line separating the military role from the private 
corporate role has become faint, to say the least. Corporations were charged 
with a vast rebuilding effort that was central to the larger aims of US policy 
in Iraq. In some cases, employees of private firms such as KBR who had no 
experience or training in combat found themselves in active combat zones at 
an operational level. In other cases, company employees were themselves ex-
military and used their specific training and skills in a combat setting for pay. 
More generally, the rise of what author P. W. Singer has termed the “Privatized 
Military Firm”42 also continues to erode the line between traditional military 
personnel, whose virtue has always been the public trust, and the privatized 
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soldier for hire, whose interest is profit. Both cases seem to suffer a critical lack 
of coordination and oversight that weakens the pursuit of larger policy aims 
amid a diffusion of corruption and mismanagement.
At the same time, corporations such as Halliburton (KBR), Lockheed-
Martin, Boeing, Bechtel, DynCorp, and Northrop-Grumman and hundreds 
of others have become relatively permanent fixtures in Pentagon circles. From 
logistics, supply, research and development, training, security, food prepara-
tion, and base-building, to maintenance and transportation, the American 
military relies heavily upon the private sector. The full effect of these relation-
ships cannot at this point be fully known. There is little doubt that such a 
role for private contractors and the blurring of the line between them and the 
military no doubt impacts both the domestic and the foreign policy realm.
The private arm of US involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq is almost cer-
tainly a harbinger of things to come. It is also a manifestation of a powerful 
American militarism and an omnipresent military-industrial complex. That 
oft-used label once referred to the symbiotic relationship between the public 
military and the private arms makers. The concern, as President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower described it in his famous 1961 speech, was that the latter would 
come to have inordinate influence in the public realm. This depiction of that 
relationship seems almost quaint nowadays. 
The Vietnam experience demonstrates the longevity of this trend. Corpo-
rations have long been deeply involved in the exercise of US foreign policy. 
Further, large, well-placed firms who regularly win government contracts have 
for decades assiduously cultivated their relationships with the government. 
Three of the four firms making up the Vietnam Builders ranked in the top ten 
of four hundred US construction and service companies who contracted with 
the federal government for 1966. All of them actually increased their rankings 
as a result of their work in Vietnam. Morrison-Knudsen moved from number 
5 to 3; Brown and Root moved from number 7 to 2; J. A. Jones moved from 
number 25 to 17. The final company of the consortium, Raymond Inter-
national, ranked tenth among companies doing business outside the United 
States.43 
Many of the corporations winning government contracts during the Viet-
nam War continue to win contracts for work in Afghanistan and Iraq. In 
1966, the top four hundred firms winning contracts with the government in-
cluded Bechtel Corp. (at number one), Brown and Root, Morrison-Knudsen 
(now Washington Group International), Ralph Parsons Company, and Fluor 
Corporation, all in the top ten. Other corporations contracted in Afghanistan 
and Iraq appearing on the list included the corporations of Foster Wheeler, 
Perini, and Vinnell. It should also be understood that government contracts 
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for carrying out the war in Vietnam were not limited to just these few firms. 
Contracts were signed by 523 firms for various tasks and services related to the 
war. The top 62 held contracts worth more than $100 million each. Famil-
iar names such as American Machine and Foundry (AMF), Alcoa, Eastman 
Kodak, Bulova Watch Company, Magnavox, General Motors, McDonnell 
Douglas, Lockheed, DuPont, Boeing, and Honeywell all won contracts. It 
seems unnecessary to even point out that corporations came to see long-term, 
open-ended US foreign policy commitments such as Vietnam as business op-
portunities. As one General Motors executive told an interviewer in 1968, 
“We want to be known as a car and appliance manufacturer, not a merchant 
of war . . . but we also want to be ready to profit from the apparently endless 
series of brushfire wars in which the U.S. seems to involve itself.” So great were 
the ties between the government’s war in Vietnam and American corporations 
that a drawdown of forces in the early 1970s caused alarm for its potential 
harmful impact on the US arms/military industry and on the US economy 
generally.44 
A significant corporate role in the execution of the government’s foreign 
policy objectives, far from being a new phenomenon, is part of a very lengthy 
and complex tradition. The advocates of war in the private sector have long 
profited from its conduct. Do they now also influence the coming and process 
of war itself for that reason? For these mighty corporations to sustain them-
selves, ensure continued profits, stable share prices, and maintain their com-
petitive advantage, they push for greater military spending, an increased role 
in the world in support of the military and preparations for war. Moreover, 
the relationship between corporate, government, and military officials and 
the revolving door of employment opportunities between them deepens and 
perpetuates these connections. Seen this way, US foreign policy interventions 
such as invasions, peacekeeping, sanctions enforcement, and state-building 
and -rebuilding all become job security. This institutionalization of war profi-
teering alters its historic meaning. Corporations once had to rely on the exis-
tence of the specific conditions of warfare for contracts and an opportunity for 
profits. The Cold War re-created these war conditions, albeit in the absence 
of outright warfare between the rival states. And although the post–Cold War 
period yielded a less-than-favorable environment, and forced a restructuring 
of the private arms and military support industry, the role played by priva-
tized military corporations has continued to grow and even flourish. What has 
lagged behind these developments is any real and meaningful transparency, 
accountability, and working out of the relationship between the goals of US 
foreign policy and the ambitions of private firms. 
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Future of War in the Twenty-First Century
Vanda Felbab-Brown
Attempts to anticipate the future of war should be undertaken with great 
humility. Too often, analysts are too strongly influenced by immediate ex-
periences; and determined not to repeat the mistakes of recent military en-
deavors, they are proven incorrect in their assumptions and planning for the 
future. After Vietnam, for example, the United States was determined not to 
get directly involved in another counterinsurgency campaign and structured 
its military doctrine around the use of overwhelming military power to be 
used only in cases of vital national interest. Yet, a few decades later, two of the 
largest US military interventions morphed into the costly, difficult, and long-
lasting counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Similarly, the end of the Cold War led many analysts to conclude that 
large-scale interstate war was over. But is it? A US air attack on Iranian nu-
clear facilities could lead to Iran’s firing surface-to-surface missiles at US ships, 
and subsequent US action to take out the missile batteries and disable Iran’s 
nuclear facilities, leading potentially to major combat between US and Ira-
nian ground troops. Although it may be true that given the preponderance 
of US military power, the United States will become involved in war against 
only enemies employing asymmetric capabilities and strategies, there can be 
great differences in asymmetric wars. During Israel’s 2006 military foray into 
Lebanon to suppress Hezbollah, for example, Israel unexpectedly found itself 
facing a nonstate actor armed with capabilities typical of a state—air defenses, 
secure communications, and antitank and antiship weapons. While a future 
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war with China—whether over Taiwan or to counter Chinese aggressive ac-
tions in the Asia-Pacific theater—would be extraordinarily costly and should 
be avoided, it is hardly inconceivable.
the comPlex sPectRum of futuRe WaR aNd  
the PeRsIsteNce of INteRstate WaR desPIte Its  
maNy asymmetRIes
The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the widespread belief that the 
era of great-power wars was over. The Gulf War’s Desert Storm campaign, at 
the cusp of the new era, was regarded by many analysts as probably the last 
major interstate military operation. The genocide in Rwanda, the rebellion in 
Chechnya, the interethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia, and the intensi-
fying civil war in Colombia dominated the news. Scholars such as Mary Kal-
dor and Mark Duffield wrote of new wars—internal, disorganized, blurring 
the lines between civilians and combatants.1 Analysts focused on ethnic and 
religious wars, even raising the specter of a clash of civilizations.2 Partially in 
reaction to such arguments, scholars such as Paul Collier, Mats Berdal, David 
Keen, and others argued that increasingly wars were driven not by ideological 
ambitions or political grievances, but by economic profit motivations, and 
that wars created their own systems of economic rents, rather than represent-
ing a complete breakdown of order and economic structures.3 Even as states as 
governing entities with a monopoly on coercive power were seen to be failing 
in many regions, new structures and economic logics of internal conflict were 
seen to be arising. 
Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack against the United States propelled ideology—salafi 
jihadism, specifically—back into the focus of analysts, but nonstate actors and 
so-called ungoverned spaces where state presence was weak still dominated the 
content of military analysis. Counterinsurgency and civil war mitigation efforts 
became intertwined with counterterrorism. After all, a nonstate actor caused 
massive casualties inside the homeland of the greatest superpower. The United 
States was helping to fight terrorism and insurgency from the Philippines 
through Colombia, assisting in toppling the Islamic Courts Union, a group 
of Islamists that seized power in war-torn Somalia. Even the conventionally 
designed US Operation Iraqi Freedom, aimed at deposing the “rogue” regime 
of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and disabling its (nonexistent) weapons of mass 
destruction, quickly became embroiled in the intercommunal conflicts of the 
country and transformed into a full-blown counterinsurgency operation. 
These various military efforts to alter the internal political arrangements 
in countries reasserted the influence of intelligence operatives—not in their 
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Cold War cloak-and-fedora undercover incarnation, but instead in blurring 
the lines between them and special operations forces. Military actions abroad, 
such as in Pakistan where al-Qaeda and the Taliban found safe havens or in 
Somalia, featured high-tech robotics and unmanned vehicles often fed target 
information by ragtag warlords and proxies on horses. Such technologies have 
spread to nonstate actors, including criminal groups that already use cyber 
sabotage and who soon will have their own miniature drones. In the twenty-
first century, civilians are at risk not just from improvised explosive devices 
deployed by insurgents, but also potentially from cyber attacks on advanced 
societies, which could knock out electrical grids, cut off energy supplies to 
hospitals, paralyze trade and traffic, and sabotage secure facilities. 
Especially after the protracted counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghan-
istan, many NATO countries, including the United States, lost their taste 
for waging out-of-theater wars to alter internal conditions in other countries. 
Thus, offshore airstrikes and drone operations came to be embraced as a key 
tool of counterterrorism in the second decade of the twenty-first century in-
stead of the boots on the ground that characterized the first decade. High-tech 
warfare with unmanned platforms controlled from remote command centers, 
combined with full-zone-of-conflict, real-time information, seems to promise 
that war can be neat, clean, and highly controllable even in remote places, the 
experience of Afghanistan and Iraq notwithstanding.4 
These technologies have increased the sense not only that war can be con-
trolled, discriminate, and sanitized, but also, by bringing to citizens in ad-
vanced societies real-time images of the suffering of distant poor oppressed 
peoples, that it can generate support for “responsibility-to-protect” (R2P) hu-
manitarian military intervention. The brutality of the internal wars of the 
1990s, during the era of great economic prosperity in North America and 
Western Europe, whetted the appetite and determination of Western govern-
ments to prevent any future genocidal wars and atrocities à la Rwanda. The 
notion that states can enjoy sovereignty from external intervention only as 
long as they protect their citizens from brutal human rights abuses was eventu-
ally codified in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty.5 
But the protracted and painful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the eco-
nomic difficulties that beset the United States and the European Union, the 
champions of the responsibility to protect doctrine, quickly soured their pub-
lics and leaders on interventions for reasons other than vital national security 
objectives. The deployment of local “peacekeeping” forces, such as those of the 
African Union, has been seen as an answer to the risks and costs of R2P inter-
ventions. Still, Western countries have not been able to resist the temptation 
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to intervene at least from the air in the Libya conflict to depose Gadhafi, even 
if they were not willing to commit ground forces to prevent subsequent chaos, 
and to provide at least financial support to rebels and the Syrian population 
being slaughtered by the bloodthirsty Bashar al-Assad regime. But this great 
visibility, real-time communications, and information flows around the globe 
also mean that war messaging to domestic audiences is quickly transmitted to 
distant war theaters, often with undesirable foreign policy outcomes. Promises 
and mobilization of domestic audiences can no longer be confined to just 
them, but almost immediately also influences the resolve of faraway military 
opponents and attitudes of contested populations.
However, while the opening decade of the twenty-first century was seized 
with counterterrorism and regime change operations, interstate war was not 
fully absent in war planning. Nor will it likely be absent over the next several 
decades. Periodic military provocations by North Korea could have triggered 
a military confrontation with the South and drawn in the United States, and 
are hardly resolved in the second decade of the twenty-first century. Taiwan-
ese independence ambitions flared up several times during the century’s first 
decade; and both Chinese and US conventional, nuclear, and cyberwar forces 
are today being sized and designed for the possibility of someday having to 
fight one another in a cross-straits conflict. The increasingly passionate dis-
putes over islands and underwater resources in the South China Sea could 
potentially trigger wars between China and Japan or China and the Philip-
pines and even draw in the United States. In 1999, India and Pakistan fought 
their fourth war, and after the 2002 bombing of the Indian parliament by a 
Pakistani terrorist group, the two countries came perilously close to a fifth war, 
and continue to plan for that contingency. 
Ominously, such confrontations on the Indian subcontinent have the 
potential to escalate into a nuclear exchange, given the precarious lines of 
control over the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and Pakistan’s tendency to move 
nuclear-armed missiles during crises to avoid a disarming strike by India and 
a lack of crisis communications lines and early warning systems. Also, nuclear 
proliferation in the Middle East, triggered by Iran’s determination to acquire 
nuclear weapons, could give rise to small and vulnerable nuclear arsenals in 
the Middle East that would put to the test concepts of mutual assured destruc-
tion and the existential deterrence capacity of nuclear weapons.
The very large spectrum of the shape of military conflict in the twenty-first 
century is underpinned by a structure of international relations characterized 
by great fluidity of alliances, unreliability of allies, and overall independence 
and nonalignment of major state actors as well as the presence of armed non-
state actors—what Seyom Brown calls “polyarchy.”6 Supposed allies will find 
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little motivation to join coalitions of the willing to counter faraway threats to 
the global order not just in direct military confrontations, but even in apply-
ing economic sanctions against rogue regimes (viz., the unwillingness of India, 
Brazil, and South Africa to join the sanctions regime against Iran, let alone the 
opposition of Russia and China). Local proxy forces feeding intelligence to 
drones will similarly find that their interests overlap only to a small extent with 
their distant patrons and will promote their often-problematic local agendas, 
many times double-crossing their external sponsors. Disharmony and lack of 
unity within the military coalitions will to a great extent characterize the spec-
trum of war in the twenty-first century.
domestIc cRIme aNd aNtIcRIme ResPoNses as loW-INteNsIty  
coNflIct aNd uRbaN WaRfaRe
An increasingly prominent kind of violence in large parts of the world—
approaching the intensity and shape of intrastate warfare—is the violence 
between criminal groups, but also the violence of states in their anticrime 
operations. Mexico today provides the most vivid, albeit extreme, example. 
Over the past several years, the country has suffered from drug-trade-related 
violence, extraordinarily intense and grisly even by criminal market standards. 
Mexico’s drug war has claimed more than 51,000 lives since 2006, with over 
16,000 just in 2011, and over 9,000 in 2012.7 Its drug trafficking organiza-
tions have been engaged in ever-spiraling turf wars over smuggling routes and 
corruption networks, turning the streets of some Mexican cities into macabre 
displays of gunfights and murders. The criminal groups have shown a de-
termined willingness to fight Mexican law enforcement and security forces 
and an increasing ambition to control other illicit and informal economies in 
Mexico and to extort legal businesses. In parts of the country, criminal gangs 
dominate the lives of entire municipalities, and their reach extends to state 
governments.8 Controversially, some analysts have labeled the Mexico phe-
nomenon and its spillovers into Central America as “criminal insurgency,” a 
label that the government of Mexico has vociferously rejected.9
Increasingly, not just remote rural peripheries but prominent urban areas 
will become the loci of potent crime.10 Karachi represents one such version 
of urban criminality and violence approaching low-intensity conflict and ap-
proximating a microcosm of a complex civil war, albeit with casualty levels 
only in the hundreds per year. The violence there is a witches’ brew of ter-
rorism, ethnic militancy and political mobilization, mafia fights, and land-
grabbing. It is also deeply and intricately linked to major political actors 
in Pakistan, with both political parties and Pakistan’s intelligence services, 
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Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), stirring ethnically based urban strife and ma-
nipulating criminal mafias to advance their political purposes. Political parties 
have taken advantage of the violence to demand monetary contributions and 
political votes from the population on the basis of ethnic divisions. The ISI 
has often used the strife in Karachi as a justification for its interventions in 
Pakistan’s political system.11
Responses to urban crime also have increasingly come to approximate ur-
ban warfare. From Colombia’s Medellín to Jamaica’s Kingston to Brazil’s Rio 
de Janeiro to Mexico’s Ciudad Juárez, governments have resorted to using 
heavily armed police or actual military forces to retake territories with ur-
ban slums with minimal state presence, essentially governed by criminal or 
insurgent groups. Brazil adopted such a heavy-force takeover policy toward 
its shantytowns in the 2000s, first in São Paulo and then in Rio de Janeiro.12 
Rio’s Pacification Policy (Unidade de Policía Pacíficadora [UPP]) toward the 
poor and crime-ridden favelas (slums)—home to 1.2 million of Rio’s 6 mil-
lion inhabitants—involving forcible takeovers and subsequent handovers to 
community police forces, has received widespread attention.13 As of Novem-
ber 2011, nineteen UPP outposts had been established in the favelas, mostly 
those close to the 2014 Soccer World Cup and the 2016 Rio Olympics venues 
and to major Rio arteries. Policies in both cities drew lessons from a similar 
pacification policy, Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais (GPAE), 
implemented with varied and limited effectiveness in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas 
in 2000.14 Both GPAE and UPP policies in Rio and its equivalent in São 
Paulo have sought to break with Brazil’s historic pattern of deep social margin-
alization and isolation of the shantytowns by erecting physical walls around 
them, and resorting to highly repressive and violent, but only temporary, po-
lice excursions into the shantytowns controlled by criminal gangs.
In Mexico, President Felipe Calderón deployed the military into Mexico’s 
streets to take over law enforcement functions in many of the country’s cities, 
including Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana, which are troubled by intense violence 
generated by brazen and brutal drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The 
strategy has been based on the premise that regular police forces in Mexico are 
so corrupt and hollowed out that they are unable to respond effectively to the 
violence and do not have the capacity to reduce the power of the DTOs. Once 
the military reduces the threat posed by the DTOs from a national security 
threat to a public safety problem and the police have been reformed, Calderón 
contended, the police would once again take over law enforcement functions. 
So far, Ciudad Juárez has seen the pullback of military forces and return of law 
enforcement to the police, even though extraordinarily high criminal violence 
in the city declined by only 24 percent from its peak levels, and the handover 
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had as much to do with public dissatisfaction with military forces in the city as 
with their effectiveness in bringing down violence and criminality.15 
In Colombia’s Medellín, the counterinsurgency and anticrime policies in 
the 2000s also followed similar patterns. President Álvaro Uribe first sent the 
military to the city in 2002 to retake the poor comunas ruled by the leftist 
guerrilla group the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC). 
The success of this Operation Orion in defeating the FARC in Medellín al-
lowed the crime-lord-cum-paramilitary-leader Don Berna to consolidate 
control over the criminal markets in the city. His firm control over the poor 
comunas and a panoply of criminal rackets in the city resulted in a significant 
drop in homicides throughout much of the first decade of the 2000s. Medellín 
mayors Sergio Fajardo and Alonso Salazar took advantage of greater security 
in the city and extended a host of development activities to the poor comunas, 
including infrastructure and public spaces such as libraries. In the latter part 
of the decade, Don Berna was imprisoned and extradited to the United States. 
His departure from the city gave rise to new violence in Medellín, as tens of 
criminal groups emerged and have fought over control of drug smuggling and 
distribution, prostitution, extortion, and gambling.16
Another example comes from Kingston, Jamaica, where for several de-
cades the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood has been ruled by drug gangs linked 
to Jamaican political parties. Since the 1990s and until 2010, this garrison 
was ruled by the drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke. When then Jamaican 
prime minister Bruce Golding finally yielded to US pressure to arrest Coke 
and extradite him to the United States in 2010, Golding sent a heavy force 
to Tivoli Gardens in an operation that resembled urban warfare more than a 
standard police arrest.17 Coke ultimately surrendered to the United States, and 
Prime Minister Golding promised to adopt community policing and social 
development in Tivoli Gardens, though little has materialized so far. 
In many of these countries, the state has been responding to violent chal-
lenges from “nongoverned spaces”—nongoverned only in the sense that they 
have not been governed by the states. The providers of governance there, bru-
tal as it may be, have been violent nonstate actors such as gangs, criminal 
groups, and insurgents.18 The state there was not failing—in many of these 
rural peripheries and urban slums, it was never present and consolidated in 
the first place, and its governance has been mediated by and dependent upon 
arrangements with the ruling nonstate overlords.
Yet, more and more, these ignored marginalized areas and their troublesome 
actors have impinged upon life in the state-controlled spaces. Increasingly, 
perceptions of public safety and the state’s effectiveness and accountability 
will be determined by how effectively the state devises responses to crime and 
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insecurity in urban spaces. Yet in many of the world’s major cities, law enforce-
ment and social development have not caught up with the pace of urbani-
zation, and there is a deep and growing bifurcation between developed and 
reasonably safe sectors of economic growth and social advancement and slums 
stuck in a trap of poverty, marginalization, and violence. Addressing the vio-
lence and lifting the slums from this trap will be among the major challenges 
for many governments.
aNtIcRIme PolIcIes as a comPetItIoN IN  
state-makINg
An effective public safety and internal security response requires that responses 
to crime are conceptualized not as merely suppression of aberrant social be-
havior, but rather as a competition in state-making between the state and 
nonstate actors. Extensive criminality and illicit economies generate multiple 
threats to states and societies. They corrupt the political system by providing 
an avenue for criminal organizations to enter the political space, undermining 
democratic processes. Political entrepreneurs who enjoy the financial and po-
litical resources generated by their connections to illicit economies frequently 
experience great success in politics. They are able to secure official positions of 
power as well as wield influence from behind the scenes. The problem perpet-
uates itself as successful politicians bankrolled with illicit money make it more 
difficult for other actors to resist participating in the illicit economy, leading 
to endemic corruption at both the local and the national levels. Afghanistan, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Haiti are cases in point. 
Large illicit economies dominated by powerful traffickers also have perni-
cious effects on a country’s law enforcement and judicial systems. As the 
illicit economy grows, the investigative capacity of those systems dimin-
ishes. Impunity for criminal activity increases, undermining the credi-
bility and deterrence effects of law enforcement, the judicial system, and 
the authority of the government. Powerful traffickers frequently turn to 
violent means to discourage prosecution, killing or bribing prosecutors, 
judges, and witnesses. Colombia in the late 1980s and Mexico today are 
powerful reminders of the corruption and paralysis of law enforcement 
as a result of extensive criminal networks and the devastating effects of 
high levels of violent criminality on the judicial system. The profound 
collapse and penetration by criminal entities of Guatemala’s judicial sys-
tem led the country to embrace a special UN body, the International 
Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión internacional 
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contra la impunidad en Guatemala [CIGIG]), to help its judiciary com-
bat organized crime and state corruption. 
Illicit economies also have large and complex economic effects. Drug cultiva-
tion and processing, for example, generate employment for the poor rural 
populations and can even facilitate upward mobility. In Afghanistan, the drug 
economy amounts to 20 to 30 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) and directly and indirectly employs about 20 percent of the popu-
lation.19 Illicit economies can have powerful microeconomic spillover effects 
through boosting overall economic activity. Drug smuggling in the Mexi-
can state of Sinaloa generates strong positive spillover effects for the overall 
economy in that locale by boosting demands for durables, nondurables, and 
services that would otherwise be absent. The drug trade there is estimated to 
account for 20 percent of Sinaloa’s GDP, and for some of Mexico’s southern 
states, the number might be higher.20 Indirectly, drug trafficking thus provides 
livelihoods to poor populations. Consequently, sponsorship of illicit econo-
mies is an important source of political capital for criminal organizations. 
But a burgeoning drug economy also contributes to inflation and can 
hence harm legitimate, export-oriented, import-substituting industries as 
well as tourism. It encourages real-estate speculation, undermines currency 
stability, and also displaces legitimate production. Since the drug economy 
is more profitable than legal production, requires less security and infrastruc-
ture, and imposes smaller sunk and transaction costs, the local population is 
frequently uninterested in, or unable to participate in, other (legal) kinds of 
economic activity. The presence of a large-scale illicit economy can thus lead 
to a form of the so-called Dutch disease, where a boom in an isolated sector 
of the economy causes or is accompanied by stagnation in other core sectors 
since it gives rise to appreciation of land and labor costs. In Mexico, for ex-
ample, the drug violence has not only undermined human security and public 
safety, but also decreased tourism in violence-affected areas, even as US firms 
continue to invest there.21
Most importantly, burgeoning and unconstrained drug production and 
other illicit economies and strong organized crime have profound negative 
consequences not only for local stability, security, and public safety, but, at 
times, also for national security. 
cRIme aNd humaN secuRIty
Although the threats that crime poses to the state may seem straightforward, 
the relationship between crime and society is often highly complex. For many 
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people in areas of state weakness and multifaceted institutional deficiencies, 
participation in informal, if not outright illegal economies, such as the drug 
trade, is often the only way to satisfy their basic livelihood needs and obtain 
any chance of social advancement, even as they continue to exist in a trap of 
insecurity, criminality, and marginalization. The more the state is absent or 
deficient in the provision of public goods—starting with public safety and 
suppression of street crime and including the provision of dispute-resolution 
mechanisms and access to justice, enforcement of contracts, and the provision 
of socioeconomic public goods, such as infrastructure, access to health care, 
education, and legal employment—the more communities are susceptible to 
becoming dependent on and supporters of criminal entities and belligerent 
actors who sponsor the drug trade and other illegal economies. 
By sponsoring illicit economies in areas of state weakness where legal eco-
nomic opportunities and public goods are seriously lacking, both belligerent 
and criminal groups frequently enhance some elements of human security of 
those marginalized populations who depend on illicit economies for basic live-
lihoods, even while compromising other aspects of their human security and 
undermining national security. At the same time, simplistic law enforcement 
measures can and frequently do further degrade human security. These perni-
cious dynamics become especially severe in the context of violent conflict.
Belligerent groups thus obtain far more than simply increased physi-
cal resources from their participation in illicit economies. They also 
derive significant political capital—legitimacy with and support from 
local populations—from their sponsorship of the drug and other illicit 
economies, in addition to obtaining large financial profits. They do so 
by protecting the local population’s reliable (and frequently sole source 
of ) livelihood from the efforts of the government to repress the illicit 
economy. They also derive political capital by protecting the farmers 
(or in the case of other illicit commodities, the producers) from brutal 
and unreliable traffickers (bargaining with traffickers for better prices 
on behalf of the farmers); by mobilizing the revenues from the illicit 
economies to provide otherwise absent social services such as clinics and 
infrastructure, as well as other public goods; and by being able to claim 
nationalist credit if a foreign power threatens the local illicit economy. 
Criminal groups also provide public goods and social services, subop-
timal as they may be.22 In taking on such a role, Brazil’s drug gangs, for 
example, have been able to dominate many of Brazil’s poor urban areas, 
such as in Rio de Janeiro. Criminal groups and belligerents can even 
provide socioeconomic services, such as health clinics and trash disposal. 
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Surprising as it may seem, since criminal groups are the source of insecu-
rity in the first place, they often also regulate the level of violence on the 
street and establish order, suppressing particular manifestations of street 
crime, such as theft, robberies, and rapes. Organized-crime groups, such 
as the Primero comando da capital in São Paulo’s shantytowns, also pro-
vide dispute resolution mechanisms and even set up unofficial courts 
and enforce contracts.23
Especially if nonstate actors sponsor labor-intensive illicit economies in the 
context of poverty, the absence of legal livelihoods, and state’s efforts to sup-
press the illicit economy, their political capital can be large.24 Such political 
capital often motivates local populations to withhold intelligence on the bel-
ligerent group from the government if the government attempts to suppress 
the illicit economy. Accurate and actionable human intelligence is vital for 
success in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency efforts as well as law en-
forcement efforts against criminal groups. 
From new warlords in Afghanistan to pirates in Puntland, such nonstate 
actors challenge not only the state by becoming alternative providers of public 
goods, but also traditional forms of governance and established tribal elites. 
By functioning as the distributors of socioeconomic goods and political- 
economic regulators, they can transform themselves into protostates.
a multIfaceted aPPRoach to combatINg cRIme
Precisely because nonstate actors, including criminal groups, can take on the 
trappings of the state’s might and legitimacy, and in areas of their operations 
even surpass the state in both attributes, states need to define their response as 
a competition in state-making, rather than merely a suppression of aberrant 
social behavior. An effective anticrime response in such a context is a multifac-
eted state-building effort that seeks to strengthen the bonds between the state 
and marginalized communities dependent on or vulnerable to participation 
in the drug trade and other illicit economies for reasons of economic survival 
and physical insecurity. Such a multifaceted approach requires that the state 
address all the complex reasons why populations turn to illegality, including 
law enforcement deficiencies and physical insecurity, economic poverty, and 
social marginalization. Efforts need to focus on ensuring that individuals and 
communities will obey laws—by increasing the likelihood that illegal behavior 
and corruption will be punished, but also by creating the social, economic, 
and political environment in which the laws are consistent with the needs of 
the people so that the laws can be seen as legitimate and hence be internalized.
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Although a law enforcement response to pervasive crime is rarely sufficient, 
it is always necessary. Without public safety and effective enforcement of rules 
and contracts, socioeconomic approaches to crime will struggle to take off, le-
gal economies will be hampered, and high violence levels will deter investment 
from coming in and society from mobilizing. There are many elements to 
an effective law enforcement strategy—from establishing a permanent police 
presence and developing local police forces, to adopting approaches such as 
problem-oriented policing and community-based policing, and to determin-
ing whether to prioritize street crime or setting up specialized interdiction 
units, to undertaking a comprehensive police reform. A careful assessment 
of local conditions is required to determine which deficiencies need to be ad-
dressed in what sequence.25
But a state’s effective response must also include well-designed socio-
economic policies to address some of the root causes of criminality and to 
strengthen the bonds between the population and the state. Generating legal 
livelihood alternatives to economically motivated participation in crime in 
turn requires that the economic development strategy addresses all the struc-
tural drivers of illegal economic production. Beyond providing for security 
and the rule of law, such a comprehensive approach requires that stable prop-
erty rights be established, access to microcredit be developed, access to edu-
cation and health care be expanded, and major infrastructure deficiencies be 
redressed.26
INteRNatIoNal mIlItaRy foRces aNd the Nexus of cRIme,  
teRRoRIsm, aNd WaR
Modern militaries have not been designed and trained to deal with illicit 
economies and organized crime. Nonetheless, since before World War II, 
major militaries have engaged with and sometimes taken on criminal actors. 
The Japanese occupation forces in Manchuria had to contend for control of 
Shanghai with the potent Green Gang, a criminal group led by Du Yuesh-
eng.27 Relying on the mafia’s assistance and intelligence provision was an 
integral part of the American campaign in Sicily during WWII.28 Many of 
the twentieth-century insurgencies, from Mao Tse-tung’s Long March to the 
Shining Path in Peru, were deeply intermeshed with illicit economies, includ-
ing the drug trade.29
The frequency and intensity of international military forces’ interactions 
with the nexus of violent conflict and crime and with criminal actors have 
grown since the 1990s. International military forces have increasingly encoun-
tered illicit economies and criminal actors in undertaking humanitarian inter-
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ventions, such as in Somalia, and peacekeeping operations in civil wars, such 
as in Sierra Leone, and in dealing with terrorism and failed states. The Balkan 
wars and the international peacekeeping operations there were deeply overlaid 
with smuggling of various ilk and illicit economies often in reaction to, or 
spawned by, international sanctions and embargoes.30 Saddam Hussein’s con-
tinuing frustration of international efforts to isolate his regime and bring it to 
heel came precisely from his ability to turn an international sanctions regime 
into a lucrative illicit economy. The counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 
and state-building efforts in Afghanistan have been inextricably bound up 
with responding to Afghanistan’s narcotics economy. In the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as 
well as individual countries ranging from the United States to Saudi Arabia 
to China, undertook a purely anticrime mission (i.e., the various antipiracy 
patrols off the coast of Somalia). How the revolutionary and social forces and 
postauthoritarian governments in Libya and Egypt manage to deal with the 
rise of organized and street crime and succeed in transforming enforcement 
from a tool of political oppression into an effective anticrime apparatus will to 
a large extent determine the fate of democracy and stability in the post–Arab 
Spring countries.
In encountering such illicit economies, international peacekeepers and out-
side intervention forces have had to grapple with difficult dilemmas: Criminal 
actors, including major warlords or key local political-military figures inside 
the official government of the country, can be potential spoilers in peace pro-
cesses promoted by the international community. Consequently, for peace 
processes not to collapse, such actors often need to be brought into the new 
political arrangements; otherwise, the international forces need to bring re-
sources to bear to neutralize such spoilers. The latter operations may require 
resources considerably in excess of what international forces are prepared to 
provide. The effort to neutralize such criminal actors is further complicated if 
they provide critical intelligence and other military assets. The United States, 
for example, relied on Afghan warlords, many of whom were or were to be-
come major Afghan drug dealers, in its early operations in Afghanistan in 
2001 and 2002 for intelligence and military operations.31
In other cases, political entrepreneurs with thick connections to the crimi-
nal world have systematically prolonged military conflicts to maintain ac-
cess to high rents. Charles Taylor’s machinations in Sierra Leone and Liberia 
to maintain access to the region’s diamonds is probably the most notorious 
example.32 Moreover, the empowerment of such entrepreneurs through 
engagement with international forces or their admittance into the postinter-
vention/ postconflict political system may bring about a form of governance 
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that is extremely unpalatable not only to the international community sensi-
tive to illegal economies such as the drug trade, but also to local populations 
subjected to the essentially discriminatory, predatory, and exclusionary mafia 
rule. Thus, the political system with deep linkages to criminal economies cre-
ated in the wake of foreign intervention for the sake of stability may ultimately 
be highly unstable anyway.33 Yet, for reasons discussed above, efforts by the 
international community to destroy an illicit economy on which large seg-
ments of local population depend for basic livelihood may be equally detri-
mental to peace and stability and may in fact fuel conflict while alienating the 
population from the international forces. 
the state as mafIa bazaaR
Nor is it correct to assume that crime and illicit economies in a postcon-
flict country are always consequences of the conflict situation. The postconflict 
shape of crime, the power distribution in the criminal market and its rever-
berations in the political system, and the particular type of illicit economy 
into which crime evolves in the postconflict phase may be new. But often the 
postconflict criminal and political arrangements have roots in the preconflict 
patronage, corruption, and rent networks.
West Africa provides a good illustration. The level of drug trafficking 
there—especially cocaine from South America en route to Europe—has in-
creased dramatically over the past decade.34 Driven by the newly intensified 
demand for cocaine in Western Europe, the shrinking of demand for cocaine 
in the United States, and the pressure on cocaine smuggling from interdiction 
operations in the Caribbean, the level of trafficking through West Africa has 
increased to a quarter of Europe’s annual consumption.35 With some coun-
tries, such as Guinea-Bissau, appearing to be overrun by drugs and significant 
political instability, coups, and assassinations linked to organized crime and 
the drug trade in the country, analysts worry about the threat that the drug 
trade poses to the rule of law, political stability, and the quality of governance 
in the region.
However, many of these institutional conditions have existed for years in 
West Africa and predate the emergence of the current intense drug traffick-
ing through the region. Neither illicit economies nor the drug trade are new 
to West Africa. Indeed, the region has been characterized by a variety of il-
licit economies and their deep integration into the political arrangements and 
frameworks of the countries in the region. Much of the political contestation 
in West Africa has focused on getting access to the state to control rents from 
various legal, semi-illegal, or outright illegal economies—such as diamonds 
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(Sierra Leone and Liberia); gold and other precious metals, stones, and timber 
(Sierra Leone and Liberia); the extraction, monopolization, and smuggling of 
agricultural goods, such as cocoa (Côte d’Ivoire); trafficking in humans for 
sexual exploitation and domestic slavery (Mali, Togo, Ghana); oil (Nigeria); 
and fishing (often conducted illegally and destructively by international fleets 
from outside West Africa). Political contestation in these countries has often 
centered on taking over the state in order to control the main sources of reve-
nue. In essence, the government has been seen as a means to personal wealth, 
not service to the people.36
Yet it would be a significant and often inappropriate leap of analysis to 
assume that “the drug trade epidemic” in West Africa will necessarily chal-
lenge political stability and threaten the existing governments and power of 
ruling elites. To the extent that external drug traffickers make alliances with 
the local nonelites—former or existing rebels not linked to the official system 
or young challengers who seek social mobility in an exclusive system—the 
traffickers will develop a conflictual relationship with the state, and political 
instability may well follow. To the extent that the governing elite captures the 
new rents, a symbiosis between external (and internal) drug traffickers and the 
ruling elites may develop. Drug traffickers will enjoy a sponsored safe haven; 
and while democratic processes and institutional development of the country 
will be threatened, political stability and the existing political dispensation 
may well be strengthened.37 In many parts of the world where international 
peacekeeping or foreign forces intervene for counterterrorism, humanitarian, 
or conflict-control objectives, they may well find a governance system built 
around criminal enterprises where the dispensation of exceptions from law 
enforcement by the country’s elites to their clients and patronage networks is 
an organic form of governance.
a cRIme-teRRoR Nexus?
Similarly, whether the intensification of the drug trade in West Africa results 
in the emergence of a nexus with international terrorism is highly contingent 
on local conditions and the terrorist group’s skills. The level and shape of law 
enforcement against illegal economies in West Africa will critically influence 
the tightness of the crime-terror nexus. It is critical to avoid inadvertently 
driving the two actors together. 
Criminal and terrorist groups may share overlapping networks, tactics, 
and intelligence. They may even work through the same logistical operators.38 
But although criminal groups and belligerent groups often interact with il-
licit economies in the same way, they have not morphed into a homogeneous 
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monolithic entity. Rather, a crime-terror nexus is far from stable or neces-
sarily inevitable. Indeed, such relations are often characterized as much by 
violent conflict between the criminal organizations and the terrorist groups as 
by cooperation.39 At most, such relationships are tactical alliances of mutual 
convenience.
Moreover, how successfully outside terrorist groups navigate new territo-
ries to which they may be drawn because of the presence of illicit economies 
depends on their intelligence capacity, their cultural and human terrain aware-
ness, and their understanding of the complex relationship between official 
politicians, governing elites, and illegal economic networks.
PolIcy ResPoNses foR dealINg WIth cRIme IN the  
coNtext of vIoleNt coNflIct
Devising policy for international counteraction to local illegal economies in-
terlinked with belligerency is difficult in the abstract. Nonetheless, some im-
portant guidelines and considerations can be drawn from even this general 
description of the crime-conflict nexus.
The mandates for international peacekeeping forces need to be based on 
awareness that the more destroyed the legal economy is in the theater of inter-
vention, the more robust and deeply ensconced the illicit economy will be. 
Prominent military and political actors in the region—possible allies or prox-
ies of the intervention forces—will also very likely be deeply involved in the 
illicit economy, and their power inextricably linked to their ability to use the 
illicit economy to provide for the population’s elemental needs. Conversely, 
however, the engagement of intervention forces with such actors will have 
profound effects on the shape of and the power distribution within the illicit 
economy, and thus within the country itself. Through their actions and en-
gagement with local power brokers, international military forces will thus 
codify or alter the balance of power in the criminal market and hence in the 
political landscape.
Rushing to destroy an illicit economy, such as illicit crop cultivation, in 
the absence of readily available legal livelihoods will hamper the internation-
als’ peacekeeping and counterinsurgency efforts. Moreover, in the absence of 
security and a strong on-the-ground presence, the effectiveness of any illicit-
economy suppression efforts will be highly limited as well. No matter what 
anticrime/counternarcotics efforts are ultimately undertaken—be it ironfisted 
suppression of the illicit economy or a prior fostering of legal alternative 
livelihoods—they will not be effective in reducing the illicit economy unless 
firm security throughout the entire territory has first been established. The 
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state needs to be strengthened and conflict ended before efforts against illicit 
economies can be effective.
The more limited the scope of the outside intervention, the more lim-
ited will be the ability of the international forces to suppress or shape the 
crime-conflict nexus and illicit economies in the intervention area. Offshore, 
from-air interventions, as in the NATO operation against Gadhafi, give inter-
national actors a highly circumscribed ability to tackle local illicit economies. 
The more the intervention relies on local proxies, the higher the chance that 
they will capture not only political power in the postintervention phase but 
also the country’s criminal markets. A criminal peace or peaceful criminal 
market run by the proxies may be the best the international community can 
hope for in such circumstances.
Expansion of the mission of international peacekeeping forces beyond 
the provision of security to direct efforts to reduce illicit economies and 
corruption requires that the international peacekeeping forces have a very 
detailed understanding of the intricacies of the local illicit economy and its 
nexus to violent conflict and the political and socioeconomic structures in 
the country. Such an enlargement of the traditional limited role of peace-
keeping forces thus requires that the mission have a continual and robust 
information-gathering component that constantly monitors the effects the 
policies against illicit economies are having on the political and economic 
distribution of power in the area and on stability and development. Peace-
keeping operations of this sort therefore must also have a robust analytical 
support component that includes political, economic, agricultural, anthro-
pology, and criminology experts. 
But, typically, outside intervention forces often not only have a poor ca-
pacity to understand local illicit economies and patronage networks of crime 
and politics, they often also lack the capacities to respond to crime. The ab-
sence of such capacities applies not only to organized crime but also to street 
crime. The rise in street crime is often the first and most direct way that local 
populations experience postintervention insecurity. Such an increase in street 
crime can again alienate the population from the state and the intervention 
force, stimulate a hankering for the regime ancien, empower extralegal power 
brokers, and even erect a criminal order. Yet both the outside intervention 
forces overall and their military police components are often ill-prepared to 
respond to street crime as well as to organized crime, nor can they effectively 
train local police forces. Neither military policing nor counterinsurgency-light 
approaches are adequate substitutes for traditional community-oriented polic-
ing skills. Thus, making a determined and systematic effort to develop police 
forces capable of tackling street crime and having training capacity geared 
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toward the suppression of crime would greatly enhance the effectiveness of 
international interventions.
If outside military forces and their civilian counterparts decide to promote 
“good” governance and undo existing criminal enterprises and illicit econo-
mies and prevent the emergence of new ones, they need to plan for and take 
on this effort early in the mission. The immediate and early postintervention, 
post-military-operations period is the critical and optimal time to shape the 
political and criminal environment in the country. At that time, local power 
brokers have the most uncertainty about the future and show the greatest 
restraint in directly or covertly challenging the intervenor. Their networks of 
power have often been weakened by the collapse of the previous order and 
they have not had time to reconsolidate and reconstitute their new power 
networks.
In the early postintervention period, the local population is also most will-
ing to work with the intervenor in setting up the new order. Under the best 
of circumstances, the people have disliked the previous political regime and 
are now hopeful about the future. At minimum, the locals will be uncertain 
about the power and capabilities of the intervenor and fearful of actively resist-
ing it. Any institutions and political arrangements that survived the war may 
be at their most pliable—most susceptible to being molded by the outside 
intervenor. The longer the intervention forces wait to set up capable state 
structures, the harder the state-building effort becomes. Military opposition 
emerges. Local power brokers’ criminal and political networks are established 
or reestablished, and the population loses faith in the future. Undoing such 
negative trends becomes harder and harder as more time elapses. Remobiliz-
ing the support of the population becomes especially difficult. The window 
of opportunity closes rapidly, and at some point reversing the bad trends may 
become impossible. 
Afghanistan in the post-2001 years provides an apt example. In 2002 
and 2003, the Taliban were scattered. The local population welcomed being 
liberated from the Taliban and welcomed the United States. Political elites, 
including the country’s warlords empowered by the design of the US mini-
malist intervention that relied on them for crucial intelligence and military 
services, were often dependent on the United States for anchoring their power. 
They were also careful of not jeopardizing their relationship with the United 
States—even as Washington and the US military forces in Afghanistan failed 
to assert their leverage. President Hamid Karzai was actively asking the United 
States to rein in and disempower the warlords. But the longer the United States 
dithered and continued defining the mission in Afghanistan in minimalist 
terms of destroying the Taliban regime only as opposed to helping build a new 
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state in Afghanistan, the more pernicious dynamics intensified. The Taliban 
insurgency erupted and grew in strength. The warlords became entrenched in 
the political system, and corruption, abuse, and nepotism intensified. Presi-
dent Karzai lost his wherewithal to challenge the warlords and instead bought 
them with state assets and foreign aid and came to tolerate their usurpation 
of power and resources. A subsequently more intense counterinsurgency cam-
paign generated more deaths among the Afghan population, but no prospect 
of defeating the Taliban. The locals soured on America, and America soured 
on the Afghanistan effort.40
But it is important to recognize that the staying power of the international 
peacekeeping forces will always be inherently limited and that efforts to sup-
press illicit economies will be sustainable only if the population in the country 
and its political representatives have the economic and political incentives to 
support such policies.
It is unrealistic to expect that outside policy interventions can eradicate all 
organized crime and illicit economies or for that matter all the drug trade in the 
area of intervention. The priority for the international community should be to 
focus on the most disruptive and dangerous networks: those with the greatest 
links or potential links to international terrorist groups with global reach, those 
that are most rapacious and detrimental to society and the development of an 
equitable state, and those that most concentrate distribution of rents from illicit 
economies to a narrow clique of people. These three criteria may occasionally be 
in conflict, and such conflicts will pose difficult policy dilemmas. In addition to 
considering the severity of the threat posed to the international community and 
to the host state and society by such drug-trafficking or organized-crime groups, 
the estimated effectiveness of any policy intervention needs to be factored into 
the cost-benefit analysis of policy choices.
It is important to realize that indiscriminate and uniform application of 
law enforcement can generate several undesirable outcomes that need to be 
guarded against: First, the weakest criminal groups can be eliminated through 
such an approach, but it can inadvertently increase the efficiency, lethality, and 
coercive and corrupting power of the remaining criminal groups operating in 
the region. Second, such an application of law enforcement without prioriti-
zation can push criminal groups into an alliance with terrorist groups—the 
opposite of what should be the purpose of law enforcement and especially 
outside policy intervention. Both outcomes have repeatedly emerged in vari-
ous regions of the world as a result of opportunistic, nonstrategic drug inter-
diction and law enforcement policies.
Finally, in determining whether and how to engage in the suppression of 
local illicit economies and organized-crime enterprises, the involved inter-
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national agencies need to ask themselves some hard questions and consider 
second- and third-order effects of their policies. For example, is it better to 
have illegal poppy cultivation in Pakistan rather than Afghanistan and if so, 
should antipoppy policies in Afghanistan be maximized? Will antipiracy ef-
forts off the coast of Somalia push piracy from the Gulf of Aden into the wider 
Indian Ocean and would that be a better outcome? If the international com-
munity imposes sanctions on a particular country, will that give rise to new 
highly profitable smuggling enterprises, and by whom will the profits be cap-
tured? Such questions do not have easy answers, and governments tend to be 
loath to contemplate them. But without anticipating such likely adaptations 
of criminal markets and enterprises to any such international interventions, 
and doing a careful cost-benefit analysis of various policy options, govern-
ments may only make the violent conflict of the twenty-first century more 
challenging for themselves.
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Odious and Failed States, 
Humanitarian Responses
Robert I. Rotberg
Repressive, odious nation-states eventually implode. That is at least one of 
the significant messages of the Arab spring, summer, and autumn of 2011. 
But such states—the worst of the worst—never implode neatly, effortlessly, or, 
in the most difficult cases, without external assistance. How to calibrate that 
external assistance so that it can produce the greatest benefit for the greatest 
number of impacted and oppressed citizens is one important question. A sec-
ond is the equally thorny question of how the world order might best respond 
to cries of oppression from within despotisms and tyrannies before internal 
implosions occur. Absent the rising up of civil forces in repressive nation-
states, indeed, before there is any obvious tumult, what is the responsibility of 
the world order? Does the responsibility-to-protect (R2P) doctrine have any 
significant policy power going forward? Should the world order plan to build 
upon its successful employment during the interventions in Libya and Mali? 
If so, how?
RePRessIve states
There is a class of nation-state, possibly numbering a dozen at any one time, 
that so abuses its own people that it deserves to be classified as odious. In-
deed, some of the greatest threats to global stability in this century come not 
from the hegemonic powers battling one another, but from smaller, much 
less intrinsically powerful entities refusing to follow the principles of civility 
that customarily guide, or are supposed to guide, world order. These out-
law nations, mostly near-failed, failed, or collapsed states, attack their own 
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peoples, show little respect for the human rights of their subjects, deny civil 
liberties and essential freedoms, and at best pretend to be democratic.1 These 
heavy repressors breach official conventions and treaties such as the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Again and again they offend 
against global human rights norms. A handful of these internally demonic 
nation-states also behave provocatively in their regions by being nasty to their 
neighbors or by being serial offenders against international norms of proper 
behavior. But in the main these kinds of states imperil the peace of the world 
primarily by abusing their inhabitants so severely that instability and internal 
conflict are likely outcomes.
Those states that thus operate beyond the international normative pale are 
characterized by the withdrawal of fundamental human rights and civil liber-
ties from their own peoples. They mock democracy. They employ the mailed 
fist to compel obedience and achieve compliance and conformity. They oblit-
erate the rule of law, assassinating and imprisoning opponents. They take po-
litical prisoners, employ collective punishment of families or lineages, and 
apply rules and sanctions capriciously. They run command economies that 
restrict individual entrepreneurial initiative and opportunity to themselves 
and their clients and are wildly corrupt. Wealth sticks to their hands and the 
hands of their close associates, even if vast numbers of citizens go hungry or 
starve. In nearly all cases these regimes depend upon a leader’s personality cult; 
ideologies are far less salient than mere obedience. Cultures of dependency 
and conformity result.
Terror inhabits most of these repressive nation-states. Their rulers are arbi-
trary and unpredictable, the better to intimidate their agents and their citizens. 
They often succeed in inculcating a widespread feeling of mental impotence 
and lethargy among their subjects. Heavy-handed presidents and prime min-
isters hence cow their citizens by a succession of quixotic, idiosyncratic, ruth-
less behaviors and by seductive exercises of co-optation—sometimes mixed 
with mindless brutalities. Malevolent rulers like those of Fidel Castro’s Cuba, 
Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, Than 
Shwe’s Burma, Kim Jong Il’s North Korea, the Turkmenbashi’s Turkistan, 
François (Papa Doc) Duvalier’s Haiti, Idi Amin’s Uganda, Jean-Bedel Bokas-
sa’s Central African Empire, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo’s Equatorial 
Guinea, and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe manipulate and suppress their fol-
lowers and their countries by spontaneous cruelties, thuggishly maintained 
obedience, harsh reprisals, deprivations (of food or freedoms), and mind-
numbing speechifying. Subjects cannot easily escape, defect, or protest—until 
suddenly they do.
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Using these and similar indicators such as counting political prisoners or 
observing the rise in rates of infant mortality, it is possible to separate the most 
offensive nation-states—the worst of the worst—from those who are merely 
smaller-scale abusers. To do so, and in order to compare and contrast one op-
pressive despotism from another, we need to discover each regime’s current 
numbers of political prisoners, house arrestees, secret incarcerations, murders 
or attempted murders of political opponents, unexplained disappearances, 
and instances of torture. We need further to document cases of collective pun-
ishment, impositions of conformity, and the duration of pretrial detention of 
political offenders. We want to know the extent of rape and other violence 
against women, the number of forced abortions, the prevalence of child labor, 
and the scale of trafficking of women, children, small arms, and narcotics.2
We can further assess a regime’s repressiveness by counting its police per 
capita; the number of security forces per capita (North Korea’s and Burma’s 
are unusually high); the scope of interference with privacy; the imposition of 
restrictions to religious freedom; the use of travel bans (internal and external); 
curtailments of freedom of expression, speech, and the media; the absence of 
freedom of assembly and association (very common); abuses of the rule of law; 
the denial of judicial independence; the use of food and hunger as controlling 
instruments; externally estimated depths of corruption; the imposition of per-
sonality cults (as in the “Little Green Book”); harassment of Internet use; and 
discrimination against minorities.
When we use such screens to sort among the world’s 194 or so recog-
nized nation-states for gross repressiveness and mere high repressiveness, we 
rapidly develop a list of nation-states that are of extreme concern to world 
order because of the harmful manner in which they brutalize their own citi-
zens. Admittedly, the screens depend on the kinds of data that are difficult to 
obtain; odious states are usually loath to provide statistics giving the number 
of political prisoners, assassinations, and torture victims. Nor do they will-
ingly admit to the deployment of collective punishment or mass starvation as 
weapons of repression. Nevertheless, employing a myriad of estimates, proxy 
measures, and smuggled data, it is possible at any one point in time to focus 
on nation-states where populations are severely at risk.3 Reports filed by the 
likes of various United Nations rapporteurs; Human Rights Watch; Amnesty 
International; relief and development organizations such as Doctors without 
Borders, Mercy Corps, and Care International; internally and externally based 
journalists; and scholars inside and outside the relevant countries, all contrib-
ute significant observations capable of being aggregated and scrutinized. Not 
least, respected internationally compiled assessments such as Transparency 
International’s corruption perceptions index, the UN Development Program’s 
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human development index (HDI), and various estimates of maternal mor-
tality and life expectancy prepared by the World Health Organization offer 
comparative insights into a nation-state’s weaknesses and strengths. If GDPs 
per capita are stagnant or falling, if life expectancy is sinking, if corruption 
is rampant, and if HDI rankings are poor, the relevant countries are more 
likely than not to be depriving their populations of basic human rights as well 
as effective good governance. The observations of journalists, scholars, relief 
and development groups, and so on can supplement and deepen the inter-
nationally available quantitative data across many relevant dimensions.
In 2007, a published designation of the worst of the worst listed (in de-
scending order, from most grossly repressive to highly repressive) North Korea, 
Turkmenistan, Burma, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Equatorial Guinea, Togo, Uzbeki-
stan, Syria, and Tunisia as the globe’s most odious regimes.4 Cuba, Iran, and 
Libya were other nation-states considered for inclusion in this list, but Egypt 
and Yemen—despite being known as states run by authoritarians, were not.
NoRth koRea aNd tuRkmeNIstaN 
North Korea and Turkmenistan (especially under the bizarre rule from 1991 
to 2006 of Saparmurad Niyazov, who called himself “Turkmenbashi” or “head 
of all Turkmen”) were the nation-states that then exceeded and still exceed all 
others in their contempt for their own citizens, their cults of despotic person-
ality, and their deprivations of the essential freedoms—even freedom from 
hunger. Neither place has ever exhibited respect for human or individual 
rights, for natural law, or for providing or permitting their inhabitants fun-
damental health and educational opportunities, much less regular jobs and 
the possibility of prosperity. Despite the exploitation of abundant reserves 
of natural gas in Turkmenistan and aid from South Korea and China in the 
case of North Korea, both populations remain poor by design and fiat, not by 
circumstance. Indeed, for much of the last fifty years or more, North Korea 
has remained “hermetically sealed.” In Turkmenistan’s case, Niyazov’s death 
in 2006 should have brought about the major improvements in welfare that 
were promised by his successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, but those 
improvements have been glacially slow in arriving.5
buRma
Burma (Myanmar) was appropriately third on the 2007 list of gross repressors. 
Its ruling military junta (the State Peace and Development Committee), un-
der Senior General Than Shwe, had long incarcerated and tortured thousands 
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of political prisoners; denied all conceivable human rights; profited collec-
tively and personally by extravagant forms of corruption; compelled confor-
mity through brutality; eviscerated the country’s once proud agricultural, 
economic, medical, and educational infrastructures; annulled the results of 
the country’s only free election in 1990; imposed new artificial participatory 
structures; and held the nation’s most prominent democrat and Nobel laure-
ate, Aung San Suu Kyi, under house arrest for the better part of twenty years.6 
But in late 2010, Than Shwe and his military associates released Daw Suu 
Kyi and installed a militarily dominated “elected” parliament under a junta-
written constitution. Few observers expected anything more than cosmetic 
changes to the repressive manner in which Burma had been ruled since 1962.
Instead, in 2011 Burma gradually emerged from its long authoritarian co-
coon. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit there in December, the first 
by such a high-ranking American official for more than fifty years, signaled 
Burma’s possible emergence into chrysalis form. Under the presidential leader-
ship of Thein Sein, a former general installed by the junta, and Than Shwe, 
more than one hundred political prisoners were released; Daw Suu Kyi was 
permitted to travel the country, give political speeches, and stand for election 
to parliament; the construction of a Chinese-sponsored hydroelectric dam on 
the upper Irrawaddy River was suspended; heavy censorship was lifted a little 
and later more significantly; and Thein Sein and his team started making the 
kinds of noises that conceivably augured well for the future of human rights in 
Burma. His regime restored freedom of assembly early in 2013.
Observers inside and outside Burma, even in the US Department of State 
and Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were unsure why Thein Sein and 
the junta had moved to liberalize by gesture and deed, however tentatively. 
Some speculated that Burma’s rulers were trying to diversify away from their 
decades-long reliance upon and warm embrace by China. Burma had been in 
serious danger of losing its effective national autonomy. Thein Sein sought 
Western approval for that reason and in order to modernize the autarkic, 
creaky, and long-neglected economic apparatus of the state. He and the junta 
may also have wanted global backing, Than Shwe and others having finally 
realized that Burma could take full advantage of its relatively recent finds of 
natural gas and petroleum, and of its enviable strategic position on the Anda-
man Sea (and the Indian Ocean), only by indicating a willingness not to obvi-
ate tight control over the population but to acknowledge that control could 
still be exercised by subtle rather than heavy-handed means.7 It was time, in 
other words, for Burma to come in from the cold.
Those were and are all probable reasons why Burma suddenly decided to 
try to leave the company of the world’s most repressive states. But there is one 
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more: the events of the Arab Spring may well have had a profound impact on 
a regime even as remote geographically as Burma from the events that took 
place in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. As fully repressive as Than 
Shwe and his associates had managed to be for so long (going back to Ne 
Win’s era from 1962 to 1988, and then afterward), they probably saw their 
future as Buddhist believers in numerology and other mystical pursuits as 
compromised by events on the other side of the globe. This logic, not easily 
refutable, probably assumed that even in a country as thoroughly controlled 
as Burma, the masses, long restive and periodically agitated by young monks, 
could again become a potent force capable of disturbing military rule and 
depriving the key members of the junta of their corrupt gains and family 
legacies. In a year that saw three heads of state indicted by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and one ousted head of state transported to The Hague 
for trial, Burma’s rulers may have understood their intrinsic vulnerability. We 
might therefore view the Burmese political dawn as an attempt to modern-
ize and preserve authoritarian rule before it was too late. In that sense, the 
lessons of the Arab Spring will have been potent, formative, indeed, trans-
formational—providing that Suu Kyi and Clinton’s belief in the promised 
tendencies of Burma’s rulers is realized in the near future.
zImbabWe aNd the afRIcaN cases
Even though former president Laurent Gbagbo of Côte d’Ivoire was forcibly 
brought before the ICC in late 2011, Africa’s long-standing tyrants, unlike 
Burma’s, showed no signs of heeding any of the possible lessons of the Arab 
Spring. Mugabe and Obiang Nguema Mbasogo continued to prey upon their 
own constituents and citizens. Having rigged six elections systemically since 
2000, Mugabe in 2013 was preparing, despite his advanced age and frail health, 
to ignore the democratizing strictures of his country’s 2009 Government of 
National Unity (a South African–imposed working arrangement combining 
Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF] 
with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change [MDC]) and hold a 
national election even before a new voters’ roll had been established and an in-
dependent electoral commission was in place. Bolstered by newfound wealth 
from alluvial diamond deposits, Mugabe (like Obiang Nguema with his vast 
petroleum receipts) had the wherewithal to continue to corrupt his security 
forces and provide patronage for crucial other indigenous power brokers.
Since 1980 Mugabe has presided over an increasingly brutal, unremittingly 
corrupt and corrupted, and thoroughly intolerant regime that as late as the end 
of 2012 was still killing and maiming its opponents, refusing to share effective 
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power (in spite of the 2009 agreement) with Prime Minister Morgan Tsvan-
girai and his MDC team of ministers, keeping most diamond-derived reve-
nues for Mugabe and his close associates and not giving them to the federal 
exchequer, and regularly reneging on promises made to South Africa and the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) about advancing demo-
cratic practices within Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s ZANU-PF still prevented private 
broadcasters from being licensed to compete against state radio and television, 
only reluctantly earlier in 2011 permitted an independent daily newspaper 
that it had bombed and shuttered in 2004 to reopen, and continued to try 
to take the remaining 250 (of an original 4,000) white-owned farms away 
from their proprietors by force (and despite SADC legal rulings to the con-
trary). Backed by China, Mugabe was importing small arms and other secu-
rity equipment from Beijing despite UN sanctions, and sponsoring a national 
campaign to intimidate opponents and their followers well before any possible 
national election. Despite being at the head of a nominal democracy, Mugabe 
and his military and political associates have ruled by fear and terror since at 
least 2000. Even his prime minister and nominal political partner has been 
attacked, held on terror charges, and often ignored.
Along with Togo under Faure Gnassingbé, the son who in 2005 inherited 
his deprived, intimidated, and corrupted country from his father, Equatorial 
Guinea has been held forcefully in thrall by Obiang Nguema since 1979, 
when he ousted his uncle, an equally notorious and thuggish president. Obi-
ang Nguema should be regarded as a Weberian “sultan,” exercising complete 
power unencumbered by any rules or any commitment to ideological or other 
sets of values. Routine violence shapes everyday life.8 Little Equatorial Guinea, 
an impoverished slice of the West African mainland and a petroleum-rich 
offshore island, might have been ignored in this chapter and in world politics 
were it not for its oil—it is Africa’s fourth-largest supplier to the world, espe-
cially to the United States and China—and its old-fashioned, Turkmenistan- 
like brutalities. Similar to tiny Togo, under dictatorship since 1978, Equatorial 
Guinea ranks toward the nasty end of index after index measuring the avail-
ability of human rights, the presence of corruption, the weakness of human 
development, the extent of misgovernance, police numbers per capita, health 
and welfare weaknesses, educational insufficiencies, and sheer mendacity. 
Whether an awareness of the reach of the Arab Spring, or the long arm of the 
ICC, will make any difference to one-man rule in either case is unclear (and 
unlikely), but in Equatorial Guinea for sure, prevailing illiteracy, lack of access 
to social media and the Internet, widespread poverty (despite oil), and the 
general inexperience of Obiang Nguema’s subjects make any revolution from 
below unlikely. Thus, in this case, as in the cases of Zimbabwe (where possible 
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ICC indictments have been investigated), Togo, Angola, Congo, the Sudan, 
and others, the role of possible outside intervention still remains to be ex-
plored. In these cases, is there a global responsibility to protect that needs to be 
considered and possibly implemented? This question will be discussed below.
belaRus aNd uzbekIstaN
Aleksandr Lukashenko, Europe’s lone tyrant and the president of anomalous 
Belarus, resembles Mugabe much more than Obiang Nguema or Gnassingbé 
in his behavior and rhetoric. His people are much more literate and wealthier 
per capita than those in Africa, and he has not systematically used hunger as 
a weapon in the Mugabe and Pol Pot manner. But he long ago perfected a 
strategy of repression with such force that contemporary Belarus, especially 
after the flawed election, arrests of opponents, and general persecution of pro-
testers in 2011, belies its European geographical setting and its aspirations 
to be considered a modern state. Lukashenko’s regime harasses anyone hold-
ing antithetical views, often hounding them out of private jobs. His minions 
respect no rights of privacy and restrict access to independent thinking and 
education. Judges obey the executive. Election results are manipulated and ar-
ranged. Lukashenko blusters and brutalizes like Mugabe, rides roughshod over 
human rights, and practices the well-learned Soviet arts of spying, intimida-
tion, collective punishment, denial of expression and assembly freedoms, and 
attempts—successfully so far—to stem the tide of participatory change that 
ebbs north from Ukraine and eastward from Poland and modern Europe. 
Even Russia, of which Belarus was once an integral part, can do little to check 
Lukashenko’s determination to resist change and democratization.
Like the great Soviet bosses from which he learned his despotic skills, Lu-
kashenko has advanced the arts of soft and hard repression by terrorizing his 
own associates and cabinet ministers, by keeping government employees on 
short-term contracts, by blackmailing (à la Mugabe) senior and junior of-
ficials, and by running a determinedly patrimonial state. Patronage, in other 
words, nakedly makes the state work, as it does in nearly all of the repressive 
polities discussed in this chapter. Patronage mandates dependence, as it did 
in Mobuto Sese Seko’s Zaire/Congo. In these kinds of states there can be no 
nonexecutive sources of economic power or employment. Information flows 
must also be organized from the center, access to social media restricted (dif-
ficult on the periphery of Europe), and ideological indoctrination made into a 
high art. Belarus, as in Mu‘ammar Gadhafi’s Libya, Kim Jong Il’s North Korea, 
and the Turkmenbashi’s Turkmenistan, has its handbook of authorized ideas 
and aphorisms. A youth brigade has imbibed and enforced such dicta, and 
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every school and workplace, Soviet- and Chinese-style, has had its ideological 
controller.
Lukashenko learned from his years as a Soviet regional boss. So did Is-
lam Karimov in Uzbekistan, a cotton-growing wasteland athwart the once 
fabled Silk Road from inner Asia. More modern and sophisticated in many 
ways than Kim Jong Il, Karimov still rules supremely, deploying sufficient 
brutality and arbitrary capriciousness to terrorize his people and maintain 
his flagging regime’s dominance over democratic and Islamist opponents. 
His regime’s corruption is legendary. He and his associates (including his 
daughter, an heiress apparent) also benefit from Uzbekistan’s strategic loca-
tion on a key transport route (needed by the United States) to and from 
Afghanistan.
Uzbekistan has no significant institutions to keep the all-powerful execu-
tive in check. The legislature is a rubber stamp, and cabinet ministers cower in 
the presence of Karimov. No human rights or civil liberties are respected. Free 
expression was long ago banished, and sources of information, naturally, are 
tightly controlled and restricted. Islamists languish in prison along with sev-
eral thousand political detainees. Torture is routinely employed by the security 
forces, journalists are beaten for “defaming the nation,” and—as in so many 
of the worst-of-the-worst cases discussed here—citizens keep their opinions to 
themselves and fear the secret police.9
syRIa aNd tuNIsIa; egyPt aNd lIbya
The authors of two original studies of repression and human rights violations 
in Syria and Tunisia believed in 2007 that their relatively prosperous, highly 
literate, reasonably sophisticated authoritarian states would gradually become 
less brutal and more conscious of the benefits of opening their regimes to new 
currents of economic and political thought.10 Indeed, when the top nomi-
nees for the world’s most odious nation-states were released in 2007, Tunisia’s 
inclusion (but not Syria’s) startled most observers who had not been closely 
following events inside the country. The global human rights community 
knew that President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime held numerous politi-
cal prisoners, used torture, censored the media, and never tolerated dissent, 
but Tunisia’s cultural closeness to France and its decades of relative calm had 
lulled most analysts of North Africa into assuming that Ben Ali’s subjects were 
comparatively satisfied. Likewise, many still believed that President Bashar 
al-Assad, the young ophthalmologist who had succeeded his always scheming 
father in 2000, was at heart sensibly Western and would shy away from his 
father’s many rapacious excesses. How wrong we were!
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The Syrian government, throughout the first thirteen-plus years of the 
twenty-first century, has curbed the right of peaceful assembly; prevented free-
dom of association and trade unionization; routinely practiced torture; held 
thousands of political prisoners, some of whom mysteriously “disappeared”; 
condemned dissidents as traitors after unfair trials; shut down opposition web-
sites; and channeled nearly all economic opportunity to relatives or friends of 
the ruling family. Spying also became a well-practiced art. Syria’s ambassador 
to the United States even admitted being from a “rogue” state that harbored 
and sponsored terrorists.11
Like Syria, Tunisia was a police state, with 150,000 police in a country 
of 10 million—more proportionally than Britain, France, or Germany. Elec-
tions, held periodically to appease international public opinion, were manipu-
lated and opponents routinely brutalized. Civil society was largely prohibited, 
the media “asphyxiated.”
Under Habib Bourguiba, Tunisia’s founding president, the impress of au-
thoritarian rule was somehow softened by his founding-father legitimacy and 
by the absence of overt avarice. The country also became an oasis of relative 
peace in a turbulent region consumed by strife next door in Algeria, and by 
coups in Libya and Egypt. Tunisia’s comparatively high levels of development 
(it was the wealthiest country per capita when the worst of the worst were 
epitomized in 2007) also sanctified Bourguiba’s guidance. Unfortunately, 
Bourguiba aged and weakened; Ben Ali pushed him out of office in 1987 and 
proceeded to “cleanse” the country. Ben Ali eliminated Islamists and other 
rivals, imprisoned critics, and organized a militia of thugs to maintain con-
trol. Ben Ali’s operatives also micromanaged and overregulated commerce 
and daily life throughout the country. Bourguiba’s mild legacy had been well- 
obscured by late 2010.
The cataclysm that erupted in early 2011 in Tunisia and then engulfed 
Egypt, Libya, the Yemen, and finally Syria demonstrated that the fires of free-
dom can smolder for decades within oppressed and resentful populations be-
fore they finally ignite in the kinds of conflagrations that quickly swept Ben 
Ali away and, for many months in 2011, 2012, and 2013, provided gathering 
pyres for Assad and his associates. Once widespread urban-located protests 
commence in earnest, the experiences of the Arab Spring show, military sup-
pression—no matter how callous toward life and injury—rarely quenches the 
flames. Co-optation sometimes succeeds for a time, as it did in Egypt, but a 
rapid embrace and legitimation of any protest is surer. Sustainable peace and 
harmony rarely flows from the barrels of guns, which more often provoke 
countervailing militant attacks, as in Syria. Thereafter, as in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Serbia, and Kyrgyzstan, once a crowd realizes that officers and soldiers (being 
 odious and Failed States, humanitarian responses 129
common, poorly paid folk) are no longer loyal to the hated regime, the crowd 
loses its fears and surges forward. The civil war in Syria serves as an unwel-
come reminder that a powerful military and a brutal government can delay 
this process.
That happened in all of the Arab cases. In Libya, however, the counterat-
tack by Gadhafi and his mercenary legions might have overrun Benghazi and 
retained power for a time were it not for opportune intervention by NATO, 
Qatar, and the United States and several European countries, especially France. 
Thus it was that the Western decision to act boldly in Libya, backed by the 
Arab League and Turkey, permitted a problematic local rebellion of middle-
class freedom seekers eventually to triumph decisively over Gadhafi. No one 
had suspected in 2010 that the autocracies of Tunisia and Egypt would soon 
be democratized, nor that protesters in Syria and the fractured Yemen would 
soon follow their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. Nor could Gahdafi’s 
demise have been predicted after thirty-five years of idiosyncratic, tyrannical, 
one-man rule. 
the fIRe Next tIme
The overturning of some of the globe’s more repressive regimes—notably 
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—and the indicting of heads of state (Côte d’Ivoire, 
Libya, and the Sudan); cabinet ministers and officials (Libya, Kenya, and the 
Congo); and warlords (the Congo) by the ICC means neither the end of im-
punity for dictators and autocrats nor the end of state-sponsored attacks on 
civilians. In 2013, the North Koreas, Turkmenistans, Uzbekistans, and Zim-
babwes of the world remained active, and their rulers and ruling classes con-
tinued freely to abuse citizens and constituents. Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, 
and Togo, led by despots, are much as they were. Cameroon, Chad, the Su-
dan, and Swaziland, in Africa, are almost as badly tainted. So is Laos in South-
east Asia, Kazakhstan in Central Asia, Iran in the Middle East, and Venezuela 
and Cuba in the Americas. China and Russia both govern arbitrarily and deny 
or abridge many of the normal freedoms. The list could continue, but at least 
Burma may have taken a turn for the better, and may conceivably improve its 
appalling human rights record over time. But hundreds of prisoners remain to 
be released, exiles remain to be welcomed home, and fully participatory elec-
tions have yet to be held. 
As the Arab Spring has demonstrated so well, protests against these and any 
new examples of state repression must usually come from within. Some Tuni-
sians and Egyptians had benefited from building up techniques of nonviolent 
resistance, learning in part from the popular uprisings in Serbia and Ukraine.12 
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And the Libyan, the Syrian, and the Yemeni protest movements would not 
have occurred absent success in Tunisia and Egypt. The use of new social me-
dia forms and methods was also critical to the crowd-amassing techniques in 
Tunisia and Egypt, later in the Yemen, and finally in sectors of Syria. In Libya, 
to gather and disburse information, and to mobilize defenders and attackers 
against Gadhafi and his legions, demanded the imaginative deployment of 
social media and text messaging. Revolutionary achievements depend now on 
cell towers and strong signals more than ideology and oratory.
Outsiders can also play a strong role in ensuring the triumph of internal in-
surrections. In the Yemen, Saudi and United Arab Emirates (UAE) diplomats 
played a brokering role between President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the various 
protest movements. The Saudis and the United States also understood more 
than others, and often more than the Saleh government, where protesters were 
active and where they were not. Pressure from the Arab League, its sanctions, 
and European Union sanctions (and refusals to purchase petroleum), were 
all decisive in weakening the Assad grip on Syria. Turkey’s antagonism, barri-
ers to cross-border trade, and willingness to harbor anti-Assad militants were 
also critical. But in Libya, the people’s military victory over Gadhafi and his 
army could not have happened without the intelligence of regime troop and 
air movements obtained by NATO and shared with the Libyan transitional 
forces. The European-and-American blockade of Tripoli and other Gadhafi-
controlled ports was also significant, as was the supply of arms and decisive 
military equipment to the insurgents by France, Qatar, the United States, and 
others. Some NATO special forces may also have deployed covertly on the 
ground. 
This much is obvious: Libya could not have been freed so readily from 
Gadhafi’s stifling grip without assistance and strong support from the Arab 
League and the West. But Libya is a very special case. Gadhafi had offended 
his fellow Arab rulers and most of the powerful nations belonging to the Arab 
League. After Ben Ali’s quick exit from Tunisia and President Hosni Mubarak’s 
ouster from Egypt, Gadhafi’s loss of legitimacy was swift. No one, except a few 
sub-Saharan African client states, saw any virtue in his continued suzerainty. 
His capture and death, awkward and inhumane as they were, seemed a fit end.
Absent dramatic internal rumblings in Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Uz-
bekistan, the West is hardly poised to intervene there on behalf of human 
rights. Only if Russia, in whose neighborhood those states lie, itself decided 
to champion the oppressed in some or all of those countries could insurgents 
rely on assistance from either the near- or the far-abroad. Likewise, there is no 
appetite to upset China by moving against nuclear-armed North Korea, even 
during times of widespread regime-induced starvation. Even with regard to 
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Zimbabwe, where an aging ruler has long defied the preferences of his neigh-
bors and perpetuated a despotic regime that has lost all international credi-
bility and local legitimacy, there is no appetite for externally induced regime 
change or ruler removal. Only a wave of impermissible atrocities, as Gadhafi 
was perpetuating in Libya, might move powerful neighbors or outsiders in 
these and similar cases to act in time, or at all.
What Is to be doNe?
World order may say “Never again” to another Rwandan genocide, but small-
scale mass killings are common from Thailand to Ecuador, Mugabe still uses 
hunger as a weapon against his own people, and President Omar al-Bashir’s 
aircraft strafe non-Arab sections in the south of the newly truncated Sudan and 
raze the dwellings of opponents in the Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain districts. 
Can anything now be done in similar weak, failed, and collapsed states to protect 
the weak and curtail those countries that prey harmfully on their own citizens?
The inhabitants of failed states like Afghanistan, Congo (Kinshasa), and 
the Sudan are particularly at risk. By definition, such states have lost the mo-
nopoly of violence; they are at war with themselves. Such failed and a handful 
of very weak states are so internally fractured, so illegitimate in the eyes of 
large numbers of their citizens, and so corrupt that they no longer perform 
for their inhabitants. That is, their levels of governance are quantifiably low.13 
It follows that such states demonstrate little respect for fundamental human 
rights. They prefer the law of the jungle to the rule of law. Most of their hu-
man development responsibilities are honored in the breach. Economically, 
they are deficient, and in most cases (other than once oil-rich Sudan) they do 
not grow rapidly, leaving their populations in poverty. In many of these states, 
nonstate actors (warlords) proliferate, and killings, rapes, and other abuses are 
perpetrated by both the state and its opponents.
No regional or subregional institutions exist to right failed states or the 
collapsed state of Somalia. Nor are there any effective mechanisms available to 
prevent weak states from becoming failed states in the manner of Côte d’Ivoire 
in 2000–2001. British paratroopers are not moving in to restore security and 
order as they did in Sierra Leone in 2000, as France did in Mali in 2013, as 
Syria did when Lebanon was a failed state in the 1970s, and as Russia did in 
Tajikistan in the 1990s. Sometimes the UN has mounted an effective peace 
enforcement operation, as in Liberia from 2003. But most UN missions, as in 
Darfur or the eastern Congo, have been holding operations. They have some-
times lacked the mandates, sometimes the troops, and sometimes the political 
will to prevent failed or weak states from pummeling their own, or permitting 
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warlords to do the same. (When the M23 rebel movement captured Goma 
in 2012, UN troops watched.) In Somalia, the African Union peacekeeping 
detachment in Mogadishu was for much of 2010 and 2011 too weak to over-
come al-Shabaab and project any power beyond the capital city. Only when 
Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan troops entered the battle scene in 2012 and 
2013 could al-Shabaab be ousted from Kismaayo, Baidoa, and other strategic 
towns, and a measure of peace be restored to Mogadishu.
Knowing that international peace enforcement and peacekeeping interven-
tions are often ineffective, slow, off the mark, indecisive, and underresourced, 
coalitions of the willing or unilateral actions have often proved productive. Syria 
into Lebanon and Russia into Tajikistan have already been noted. Of equal sig-
nificance, Tanzanian troops ousted Idi Amin from cruelly run Uganda in 1979. 
Directed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a 
predominantly Nigerian task force dampened violence in Liberia after 1990. 
Australia sent soldiers and sailors twice to support peace processes in the Solo-
mon Islands in 2003 and 2006. They were also active in Timor-Leste in 1999, 
but at the request of the UN. A renegade Lesotho was corralled by South Af-
rican and Botswanan soldiers in 1998–1999, but at the nominal behest of the 
SADC. Ethiopian forces eliminated the hegemony in southern Somalia of the 
Union of Islamic Courts in 2006. It is evident from these and other scattered 
examples that interventions for legitimate peace-creating purposes have their 
place in ending despotism and removing abusers from power. Whereas national 
violators of human rights have traditionally been immune from direct global 
sanctions because of a misplaced sense of sovereign immunity, their excesses 
occasionally provoke hard-edged martial responses from powerful neighbors 
and near-neighbors or from groups of them. After ousting dictators or stanch-
ing civil wars, those “invasions” have enhanced the quality of life and educa-
tion and health opportunities in former despotisms. At the very least, they have 
prevented tyrants from continuing to abuse their populations.
But it would be unwise to rely on such direct initiatives to safeguard vulner-
able peoples across the globe. Thailand never considered saving the Cambodi-
ans under Pol Pot. Its neighbors never thought before late 2012 of intervening 
in the Central African Empire. Nor did France. SADC and South Africa are 
not crossing national frontiers to impose justice on Zimbabwe. Nor is massive 
Nigeria prepared to right hideous wrongs in nearby Equatorial Guinea. The 
Sudan is sovereign within its borders, despite systemic attacks on dissenting 
peoples along its new southern frontier and in Darfur. The Laotian govern-
ment is allowed to violate the human rights of its citizens. No one is curb-
ing excesses in Uzbekistan or Kazakhstan, or even in Turkmenistan. Until an 
indigenous freedom movement arose in Libya, or in Tunisia, outsiders were 
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hardly anxious to intervene. Nor, one assumes, did any powerful state even 
contemplate such adventures.
ResPoNsIbIlIty to PRotect
The new responsibility-to-protect norm, discussed by the United Nations in 
2005 and again in 2009, but never formally accepted or ratified, provides an 
umbrella rationale under which world order should in theory rescue citizens 
in countries at risk and intervene in countries that have crossed some red 
line between general nastiness and wholesale abuse. The latter category could 
legitimately be restricted, say, to situations where states and rulers are com-
mitting crimes against humanity according to The Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, the statute of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the 1948 Genocide 
Convention, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the additional protocols to 
the Geneva Conventions in 1977, the statutes of the International Tribunals 
for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court. These instruments regulate human conduct dur-
ing war and prohibit genocide, ethnic cleansing, enumerated specific crimes 
against humanity, and all manner of mass and nonmass atrocities. Although 
imprecise, these prohibitions compose an overarching norm that should be 
sufficiently robust to hinder renewed attacks on civilians or groups.14 Cer-
tainly the ICC and the several tribunals can base their own prosecutions (and 
subsequent judgments) on the various violations of appropriate and decent 
conduct that are enumerated in the conventions and statutes.
By at least some readings of the Genocide Convention, the UN and mem-
ber states are “obligated” to prevent and suppress acts of genocide.15 But the 
means to obligate the obligation are not yet available in world order. Nor are 
thresholds easily defined for genocide or ethnic cleansing, even in those hei-
nous situations where it appears obvious that there has been or that there is 
about to unfold a “mass destruction” of a human collectivity. 
The Rome Statute is much more precise: a crime against humanity is any 
systematic attack against civilians that includes murder, extermination, en-
slavement, forcible transfers, imprisonment or severe deprivations of physical 
liberties, torture, rape, or sexual slavery. Crimes against humanity are always 
“large” in scale. There is some thought that crimes against humanity must also 
be premeditated and willful of intent. Because the provisions of the Rome 
Statute were written for interstate rather than intrastate wars, the more preva-
lent form of combat in this century, they were not meant to apply to riots and 
sporadic acts of violence, but they were and are intended to cover protracted 
armed civil conflicts between governments and nonstate actors.
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Individual rulers and leaders are, according to the Rome Statute, held re-
sponsible for crimes against humanity perpetrated by a country’s armed bat-
talions or soldiers. The mistreatment of civilians in the Congo, say, is fully 
covered. In 2012 and 2013, the application of these provisions was being 
tested in The Hague by both prosecutors and defense attorneys for Gbagbo 
and other alleged wrongdoers. These several cases brought by the ICC, and 
earlier trials in The Hague and Arusha before the Yugoslavian and Rwan-
dan panels, presumed that the act of bringing perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity to justice would ultimately deter others—that the punishment of 
those who authorized ethnic cleansing or mass-atrocity crimes would cause 
other potential perpetrators to hesitate before they ordered such crimes against 
innocent civilians within their own countries.
Whether or not this is in fact occurring—whether or not the malevolent 
mailed fist of tyranny is being stayed—is difficult to determine at this early 
stage in the life of the ICC. Possibly in a decade there will be sufficient evi-
dence to demonstrate the efficacy of the ICC, and of its prosecutions. Con-
ceivably, too, it will be the fear of being investigated by prosecutorial teams 
from the ICC that will deter potential abusers of power. In the Kenyan cases, 
for example, the suspicion that powerful politicians brought about ethnic at-
tacks in 2008 may chill other equally mendacious political actors in Kenya 
and in similar African countries in the near future. That Gbagbo was hauled 
away to The Hague may conceivably compel would-be despots (hardly exist-
ing ones) to behave more cautiously and less perniciously. Yet, even if it does, 
only 139 states have signed the Rome Statute. For nonsignatories (like Libya 
and Zimbabwe), the ICC cannot indict individuals until such time as the UN 
Security Council, hoping for Chinese and Russian abstentions rather than 
vetoes, votes to refer a country case to The Hague. The UN Security Council 
did so in the case of Libya, but has not yet been asked to do so in the case of 
Zimbabwe.
This question of sovereignty and the presumed right (according to serial 
abusers) to rule despotically within a country stands squarely in the way of 
justice. Moreover, even if we choose to believe that indictments, prosecutions, 
and judgments curb future war crimes, there will never be sufficient investiga-
tors, courts, and funds to combat atrocities through the legal system, domestic 
and international. Moreover, courts act after the fact. Thus there has long 
been a need to prevent abuses against civilians by their rulers in real time. 
World order should have reacted immediately, for example, when the first 
intimations arrived of a possible genocide in Rwanda.16 When the Mugabe 
regime permitted its people to starve in the millions from 2003 through 2008, 
world order responses should have been triggered.17 When Belarus or Syria 
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shoots protesters in the streets, again and again, or when Bahrain abuses its 
Shia majority, there should be some means of hindering the perpetuation and 
the proliferation of such crimes against humanity.18
In 2001, a Canadian-sponsored international commission proposed that 
the world order and every nation-state had a “responsibility to protect” its 
own citizens from grievous harm.19 The physical and psychological safety of 
inhabitants of a country were more important than sovereignty, and overcame 
claims of sovereignty. Indeed, the commission asserted an overriding right of 
humanitarian intervention. Violence within a state that shocked “the con-
science of mankind” should trigger outside military intervention. Certainly 
large-scale loss of life or large-scale ethnic cleansing provided “just cause” for 
military intervention. (“Large-scale” was not defined.)
In 2005, a UN World Summit accepted the R2P norm. Between 2001 and 
2005 there had been an avalanche of deaths in Congo and the Sudan (Darfur), 
thus concentrating the minds of the delegates. The Outcome Document of 
the Summit obligated world order and individual states to protect groups in 
harm’s way and, if necessary and despite hitherto-sacrosanct borders, to rescue 
them. The R2P norm of 2005 charged each state with the protection of its 
citizens. The member states at the summit further promised to assist popula-
tions under stress even before attacks begin. Thus the intent of the Outcome 
Document could be read as a rejection that sovereignty (as construed since 
the Congress of Westphalia) shielded leaders and regimes from international 
concern.20 But in 2005 the member states did not determine what the UN 
itself should do. 
Nor did they in 2009, when the UN secretary-general and his special pre-
paratory task force attempted to negotiate an operationalization of the R2P 
norm. How should the UN, in all of its component parts, be mobilized to 
protect peoples at risk? That essential question was never answered in pre-
cise or implementable terms, the proponents of extending the reach of R2P 
repeatedly being rebuffed by those defending sovereign immunity. Burma, 
Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, the Sudan, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe led the 
charge against R2P. Russia and China were not anxious to see any change in 
existing modalities. The strongest backers of converting R2P from a concept 
into a norm were a clutch of African nations, including South Africa and 
Nigeria, most South American countries, the nation-states of the developed 
world, Jordan, Morocco, and Qatar.21 But, in 2013, R2P remains an ideal, a 
set of principles, and an unarticulated premise instead of a norm (unlike the 
anti-land-mine norm, converted into a treaty) that mandates the protection 
of civil populations when they are abused by the regimes under which they 
are governed.
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Gareth Evans, one of the principal inventors and articulators of R2P, argues 
that the norm should not be thought of as a remedy for human security issues 
generally. It is not “about solving all the world’s problems.” Rather, it should 
be applied in those special cases where mass-atrocity crimes are “clearly being 
committed,” where such crimes are “about to be committed,” or where there 
is a serious risk that such crimes will be committed in the foreseeable future 
“unless effective preventive action is taken.”22 Evans and other supporters of 
R2P indeed prefer a narrow construction of the norm for fear that any broader 
application would make it incoherent, and its application haphazard.
In fact, R2P provided a justification for outside intervention in Libya; cer-
tainly the US National Security Council persuaded Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton and President Obama that the West and the United States were obliged 
to protect those in Benghazi and eastern Libya who were about to be smashed 
by Gadhafi and his followers in March 2011. Intervention at that moment 
saved the lives of many insurgents and, by engaging NATO fully on the side 
of rebels, turned the tide of the war.
Less dramatically but just as powerfully, former UN secretary-general 
Kofi Annan employed the concept of R2P in Kenya in 2008 to intervene 
morally, first to end postelection tit-for-tat killings of ethnic opponents and 
then to impose a coalition government on those on either side of the ethnic 
and political divide. Annan, by stature and experience representing world 
order, could make R2P work. So could French troops and UN interposition 
in Côte d’Ivoire provide physical and diplomatic cover to Alassane Ouat-
tara, winner of the 2010 presidential election, and ultimately legitimize the 
removal of Laurent Gbagbo after he refused to give up the presidency. In 
2013, France’s forcible intervention against al-Qaeda-linked jihadists who 
had occupied and repressed northern Mali was critical in protecting and 
liberating indigenous Malians from the depredations of Islamists. In all four 
cases, there was no Security Council declaration of an R2P emergency. In-
stead, in keeping with the amorphous and ambiguous normative terrain 
occupied by R2P, the force of R2P was deployed when and how it could be 
most influential.23
Note, however, that R2P was never enunciated or even alluded to when 
protesters took to the Tahrir Squares in Tunis and Cairo, when Yemeni soldiers 
shot protesting students in Sanaa and Taiz, or when Bahrainis shouted against 
Emir Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa in Pearl Square. Nor, as conditions worsened 
by the day, month after month, did world order consciously accept any com-
pelling obligation under R2P to forcibly stop the killings in Homs, Hama, 
Aleppo, and other Syrian cities, or even to impose a no-fly zone as they had in 
Saddam-afflicted Kurdistan.
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Clearly the world order, the UN system, the G7, the G20, and regional and 
subregional organizations know what to do. They all know how to intervene 
to save lives, but not exactly when, or with what rationale. Sarah Sewall argues 
that “the United States and the international community should proactively 
respond to the outbreak of widespread civil massacres with military force as 
well as other tools of national and international power.” She prefers early in-
terference in order to obviate the escalation of state-directed violence against 
disadvantaged citizens. Acting early is always better than acting late, or not at 
all, and the costs are far lower. Lives are saved, too.24 
cuRReNt RemedIes
Given that Sewall’s doctrine is unlikely ever to be embraced by the United 
Nations, and by the EU and the United States only in limited and very spe-
cial circumstances (Libya), populations in failed and collapsed states, in weak 
states, and certainly in the worst of the globe’s polities will remain at risk. 
Mugabe wannabes will continue to kill and maim their opponents and sub-
ject large numbers to the trials of hunger. Women of the eastern Congo will 
continue to be raped, forty a day according to one report.25 Burma’s military 
will bomb Kachin and Shan ethnic strongholds, the Chinese will harass and 
imprison Tibetans and Uighurs, and Uzbekistan will chain its Islamist prison-
ers ever more tightly.
The world order has still not managed to create consistent tools to curb 
dictators, to impose civilized methods on primitive and recalcitrant regimes, 
or to persuade its most odious members to embrace humanity and tread the 
democratic paths of tolerance and civility. Nor has the UN itself, or most of 
its members, ever found a voice with which to condemn and shame those who 
are the worst of the worst. Redress will therefore come episodically and pain-
fully, primarily from within.
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Chapter 7
State Collapse and Local Response in Somalia
Ken Menkhaus
Somalia has been the site of an extraordinary political drama. For more than 
twenty years, the central government there has been in a state of complete 
collapse. An estimated eight million people have been living without a state 
for two decades. For Somalis under the age of thirty, or 73 percent of the total 
population, state collapse is the only political order they have ever known. 
If and when a posttransition government is established, most of the Somali 
population will be learning for the first time what a central government can 
and should do. 
In 2011, a transitional federal government (TFG) existed in Somalia, but 
mainly on paper. Most of the capital of Mogadishu is divided into militia 
fiefdoms, and the countryside is a mosaic of different local authorities, includ-
ing the now-weakened jihadi group al-Shabaab. The TFG oversaw the transi-
tion and selection process of a new federal government that formed in August 
2012. What is important to remember is that a declaration of a posttransition 
government has not changed the fact that most of the country will remain 
beyond the reach of the new government for some time to come. Most of the 
country and parts of the capital itself will remain under the de facto control 
of autonomous strongmen, self-proclaimed regional states, clan militias, and 
al-Shabaab. 
What this means is that most local communities in Somalia will remain on 
their own when it comes to basic services associated with the state, including 
security, law and order, market regulation, and basic common goods. Somalis 
are not alone in this predicament. Many tens of millions of people in fragile 
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or failed states live more or less beyond the meaningful reach of a central 
government. 
Journalists and analysts who cover these “stateless” zones often gravitate 
toward one of two camps. One depicts areas of state collapse as sites of “Mad 
Max anarchy,” where warlords and armed criminals rule and prey on helpless 
citizens. The second school of thought depicts these areas through a libertar-
ian lens, celebrating the unfettered entrepreneurism of local businesses, the 
privatization of everything from seaports to passports, and the freedom from 
government taxes and regulations. 
There is a grain of truth in both of these perspectives on life in a collapsed 
state, but both are also gross distortions of the reality on the ground. Living in 
a collapsed state is neither a nightmare of Mad Max anarchy nor a libertarian 
paradise. It is instead a messy and complex operating environment for families 
and businesses, but one in which they learn to cope and adapt. And it is one 
in which communities quickly construct a variety of systems and informal 
political orders to provide for themselves some degree of law and order—what 
some of us have termed “governance without government.” 
What does this “governance without government” look like in Somalia, 
and what role might it play in the country’s ongoing task of state revival?
goveRNaNce WIthout goveRNmeNt
The sudden collapse of the Somali central government in January 1991 was 
accompanied by uncontrolled predatory militia violence that produced mas-
sive displacement and casualties, and a famine that claimed 240,000 lives. 
Teenage gunmen terrorized communities, and traditional authorities were un-
able to control them. Not surprisingly, most observers concluded that Somalia 
constituted a zone of Mad Max anarchy.
But in a relatively short period of time, local communities began to 
forge informal arrangements to provide some degree of predictability and 
security for themselves. That they were so quick to do so serves as a re-
minder of a powerful observation about zones of state failure: in many 
cases, people and communities are not passive victims in the face of state 
collapse and criminal violence. The result was that by 1995, when the ill-
fated United Nations peace-enforcement mission left Somalia, a patch-
work quilt of local political orders had emerged in neighborhoods, towns, 
and villages across much of the country. This assortment of local arrange-
ments was hardly ideal—it was fluid, patchy, variable in capacity and legiti-
macy, chronically contested, vulnerable to armed spoilers, and illiberal in 
the kind of justice it dispensed. But these local arrangements have endured 
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and evolved over the past fifteen years and in some cases have provided local 
communities with better basic governance than exists in neighboring states. 
It is commonly believed that the capacity of Somali communities to reassert 
some degree of law and order was due to the revival of traditional authority 
and customary law. It is true that clan elders succeeded in regaining some con-
trol over their kinsmen, and that “xeer,” or customary law, remains the prin-
cipal mechanism for resolving disputes, compensating victims of crime, and 
managing interclan relations. But the rise of informal governance in Somalia 
was more complex than just a revival of customary law. Clan elders could not 
have done this on their own. 
The assertion of order involved a hybrid coalition of actors with a shared in-
terest in establishing basic security and rule of law. These other actors included 
professionals, who guided elders through the new and complex problems that 
customary law could not address; Muslim clerics, who set up local, clan-based 
sharia courts as a complement to customary law; women’s market-vendor 
groups and other civic organizations that were able to mobilize populations, 
reach across conflict lines, and shame militiamen; aspiring local politicians, 
who saw opportunities to advance their own ambitions by supporting local 
governance; and an emerging business class, which underwrote local sharia 
courts and police forces in order to provide for themselves a more conducive 
commercial environment. Potential spoilers, including armed gangs and mi-
litias, were sometimes co-opted as deputized local police or protection forces. 
This was not always possible, but in many instances young gunmen were 
happy to take up a more respectable, salaried job in a local security unit rather 
than face the dangers and stigma of operating a militia checkpoint. 
In other cases, law and order was established by militia leaders who, in or-
der to advance their economic or political ambitions, saw benefits in recasting 
themselves as “governors” rather than “colonels.” The crudest of these polities 
were little more than warlord fiefdoms, a reminder that the legitimacy of in-
formal governance systems can range widely from one location to the next. 
The capacity of Somalia’s local polities in the post-1995 period also var-
ied significantly. Some were little more than protection rackets, providing 
basic security for a fee. Others provided more-robust rule of law and dispute 
mediation—typically parties to a dispute were afforded the choice of custom-
ary or sharia law, so the two were not seen as rival systems. Almost everywhere, 
clan elders were relied upon to manage endemic land disputes and provide a 
critical role as witnesses to property sales, acting as guarantors that deeds were 
legitimate. This was a very important role for the emerging private sector. In 
a few places, informal governance systems pushed beyond security and rule 
of law into more advanced governance roles. In several towns, committees of 
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clan elders regulated the allocation of all contracts, employment, and rentals 
that international aid agencies introduced into the area, as a means of ensur-
ing proportional allocation by clan and preventing conflict over resources. 
Many towns organized fund-raising and volunteer labor in order to provide 
a public good that, due to its cost, constituted a “collective action” problem, 
such as a damaged road or bridge. In other locations, committees of clan 
elders served as regulatory bodies to determine, for instance, the fair price of 
electricity sold by a local business group that operated a generator and ran 
lines to customers’ homes. 
This “regulatory commission” role pointed to the fact that the private sec-
tor was stepping in to provide many of the services normally associated with 
the state. In Mogadishu, private entrepreneurs ran electrical grids and under-
ground piped-water systems to paying customers, operated private airports 
and seaports, provided basic and advanced medical services, and established 
private schools. The most advanced and inexpensive cellular telecommunica-
tion system in Africa arose in Somalia in the late 1990s, thanks to competing 
businesses. And Somalia’s numerous remittance companies provided trusted, 
efficient money transfers and other quasi-banking roles. A small group of 
businesspeople also assumed control of core sovereign roles of the state, such 
as control over the exchange rate and circulation of Somali shillings.
Local nonprofit groups, many underwritten by Somalia’s large diaspora, 
also competed to provide schools and health services. This included some of 
the largest universities in Somalia, such as the University of Mogadishu and 
the Somali Institute of Management and Administration Development. Local 
civil groups, including NGOs, self-help groups, women’s market-vendor groups, 
and, above all, mosques, continued to serve as a critical source of basic welfare 
for families in need. This was a role the Somali government had never been 
able to play prior to the 1990s. 
In a number of towns, these governance arrangements were formalized into 
municipalities, some of which constituted the most effective and impressive 
form of administration in the country. Mayors had the advantage of presid-
ing over a political unit that, unlike informal governance, was recognizable to 
international donors and so could tap modest amounts of foreign assistance to 
help underwrite delivery of services including road repair, water systems, and 
urban planning. Towns also tended to be sites of residence and business for 
multiple clans, offering greater opportunities for functional collaboration on 
matters of shared interest. 
In a few cases, local governance in the 1995–2006 period grew to an even 
larger scale in the form of regional state administrations. The biggest and most 
successful of these, Somaliland, is a secessionist state with a fully developed 
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government, parliament, court system, and security sector operating on a 
modest annual budget of about $35 million. In the northeast of the country, 
the nonsecessionist state of Puntland emerged in the late 1990s. Like Somalil-
and, it benefits from customs revenues on an active seaport and has estab-
lished a modestly effective formal administration and police force. 
These local governance arrangements are quite complex, in a constant state 
of flux, and hence very challenging for Somalis to navigate. Working effec-
tively in this environment, whether as a businessperson, elder, politician, or 
civil leader, requires a level of political acumen that outsiders often fail to 
appreciate. 
Recent challenges 
Since 2006, armed hostilities, foreign military occupation, jihadism, internal 
displacement, and humanitarian crises have taken a toll on local governance 
systems. Civil society leaders across the board, from prominent elders to edu-
cators to human rights advocates, have been hammered by political violence. 
Political threats and assassinations have become epidemic in scale, leading 
to the death or exodus of many of the most powerful social voices in local 
governance. In the past year, growing numbers of civil society leaders began 
returning to Somalia after seeking refuge abroad, but the once powerful civic 
networks that constituted such an important part of local political orders have 
been weakened. Clan elders have also been subjected to new levels of political 
manipulation in national consultations and nomination processes, eroding 
their credibility among the public. Some business leaders divested from war-
torn Mogadishu and invested instead in neighboring Kenya, while those who 
remained in Somalia have had to pay taxes to either al-Shabaab, the transi-
tional federal government, or both, leaving them less willing and less able to 
underwrite informal authorities as well. 
InfoRmal goveRnance undeR al-shabaab
By 2008, most of southern Somalia had fallen under the control of the radical 
Islamist group al-Shabaab. The group imposed direct administrative oversight 
in the largest urban areas under its control, such as Kismaayo and portions of 
Mogadishu, but lacked the means to create a “state within a state” across all 
of southern Somalia. Instead, it outsourced day-to-day governance to existing 
authorities, replaced elders and other local authorities deemed untrustworthy, 
and posted young al-Shabaab militia in villages to monitor local authorities. 
One area of governance al-Shabaab did retain for itself was the imposition of 
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law and order. Criminals, as well as individuals accused of moral wrongdoing 
such as adultery, faced severe punishment under al-Shabaab, including ampu-
tations and stonings. 
Clan elders and other local authorities living under al-Shabaab’s rule were 
and remain marginalized and constrained, but by many accounts they have 
still been able to articulate community grievances to al-Shabaab commanders 
and exercise some influence over militia leaders. This was most in evidence 
during the worsening humanitarian crisis that culminated in the 2011 fam-
ine. Al-Shabaab leaders with clan constituencies in their areas of control came 
under sustained pressure to allow international food-aid deliveries, producing 
serious tensions within al-Shabaab. 
In “liberated areas”—zones where African Union peacekeepers, Kenyan 
and Ethiopian forces, and their local proxies have pushed out al-Shabaab—
systems of informal governance have been slow to bounce back, in part be-
cause the armed militias that have replaced al-Shabaab often come from other 
clans and regions, and are therefore beyond local control. But local authorities 
in liberated areas have found ways to reassert themselves, most notably by 
insisting on the right of the local community to appoint its own government. 
This has pitted local authorities against the TFG, which has insisted on the 
right to name its own governors across the country. For leaders of local politi-
cal orders, both al-Shabaab and the TFG are viewed as outside threats
hybRId goveRnance and foRmal state stRuctuRes 
In both of the most successful regional states, secessionist Somaliland and au-
tonomous Puntland, traditional authorities—that is, clan elders—have been 
formally incorporated into government deliberations. The TFG has done the 
same, employing clan elders as representatives in a national constituent as-
sembly that was tasked with selecting a new parliament and approving a pro-
visional constitution. The most interesting example of “hybrid governance” 
—incorporating traditional authorities into formal government—has oc-
curred in Somaliland, where elders’ roles are enshrined in an upper house, or 
“guurti,” of a bicameral parliament. This was done in part to build popular 
trust and confidence in the nascent government and in part to influence and 
co-opt the clan elders. It is this latter dynamic that worries some critics of 
hybrid governance, who see in it a real danger of manipulation of traditional 
authorities, leading to a decline in their legitimacy.
A somewhat less controversial form of hybrid governance involving part-
nership between emerging state authorities and informal authorities can be 
seen in judicial functions. Throughout the Somali-inhabited East Horn, in-
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cluding eastern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, the vast majority of criminal 
cases and disputes are handled through either customary or sharia law, not 
the formal court system. Somalis have a strong preference for compensational 
rather than punitive justice and have greater confidence in clan elders than in 
judges and the court system. In Somaliland, Puntland, Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
and Kenya, this has led to an awkward situation in which whole communities 
rely on an extralegal, unconstitutional process to handle serious criminal of-
fenses. In a growing number of cases, formal governments are exploring ways 
to harmonize customary, sharia, and civil legal systems, pointing toward the 
creation of a hybrid judicial system. In practice, this is already commonplace 
in Somalia, where clan elders frequently work with local police to arrest and 
detain criminal suspects. 
local oRdeRs and the state
The protracted weakness of formal state structures in Somalia, contrasted with 
the ubiquitous presence of more-effective informal governance systems, raises 
an unavoidable question: Is there a role these local political orders can play in 
state-building in Somalia?
There are four different schools of thought on the relationship between 
informal governance systems and the state. 
The first holds that informal governance has no significance to state-building. 
This has been a dominant view among state-building programs that focus ex-
clusively on formal state institutions and processes in Somalia. For many of 
these actors, informal political orders are invisible and inconsequential.
The second considers informal governance significant but negative—that 
is, it poses a threat to state-building. From this perspective, subnational poli-
ties and informal political orders are rivals to the state and serve as active im-
pediments to the expansion of state authority. Leaders of local political orders 
have a vested interest in perpetuating their autonomy and are spoilers that 
states must overcome. In Somalia, nationalists fear that substate polities are 
enshrining clan enclaves. Many others object to legitimation of any informal 
political order that enforces unconstitutional and illiberal laws, noting that 
both sharia and customary law do not afford equal rights to women and fall 
well short of due process and other minimal legal benchmarks. This school 
of thought opposes any proposal to create hybrid political arrangements that 
include informal authorities.
The third sees informal governance as significant and positive, but tem-
porary. Many observers recognize that in a weak or failed state, informal gov-
ernance systems are the only source of security and rule of law that millions 
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of citizens can count on. This is a view of informal governance as a form of a 
coping mechanism. Embracing a “Do no harm” ethos, this school of thought 
argues for policies that recognize and respect informal governance systems 
during the long interim period required before state-building efforts yield a 
police force, judiciary, and public administration that the public can trust. At 
that point, the argument goes, clan elders, customary law, and other features 
of informal governance will gradually fade in importance.
The fourth school of thought argues that informal governance plays a sig-
nificant role in the construction of a new, more indigenous “mediated” state 
in Somalia. Such a role for informal governance systems in state-building is 
possible only if one conceives of a different kind of central government, one 
that may not conform to the template derived from Western political institu-
tions. Some argue that Somalia is already embarking down a road toward a 
new, more indigenous state that involves hybrid governance arrangements not 
so much out of choice as out of necessity. 
Somalia’s posttransition government is likely to be very weak for some time 
to come, and its only means of extending its authority will be to do what it has 
already done: negotiate relations with nonstate and substate entities in areas be-
yond its control. This is the so-called mediated-state model, in which a central 
government that “has the competence to know the limits of its competence” al-
lows local authorities to mediate relations between the state and its citizens, and 
outsources to the private sector, nonprofits, and local polities many functions 
normally associated with a central government. The TFG’s reluctant relations 
with subnational polities Puntland and Galmadug, for instance, are vintage 
examples of a mediated state, as are its tense relations with powerful local poli-
ticians in Mogadishu, who are at once members of parliament and warlords 
preventing the TFG police from entering their neighborhoods. Such a path 
toward state-building is messy, fluid, conflictual, and not at all amenable to 
most state-building aid programs. But it is a much more realistic model of how 





Some three years after the conference that brought these scholars together 
and generated the chapters you have just read, their arguments appear equally 
timely and pressing. We decided not to update the chapters to reflect events of 
the past three years in detail; sadly, the general themes and issues remain per-
tinent and the conclusions remain largely pessimistic. Since the 2011 Baker 
Peace Conference, the civil war in Syria has widened and taken on horrific 
dimensions, the revolution in Egypt has turned sour and the political crisis 
remains to be resolved, the Middle East in general appears no more stable now 
than it did then, and the same could be said for other regions of the world. As 
I am writing, South Sudan is in the news. Newsmakers tend to pay attention 
to poor countries mainly in times of crisis, and they have a hard time keeping 
up. There are success stories, notably Colombia’s war on drugs and insurgents, 
but crisis seems to be the mode of our time; and failed states and fragile socie-
ties remain at the center of crises, either as cause or as effect.
The most pressing question of this moment, in the winter of 2013–2014, 
is whether the West should intervene forcefully in Syria, even though the re-
cent notion of an American- or United Nations–led military intervention has 
been set aside in favor of diplomatic efforts. However, it is not at all clear what 
either diplomatic or military efforts could accomplish in the medium term. In 
the short term, hardly anyone in the West would object to the ouster of Bashar 
al-Assad. But then what? The opposition is deeply divided, fragmented even; 
and regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Iran, as well as global ac-
tors such as the United States and Russia, would not find common ground. 
Moreover, Islamist fundamentalist groups, perhaps only loosely combined un-
der the roof of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,” offer a challenge that 
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none of these external powers could find tolerable unless they were invested in 
an instable Syria that poses a threat to the West and to the global order of the 
past centuries that the West has underwritten. Surely military intervention, 
though it may stop the slaughter in the short term, has little to offer by way of 
hope for a stable Syria. On the other hand, as Robert Rotberg argues, the West 
has a responsibility to protect the people who are innocent victims. Humani-
tarian ideals and political and strategic circumstances do not come into ready 
alignment. Those who favor military intervention on humanitarian grounds 
need to consider the long-term commitment and ramifications, while those 
who oppose it have to address whether it is ethical to stand by and watch the 
deaths of civilians on the evening news.
Similarly, the future of Afghanistan remains in doubt, with the withdrawal 
of American and NATO forces looming in the near future. Here, too, civil 
society appears too fragmented to uphold a state in the modern sense of the 
term. It is very difficult to imagine an Afghan government in Kabul that could 
hold and maintain a monopoly of violence and enforce law and order in all 
corners of the country. That could have been said about Somalia, too; yet, as 
Ken Menkhaus suggests, local structures can fill functions we usually associate 
with the state, and society can serve as the host of popular sovereignty. What 
may complicate matters in Afghanistan is that it remains of great concern to 
its neighbors and thus will be watched closely not only by the United States—
indeed, perhaps least closely by the United States if we took the history of 
the 1990s for a guide—but also by Pakistan, which has little to gain from a 
stable Afghan government that may lean toward India and Iran rather than 
Pakistan and China. Perhaps the Afghan crisis, in one way or another running 
since the 1970s, has been equally homemade and propelled by external forces. 
Yet it is safe to say that very little has changed in the long-term outlook on 
Afghanistan’s future since the attempts of the Obama administration to repeat 
the relative success of the surge of armed forces in Iraq. In Afghanistan that 
did not work, but even if it had, long-term stability cannot result from mili-
tary means or even from a more broadly conceived counterinsurgency and 
nation-building effort, which requires a legitimate national government. In 
that regard, Afghanistan today bears resemblance to the South Vietnam of the 
early 1970s. 
What these examples show, and what other case studies in this volume 
underscore, is a crisis in sovereignty and, therefore, a crisis of the modern state 
itself. As noted earlier, Max Weber’s definition of the state no longer applies 
readily in large parts of the world. Perhaps it never did, since the chronologies 
of decolonization and failing states appear to overlap in the Cold War era. 
Western observers were then heavily conditioned to view the world in terms 
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of great power confrontation, dating back to a mind-set that took shape not 
in 1945 but had evolved since the mid-seventeenth century. Western observ-
ers today may still be too heavily wedded to the notion that the state makes 
war and that nonstate actors can be contained by military and political means 
that seemed to work throughout modern history. What if we are experiencing 
a transitional age between modernity and whatever may follow? History of-
fers some hope, for after the upheaval of the seventeenth century—global in 
scale, as Geoffrey Parker points out in a magisterial new study—came relative 
stability, albeit at great cost as the West amassed wealth and other parts of the 
world either fell behind or remained underdeveloped.1 But no matter one’s 
sense of history, these basic questions remain for present and future: Are failed 
or failing states and fragmented societies an indicator of flaws in the modern 
international order that can be fixed? Or are they a sign of things to come? 
And what past do we turn to for guidance or what other prognosticators do 
we apply? 
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